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ENGLAND AND THE WORLD

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THE UNITY SERIES VII

ENGLAND AND THE WORLD

ESSAYS ARRANGED AND EDITED

BY

F. S. MARVIN

'Let us hope that England, having saved herself
by her energy, may save Europe by her example'
WILLIAM PITT

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PREFACE

THIS seventh volume of the 'Unity' Series follows a School held at Bournemouth during the Easter week of 1925. It was suggested by a desire expressed at the International Moral Education Conference of 1922 at Geneva that the history taught to all the nations of the world should have an international as well as a national bearing. It should have regard to the position of each nation in the international order, what each people has gained from, and given to, the others in the course of its evolution. This has been the inspiration of all the writers contributing to this book, and it is obviously an application of the ideas at the root of all the volumes in this series from the *Unity of Western Civilization* onwards.

It is also an aspect of history teaching which the editor, in the course of his experience as an inspector of schools, has found much needed by teachers in all classes of schools from the elementary upwards. If this book is found to meet the demand of teachers at all adequately, it is hoped later on to produce a shorter and simpler work more suitable for beginners. The plan followed is similar to that in the previous volumes of the series. The first seven chapters give a brief

historical survey of the subject; the last five discuss some of the leading practical problems which arise from it.

As to the desirability, even the necessity, of the main object there can be no two opinions: we must learn to appreciate our mutual debts and our mutual need of service, if mankind is to face the future with any greater hopes of united action or peaceful progress.

F. S. MARVIN.

WELWYN GARDEN CITY.
August 1925.

N.B.—The book, already announced, on 'Art and Social Progress', will, it is hoped, appear as the eighth volume of the series.

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
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Stone circle
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Ancient trackways
Area of intensive settlement
LEAD
COPPER
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JET
FLINT
AMBER
GOLD
TIN
CHALK
The first
Civilised Occupation
of
ENGLAND & WALES

I

THE FIRST CIVILIZATION OF ENGLAND

W. J. PERRY

THE first civilization known in Britain is that of the builders of stone monuments, usually termed 'megalithic', of dolmens, stone circles, and similar works.[1] The men responsible for it suddenly appeared in the country. We know that they came from the direction of the Mediterranean, for they were of the Mediterranean race; they were those small, slim, small-boned, dark-haired, dark-eyed folk among whom the earliest known civilizations of the world originated. These people came to England a good many centuries ago, and settled in different parts of the country, as well as in Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. In England and Wales they confined themselves principally to certain areas, as may be seen from the accompanying sketch-map. Their colonization of England was, for instance, of a very different order from that of the Anglo-Saxons, who came much later. For, while the

[1] See T. E. Peet, *Rough Stone Monuments*. London, 1912, for a description of these monuments. When I speak of 'civilization' in this connexion, I refer to the 'food-producing' stage of culture, as distinct from the 'food-gathering' stage.

For some time past my friend, Mr. H. J. Massingham, has been engaged in the task of writing a book on the subject of this chapter. It constitutes the first attempt, in my knowledge, at a systematic treatment of the earliest civilization of England. The reader is referred to this book, *The Birth of England*, for a fuller exposition of the fascinating theme of the story of this country's early civilization.

Anglo-Saxons settled near the banks of the rivers of the eastern counties, the earlier folk were located chiefly on the uplands of the South and West.

Their civilization was, in general, continuous with that of Iberia, France, and Scandinavia; and there are, certainly in the later stages of this civilization, many traces of intercourse with these countries. The similarity in culture is so great that few venture to maintain that the communities of England, France, and Iberia, for example, independently invented the practice of building monuments of large stones. This similarity raises important questions of origin, about which something will be said later in this chapter. But for the present it will be well to concentrate on England, so as to try to understand, so far as is possible, the nature of the early occupation of this country.

In dealing with the early civilization of England it is customary to define the phases of prehistoric civilization in England as 'Neolithic', 'Bronze', and 'Iron' Ages. For the present purpose the Iron Age may be left on one side, for it avowedly belongs to a later and an entirely new civilization, which came into England from the direction of Central Europe.[1] We need only deal with the distinction between the so-called Neolithic and Bronze Ages.

It must not be thought that this is a matter of interest solely to archaeologists. On the contrary, it is essential, for the proper understanding of the problem of Western European civilization, that the reader should be aware of the real position of affairs. In this country the 'Neolithic' period is characterized by the building of what are termed 'long barrows'. A long barrow consists of an elongated mound of earth, running usually from west to east, with the east end higher than the west end. It sometimes contains a

[1] The reader is referred to the British Museum Guide for details on this phase of early civilization in England.

stone burial chamber approached by a passage of stone. Sometimes the chamber is megalithic, and sometimes it is made of stone-walling; and similarly with the passage leading to it. Some long barrows, on the other hand, have no chamber. The so-called 'Bronze Age' is characterized in England by the building of round barrows, usually without a stone chamber. In the long barrows, and in the early round barrows, the dead were not cremated, for this practice came in at a later stage of the Bronze Age. What is more, people with long heads are usually found in long barrows, while round barrows were the burial places of some people with round heads, in addition to others with long heads. There is a contrast, that is to say, between the burial mounds of the two ages in this country. There was, in the round-barrow period, an intrusion of a new race among the old Mediterranean long-headed population.[1] But, in spite of this, it is not possible wholly to separate the two phases. For in both phases stone circles were made.

The stone circle serves to link together the 'Neolithic' and 'Bronze' Ages of England into a whole, as contrasted with the Iron Age that followed. That being so, the Neolithic and Bronze Ages simply appear as two phases of one and the same civilization, phases that can be distinguished for some purpose, but which must be taken together for others.

It is possible to distinguish these two phases, while at the same time realizing their continuity, by remembering that the two greatest stone circles of this country were in all probability made, one in the earlier phase, and the other in the later phase. I refer to Avebury and Stonehenge. Avebury is generally admitted to be the work

[1] I make no assumption concerning the relationship between long and round barrows. Mr. Massingham discusses the question in his book on *The Birth of England*.

of the earlier folk, the builders of the long barrows; while Stonehenge just as certainly was made by the men who buried their dead in round barrows. I shall therefore speak of the Avebury and Stonehenge stages of the early civilization of England. In this way I am adopting a definition that, while it shows that the civilization had two phases, emphasizes its essential unity as compared, say, with the Iron Age that followed.

This leads to the consideration of the distinction made between the Neolithic and Bronze Ages on the supposed basis of the use of metals only in the latter. This classification was first made in Scandinavia. Thomsen, the curator of the Copenhagen Museum, noticed that the earliest tombs in that region contained no copper. Then came a phase in which there was bronze, and finally a phase with iron. He therefore termed these phases the 'Neolithic', 'Bronze', and 'Iron' Ages. This form of nomenclature harmonized with the current doctrines of evolution, as applied to human society, and was adopted for European archaeology as a whole. Down to this day it has been predominant; so that it is an act of temerity to challenge it. It must be agreed that it has worked well up to a point, but, nevertheless, it is at this point that its further use becomes disastrous.

It is extremely dangerous to found a classification solely on the absence or presence of a metallic alloy. For instance, while in Scandinavia it is true that no metals have been found in the early graves, yet the shapes of some of the flint implements and weapons show unmistakable evidence of having been modelled on metal prototypes. That is to say, the people who first determined the shapes of these implements and weapons knew of metal.

When we turn to England we find it stated that the people of the Avebury period, who buried their dead in long barrows, knew of no metals except gold, because

copper, bronze, and iron have not been found in these tombs. That sounds convincing. But I should like to quote from the late Canon Greenwell's *British Barrows* on this topic, for his remarks are of great importance. After stating that the long barrows constitute the earliest English sepulchral mounds he goes on as follows: 'All the evidence we possess, which amounts to a large aggregate of facts derived from an examination of these mounds, shows very conclusively that they are the burial-places of people unacquainted with metal; for though abundance of stone implements have been found in some of the chambers no article of bronze, much less of iron, has been discovered' (p. 483). That again sounds very convincing. But, he says on a later page, 'At the same time I fully admit that the absence of metal in any given set of barrows is not in itself proof that the persons who erected them were ignorant of its use; for it is not an infrequent occurrence to find a number of round barrows containing nothing of metal, when from many other circumstances connected with them we can have no doubt that it was known when they were made. The case of the long barrows, however, is quite a different one, since the absence of metal in them is an universal, not an exceptional, feature; and so many of them have been examined as to make the fact one of very great value. Indeed, it seems scarcely possible to believe that, had metal been known, it should never have occurred in any of the numerous long barrows which have been explored with great care in different parts of England' (p. 548).

The reader would perhaps conclude from this that the long barrows had a tomb furniture from which metals were lacking. But this is not the real case. For we find that the long barrows contained little that would serve to indicate the cultural stage of their builders. 'Pottery again seems to have been but little in use, at all events

for burial purposes; for it is but of the rarest occurrence in the long barrows, and when it is present, it is not, except very occasionally, in the shape of whole vessels but of mere fragments. In the round barrows, on the contrary, it is extremely common, not only as sherds of pottery, but as complete vases' (p. 549).

This statement puts an entirely different complexion on the matter. In long barrows no copper is found, but usually only a few flints. Therefore, for some reason or other, the tomb furniture of the long barrows was very sparse compared with that of the round barrows, so that it is impossible to base any stable conclusion whatever on it.

When inquiry is made in other countries where similar tombs exist it is found that the people who inhabited Iberia and made tombs corresponding to the long barrows of England, people who were likewise of the same race, had a knowledge of copper, for finds of that metal have been made in their tombs.[1] Therefore, when men of this Mediterranean race came from Iberia or France, more probably the former, to England, they, for some reason or other, did not put copper articles in their tombs; in fact, as we have seen, they put practically nothing: or else, it may be, tomb-robbing has deprived these tombs of their furniture in the past. The important point to remember is that the same civilization as that of the people of the Avebury period possessed, in Iberia, a knowledge of copper at least; so that to term the Avebury period 'neolithic' is dangerous, unless it clearly be understood in what sense that term is used.

I have spent some time over this matter because it is of crucial importance in the study of the civilization of Western Europe. It is well known that copper was used in Egypt long before 3300 B. C., a date far earlier than

[1] E. T. Leeds, *Archaeologia*, lxx. 201 seq., 214–15, 222.

that which any serious writer would be inclined to assign to the long barrows of England. What is more, the building of stone monuments began considerably later in Egypt and Crete than the working of copper in Egypt. The evidence gathered from the long barrows of England suggests, on the other hand, that they were made before the knowledge of copper had been acquired, so that, in England, the use of stone for construction antedated the use of copper. But when the Iberian affinities are borne in mind, when it is remembered that the builders of long barrows came from the direction of the Mediterranean, then we see that somehow or other the use of copper, which was characteristic of the early Iberian tombs, has disappeared in the course of the transference into England. This disappearance needs explanation, but that it took place cannot be doubted. I shall therefore take it that the question of the use of copper among the people of the Avebury period must be left entirely open.

Mr. Massingham, in his future book *The Birth of England*, has put forward much evidence to show that England in the Avebury period was occupied by a uniform civilization with a centralized authority. The idea of independent tribes inhabiting the different parts of the country, but maintaining some intercourse between themselves, fails to explain the facts. Everything goes to suggest unity of occupation.

To begin with Avebury itself and its neighbourhood, the centre of life in England in those early days.[1] The realization of the existence and of the significance of this mighty monument must serve to impress on the mind the nature of the early occupation of this country. Think of a great wall of earth, circular in shape, and enclosing a village, an area about a quarter of a mile across and

[1] See Hippisley Cox's *Guide to Avebury*. London, 1909.

twenty-nine acres in extent. Inside the rampart is a ditch, and, as I measure it at one place, from the bottom of the ditch to the top of the rampart is a height of eighty feet. The rampart and ditch enclosed what formerly was the greatest stone circle in the world, of which but a few stones yet remain, but these are ample to reveal the original size of the monument.

I might spend many pages in enthusiastic description of this great monument, but must content myself with urging any one who has not seen it to make the pilgrimage to this, England's earliest and most beautiful and dignified capital. He will be well rewarded. In the neighbourhood of this the greatest stone circle of Europe is the greatest tumulus, Silbury Hill, undoubtedly made by the same people. This great mound covers five and a half acres of ground, and is one hundred and thirty feet high. Within this small district, therefore, are the two most impressive ancient monuments of Europe, surely a thing for us to be proud of, and something to make us realize what England must have been in those far-off days.

This is not all. Within sight of Silbury is the West Kennet long barrow, over one hundred yards long, with what formerly must have been an impressive stone burial-chamber, approached by a gallery, and built in accordance with the megalithic tradition.

A trip to Avebury shows that this part of the country must have been thickly populated in those early days, for the surrounding district is full of remains, both of the times of the long barrows and of those of the round barrows. The work of Mr. Hippisley Cox on *The Green Roads of England* as well as his *Guide to Avebury* make this quite clear. His maps show, for instance, a vast network of trackways linking together a series of earthworks, often of immense size, and beyond any reasonable doubt the work of the people of one or other of the periods in

question.[1] These trackways not only link up the region round Avebury, but they run in all directions to all parts of the country.

Avebury is in that part of England which certainly was most thickly populated in those early times. The counties of Wilts and Dorset are full of remains of the builders of barrows, both long and round; and there are many earthworks on the summits of the hills, all linked up in one vast network. Thence roads run across the Mendips to the Somersetshire coast, the route along which men must have travelled to and from Wales. An old road, the Ridgeway, runs from the Devonshire Axe through Dorset, Wilts, and Berkshire right up to the Wash in Norfolk. Another road runs along the South Downs through Sussex. There are also numerous roads leading down to the Dorset coast. A road runs northwards through the Cotswolds into Oxfordshire, and thence, doubtless, into the North of England. In all directions do these roads run, converging on the downland of Wilts and Dorset, and they stand, with their beautiful turf, as an eternal witness to the extent of the intercourse that must have taken place along them from one end of the country to the other. Life in those days of old was lived mainly, if not wholly, on the tops of the hills, and especially on the Downs of Wiltshire and Dorset. Not till later times, till the days of the Saxons, did men begin to live in the valleys, to hug the water-courses along which they had penetrated the country, and to set the fashion that is only now beginning to be changed. For centuries we have lived in the low country: now villas are beginning to dot the hill-tops, and to spoil our scenery. But the desire for the uplands is returning, and we are harking back to the habits of our remotest forebears, the small, dark men of the Mediterranean, who so

[1] See also C. A. Smith, *Guide to the British and Roman Antiquities of the North Wiltshire Downs*. Marlborough, 1884.

loved the heights that they never left them, except when needs must.

What was the real function of these roads? A glance at the map shows that these men of old were living in scattered communities, in Cornwall, Devon, Dorset and Wilts, Derbyshire, Yorkshire, and elsewhere. They had need, it will at once be said, to communicate with each other, and that accounts readily enough for the net-work of roads. But a close study of the map, together with the remembrance of the magnitude of Avebury and Silbury, forces the impression on the mind that this was one whole, that the parts were all connected, and that the central focus was in the downland of the south-west. The roads are extremely plentiful in the south-west; in other parts not nearly so. They run in all directions through the counties of Dorset and Wilts, but tail off in the remoter areas. Likewise do the remains. We do not find in the outlying parts of the country, speaking generally, the larger, more impressive remains. There are long barrows, for instance, in Sussex; but they are not so large as those of the south-west, nor are they chambered. Everything in the outlying parts is on a lower scale. The greatest stone circle of Derbyshire, Arbor Low, cannot compare with Avebury in size and grandeur. There is a uniformity throughout the country, but the centre of gravity of the mass appears to be in the counties of the south-west, with Avebury as the ceremonial centre. Indeed, what other interpretation can be given of this mighty monument, and its attendant Silbury? To that spot must have come the important people from all quarters to take part in ceremonial and other gatherings. Otherwise its immense size cannot be explained. In later times, when Avebury was a thing of the past, Stonehenge was built to serve, in like manner, as the ceremonial centre, perhaps of the country as a whole.

In the neighbourhood of Stonehenge, as in that of Avebury, there was a great concentration of population, thus showing once again its great importance to the men of those days.

What was the reason for this long occupation of England with its two phases, those of Avebury and of Stonehenge? In the nature of the case it is not possible to say much with regard to the earlier stage, because of the lack of tomb furniture in the long barrows. When these people neglected to leave an adequate amount of material in their tombs, or, possibly, when other people robbed these tombs, they did not remember what heated discussions would take place in later years because of their omission. It really was tiresome of those folk. We have, therefore, to do the best we can with what was left behind. It is possible, however, to show that there was intercourse between all parts of England even in those times.

The evidence for this intercourse is derived from the consideration of the raw materials used by these people for their domestic industries. Avebury and the other remains of Wilts and Dorset are situated in a part of the country where there is chalk, which contains flint. In those days great use was made of flint for implements. These people had immense flint mines at Cissbury in Sussex, and at Grime's Graves in Norfolk, as well as numerous workshops up and down the chalk country, and sometimes in other places where there was flint in glacial drift and other formations. The presence of mines at Cissbury shows that they had a knowledge of mining, which is a fact of great importance. The interesting point about the flint of this time is that it was taken by these people to other parts of the country to be used. Flint implements are found in all parts of England, even in places many miles away from the source of the material, thus witnessing to intercourse of a definite kind,

This early civilization was characterized, from one end of the world to the other, by the possession of two distinct techniques of working stone. The folk not only chipped flint and chert, but they rubbed down hard rocks such as granite, basalt, diorite, and so forth, and made of them implements of a distinctive type. This duality in industry is a fact of the utmost importance, for it tells of some important historical experience whereby early man became possessed of a new technique which he added to his equipment and carried to all parts of the world.[1] It would seem that palaeolithic man in Europe and Asia was decided in his choice of residence, partly by the presence of flint and chert, or, in the case of India, quartzite, and partly by the presence of caverns. The civilization in question has gone a step farther and has added a new technique, that of rubbing down hard rocks.

This new technique has served to produce complications in human distribution. For it is found that these new polished stone implements were, like the flints, carried to all parts of the country in those days, thus again bearing witness to intercourse. The flint country had implements made from hard-grained rocks, while the areas with hard-grained rocks had flint implements.

It is easy to rush in with some facile explanation such as ' barter ' to account for these facts. But this is dangerous reasoning, especially when we are dealing with a uniform civilization spread throughout a country. It is just as easy to claim that the people of the country in those days were engaged in exploiting its natural resources, and that, practising both techniques of implement-making, they sought far and wide for what they needed.

But I have only spoken of the domestic industries,

[1] See Perry, *The Children of the Sun*, p. 457, for a discussion of this point.

and have not touched the central problem of what the people were doing in England in those days. More light can be shed on this problem by remembering that the builders of the long barrows left behind them evidence of their activities. Gold has been found in long barrows, as well as Kimmeridge shale. The Kimmeridge shale came from South Dorset, from a densely populated area, and therefore tells us little about the relationship between this and the surrounding districts. But the gold, like the polished stone implements, tells of intercourse between the downland and other regions. This gold might have come from Dartmoor, from Cornwall, Wales, Cumberland, or elsewhere.[1] It certainly affords evidence of intercourse. But what was the nature of this intercourse? Unfortunately, the evidence from the long barrows tells us no more, and we have to turn to the later stages of this phase of civilization for information. The round barrows have revealed objects of gold, amber, tin, copper, bronze, jet, and shale, as well as segmented and star-shaped beads of blue paste, and chalk drums from the Wolds decorated with designs similar to those regarded as characteristic of the Aegean.

The distribution of these finds is suggestive. For the articles of gold and amber were mainly confined to the area south of the Thames. That is to say, the area of greatest occupation was the richest. It therefore would accord best with the facts to assume that the people of the south were exploiting the resources of the neighbourhood, than to believe that they were bartering their goods for those produced in more distant places.

Judging from the distribution of stone circles and other megalithic monuments, it seems that the people of the

[1] It is curious to note that practically every archaeologist assumes that the gold of those days came from Ireland. There were other El Dorados in the West, even in England.

south-west were directing a widespread exploitation of the natural resources of the country, and that the areas of exploitation consequently reveal little or nothing of their real wealth, since these areas were being robbed of their wealth. The presence of stone circles, for instance, in the neighbourhood of Minsterley in Shropshire can only, to my mind, be explained as the outcome of lead-mining activities on the part of their builders. The same is true of the stone circles of Derbyshire. They are so closely correlated with the lead-mining area that the intentions of their builders can hardly be doubted. We know, too, that lead was used in the Bronze Age in this country, in the latter part of the period when stone circles were erected; but there is not enough lead in the barrows to indicate the probable extent of the industry. Evidently there was overseas intercourse in those days.

The presence of amber in the south-west has a bearing on this question of overseas connexions. For this substance must have come either from the east coast of England, or, as is more likely, from Scandinavia, where a similar civilization existed, actively associated with the exploitation of amber. Amber, like jet, was certainly prized in antiquity on account of its supposed life-giving properties.[1] It is significant to note that both these substances found their way into Spain at the time under consideration, thus again pointing to widespread connexions by sea between the different countries.

I have argued, more than once,[2] that the distribution of megalithic monuments in England suggests the exploitation of the natural resources of the country, of gold, tin, copper, jet, and lead. In accordance with this theory, these substances would have been mainly sent abroad. In the case of jet there is no doubt in the matter, for it is

[1] *Archaeologia*, xliii, p. 517, for jet.

[2] See *The Growth of Civilization*. Chapter IX.

found in Iberian tombs of the period. So why should there be any reason to doubt that gold, copper, tin, lead, and other substances were being sent out of the country; that, in fact, a vast exploitation was in progress? Such traffic is common knowledge in the history of the opening-up of new countries.

While it is certain that the people of the Bronze Age in England knew of the tin, copper, gold, &c., of the country, and were undoubtedly engaged in searching for them, doubt may be cast on the theory that the people of the long-barrow period were similarly engaged. But in favour of that view it must further be urged that the great size of Avebury, Silbury, and the various earthworks that these men of old made, argues strongly in favour of a high degree of culture. These men were not mere pastoral nomads, but highly civilized people. Moreover, the presence of people of Mediterranean stock in England shows that they had boats large enough to enable them to cross the Channel.

The case of the long-barrow people, the folk of the Avebury period, can more readily be understood when reference is made to the countries Spain and Portugal, whence they probably came. There we find that the builders of the megalithic passage dolmens, which correspond to the long barrows of our country, were actively engaged in the exploitation of the resources of the Peninsula, namely, copper, a kind of turquoise, amethyst, gold, and other materials, a list that shows them to have been engaged in the same kinds of activities as the builders of the round barrows in England. What is more, the geographical distribution of megalithic monuments in Iberia, as well as France, bears out the contention. On the whole, the civilization of the builders of passage dolmens in Iberia and France and of long barrows in England must have been elaborate from the beginning,

and one, moreover, in which there was active intercourse between England, Scandinavia, France, and Iberia. Not only were the various countries being exploited, but free communication was established between all parts of Western Europe.

It may be argued that every people naturally exploits the resources of the country it inhabits, and need not learn to do so from without. It may be argued, further, that in course of time any given people will come to exchange its natural products with those of other countries, and in this way the presence of Whitby jet and Baltic amber in Iberia will be accounted for. While this certainly happened in later stages of civilization in all parts of the world, it was certainly not so in earlier times, when a complete culture, including the practice of making elaborate stone tombs, suddenly appeared. While it may be contended that the people of Spain traded their products for the Whitby jet, and that this was the way in which the early civilizations were built up, the correspondences in the types of tombs in the different countries forbid any such explanation. They irresistibly suggest an actual transference of people. The builders of the long barrows came to England, and they were Mediterraneans. They must presumably have come from a place where similar tombs were made, and we find such tombs in France and Iberia. Therefore the presumption implies immigration, and not trade and barter. The immigrants, moreover, were intent on exploitation, and were not being driven by scarcity of food (or any such cause) to seek new sources of supply.

Realizing that there was intercourse between the different countries of Western Europe during the days of the stone circles, what interpretation is to be made of the facts? Are we to believe that this activity was part of some wider process, of the development of civilization as

a whole, or are we to believe that it sprang up spontaneously in Western Europe? According to Mr. E. T. Leeds of Oxford, the building of the passage dolmens began in Portugal and spread thence in all directions.[1] He believes in the spontaneous development of culture, even to the extent of sweeping on one side the obvious cultural relationships between Eastern and Western Mediterranean countries, and he characterizes the resemblances as 'fortuitous and such as occur among any series of primitive cultures'.[2]

The megalithic civilization of Western Europe takes its place in the circle of the wider civilization that was radiating from the Eastern Mediterranean. For just as the long barrows of England are coupled on directly to the passage dolmens of France and Iberia, so the latter are associated with rock-cut tombs.[3] The making of rock-cut tombs is acknowledged, even by those who dissent most vehemently from the views advocated here, to be an element of the civilization characterized by the building of megalithic monuments. Not only are such tombs found in France and Iberia, but they exist also in Italy, Sicily, Crete, Cyprus, and Egypt, as well as in other places. In the latter countries there are no passage dolmens. This has impelled certain students to deny any connexion between them and the Western Mediterranean, and to claim that the peoples of the Western Mediterranean invented the passage dolmen themselves. That is to say, they assume that a convergence has taken place, in that the people who made passage dolmens in Western Europe

[1] 'The Dolmens and Megalithic Tombs of Spain and Portugal *Archaeologia*, vol. lxx, p. 201 seq.

[2] *Cambridge Ancient History*, ii. 590.

[3] See G. Elliot Smith, 'The Evolution of the Rock-cut Tomb and the Dolmen', *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway*. Cambridge, 1913.

came finally to construct rock-cut tombs similar in plan to those of the Eastern Mediterranean. They seem to argue that the unity between East and West in the Mediterranean is entirely fortuitous, and the outcome of converging lines of evolution of tomb-types.[1] This hypothetical convergence, as may be seen from a comparison of the plans of rock-cut tombs in France, Majorca, Crete, and Egypt, has brought about some astounding coincidences, such as I, for one, cannot accept as being due to independent development. Moreover, the rock-cut tombs, and the tombs termed 'megalithic' by Mr. Leeds, contain objects of gold, amber, jet, jadeite, and a kind of turquoise, that strongly suggest oriental influence, and particularly that of Crete. Mr. Leeds, that is to say, places the rock-cut tombs at the end of his series, and argues that the people had come to value the same sort of objects as were appreciated by the Cretans.[2] Mr. Leeds is of the opinion that the megalithic

[1] See Leeds, *op. cit.*, p. 229. 'The evidence points to priority in date for . . . the simple polygonal type, follow on with the galleried dolmens, from which in turn are evolved . . . the artificial grottoes on the one hand and the whole range of megalithic tombs on the other.' See also T. E. Peet and T. Ashby, *Cambridge Ancient History*, ii. 600–1. After stating that the rock-cut tomb is confined almost exclusively to the Mediterranean (which is not true) they go on to compare those of Egypt, Cyprus, and Crete with those of other parts of the region. After rejecting the idea that Egypt and Crete could have learned from, say, Spain, they canvass the opposite possibility. 'We must therefore suppose either that these latter learned the use of the rock-sepulchre from their more advanced neighbours, such as the Egyptians and Cretans, for which there is no evidence whatsoever, or else, what is far more probable, that they have evolved it independently for themselves.'

[2] Witness his remark 'the turquoise and amethyst, both possible products of the peninsula, not requiring an eastern origin, prove nothing'. *Liverpool Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology*, ix, 1922. In this connexion read B. Laufer, *Notes on*

civilization, having originated in Portugal, spread thence by sea to Sardinia, Sicily, and elsewhere. This seemingly involves the further theory that these people also spontaneously invented boats to carry them across the sea.

On the other hand, if all the evidence be kept in mind, I suggest that the exact contrary took place in Western Europe, that the rock-cut tomb was introduced from the East, together with the appreciation of turquoise, amethyst, and other precious objects, and that this exotic civilization became modified. It is well known that the transference of culture from its homeland to another place usually results in a loss of arts and crafts, in a diminution of skill and technique. Therefore I urge that when the practice of making rock-cut tombs spread from its original home in Egypt, where it arose as the result of the invention of the copper chisel, it tended to die out. On its arrival in Iberia and elsewhere, the people were not skilled enough to undertake the labour of cutting a tomb in the rock, but by the easier path attained essentially the same result. They made, in the first instance, a trench in the ground which they lined and covered with slabs of stone. Finally they constructed a tomb above ground of slabs and heaped a mound over it. By the time the last stage had been reached, the original use of amethyst, turquoise, and other signs of exotic influence had disappeared, so that in the latest tombs there was little variety in their furniture.

I must remark that I am not now advocating a new theory, but merely trying to give greater cogency to one long supported by competent archaeologists. The view that the making of rock-cut tombs, or that the inspiration of the megalithic civilization as a whole, has spread from the Eastern Mediterranean has been held by

Turquoise in the East. Field Museum of Natural History, Anthropological Series, vol. xiii, No. 1, Chicago, 1913.

Montelius,[1] Sophus Müller,[2] Déchelette,[3] and others. Moreover, the suggestion that the rock-cut tomb was the prototype of the passage dolmen serves to harmonize the views of two eminent French archaeologists concerning the origin of this monument. Mortillet urged that the passage dolmen arose as the result of the practice of disposing the dead in caves. This was followed by the rock-cut tomb, and finally by the passage dolmen that ultimately came up out of the ground. Déchelette rejected this view because he was persuaded that the practice of building megalithic monuments came from the East.[4] If, however, the first stage of Mortillet's scheme be jettisoned, then the two views perfectly harmonize.

As a working hypothesis, then, let us adopt the view that the building of passage dolmens arose in Western Europe as the result of the introduction from farther east of the making of rock-cut tombs. It now remains to see whether anything more can be learned of Crete and Egypt of this great outward movement of civilization, and especially whether any motives can be assigned for it.

The available evidence points to the period of the Egyptian Middle Kingdom, *c.* 2000 B. C., as the time when rock-cut tombs similar to those found in Crete and Western Europe were coming into general use.[5] That being so, what evidence have we to connect this fact with the occupation of Western Europe by the builders of megaliths?

[1] O. Montelius, *Die Chronologie der altesten Bronzezeit*, Brunswick.

[2] Sophus Müller, *L'Europe Préhistorique*, Paris.

[3] J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'Archéologie celtique et gauloise*, Paris.

[4] Op. cit., i. 423 seq.

[5] N. de G. Davies and Alan H. Gardiner, *The Tomb of Amenemhat*, 1915, p. 11. A. J. Evans, 'Prehistoric Tombs of Knossos', *Archaeologia*, LIX, 2. 1905, p. 558.

The evidence is there, and it is of supreme importance. For, as Montelius showed twenty-five years ago, the general use of bronze began in Egypt during the period of the Middle Kingdom. It also began at about the same time in Crete.[1] Bronze consists of a mixture of copper and some other metal, in this instance tin. There is no tin in Egypt or Crete. Therefore, both these countries must have been procuring this metal from elsewhere. It is acknowledged that the Cretans were great seafaring people in those times, and that they traded far and wide. As Sir Arthur Evans says in his great work on *The Palace of Minos*, they went westwards: 'It was certainly in pursuit of very solid commercial objects that Minoan and other Aegean merchants pushed into the West Mediterranean basin.'[2] Is it therefore chance, or is it the result of some such intercourse, that the countries of Western Europe, easily accessible by sea, and rich in tin and copper, not to speak of gold, suddenly received a population of people with a culture strangely suggestive of Crete and Egypt at that very moment when tin was coming into general use in both countries? It seems to me that there is only one possible opinion on this topic, namely, that the people of the Eastern Mediterranean were exploiting the resources of the West, just as the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, and Romans did after them. They were going to these countries on mining expeditions, and there making tombs as they made them in their homeland. This conclusion is strengthened when, as Mr. H. W. Howes has shown,[3] the distribution of megalithic monuments in Galicia in Northern Spain corresponds closely with that of tin and gold. In fact, a general map of Iberia reveals a close correspondence between the distribution of megalithic

[1] S. Xanthoudides, *The Vaulted Tombs of Mesara*, 1924.

[2] Op. cit., p. 23. S. Xanthoudides, op. cit., p. 27.

[3] *Folk-lore*, 1925.

monuments and ancient workings of tin, gold, and copper, not to speak of lead and other things.

The solution that I propose satisfies all requirements, and violates none of the evidence. The sudden appearance and distribution of this exotic civilization are explained. And, too, a motive is given for the westward movement, namely, the search for such raw materials as had then acquired a definite value. For the materials were actually in use in the places whence I suppose the influence to have come.

There is one difficulty, namely, that the people who made the early monuments in Iberia, France, and elsewhere did not leave tin or bronze in their tombs. That is explained by the nature of the process. Miners working in foreign lands are usually getting ore for export and not for local use. The crude stone implements were enough for their own needs. They shipped the ores to the East, to Crete and Egypt, where they were used for the purposes of those great civilizations. It is dangerous, as has already been pointed out, to infer too much from the supposed absence of metals from tombs. For a tin button has been found in a rock-cut tomb in Italy of the so-called copper age.[1] This is evidence that these people actually knew of tin, and that it was used, but rarely put into the tombs.

This line of reasoning accounts well for the distribution of megalithic monuments in Britain. For, as I have already shown, the distribution of these monuments agrees so well with the sources of gold, tin, lead, and other substances, that there can be little reasonable doubt as to the intentions of their builders. If it be assumed that they were mainly engaged in exporting it by way of the routes leading down to the sea, then we have a sufficient explanation of the facts. The theory of exploitation accounts also for the comparative absence of lead in the Bronze Age

[1] A. J. Evans, *The Palace of Minos*, 101.

in this country. Lead certainly was used, but not in quantities sufficient to account for the degree of exploitation of the Mendips and of Derbyshire that is suggested by the remains in those areas.[1] But if it be assumed that the lead was used for export, to provide the Cretans and Egyptians with their silver, not to speak of the lead itself, then its comparative rarity is readily accounted for.

It is at present impossible to frame any satisfactory working hypothesis to account for all the evidence relating to the Avebury period in England, for there are several serious difficulties to be met. But I am persuaded that what I have said will stand the test of criticism better than any scheme hitherto suggested. For it accounts for most of the facts. I am persuaded that the appearance of this civilization in England was part of the process set in motion in the Twelfth Dynasty in Egypt, if not before. But as to whether the influence got directly to England, or indirectly through Iberia, is a problem that does not yet seem capable of solution. The evidence suggests that the movement to England came from Western Europe, perhaps Spain or Portugal, and not immediately, for otherwise the absence, up to the present, of objects directly suggesting oriental influences cannot be accounted for. That is to say, the first centrifugal movement must be regarded as having become more diffuse as it proceeded.

It has already been pointed out that one set of immigrants introduced into England the phase of culture associated with Avebury, and a much later group was responsible for Stonehenge. The former I have referred to an influence starting from Egypt about the time of the Twelfth Dynasty, and coming westwards by way of Crete.

[1] J. Evans, *Ancient Bronze Implements of Great Britain*, 1881, p. 417. Numerous lead axes of this period have been found in Brittany.

What is known of foreign connexions during the second period, that of Stonehenge ?

In the Bronze Age, England was under the indirect influence of culture emanating from Crete and Egypt.[1] For in the barrows of the south of England there have been found beads of blue paste, some segmented, others star-shaped, conforming to types first made by the Egyptians. The segmented types were used in Crete, but not the star-shaped—at least, they have not yet been found, but it is possible that the Cretans were the agents for their dissemination to the West. Whether the beads were imported or made locally in imitation of Egyptian prototypes, the evidence of diffusion they afford is equally definite. Since the use of segmented beads became common in Egypt during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties, it must be assumed that they arrived in Spain and elsewhere later than the Seventeenth Dynasty. Sir Arthur Evans puts the date at between 1600 and 1200 B. C.

This does not exhaust the evidence for oriental influence in England during the Stonehenge period. For there has been discovered at Manton near Marlborough a disk of amber encased in gold. ' It is of red amber framed in a casing of thin gold. The gold is ornamented with six concentric lines, very finely and regularly drawn, and on the lines, at regular intervals, are a number of minute punch-marks. The disc is the same on both sides, the gold being in two separate pieces, skilfully joined round the rim.' This is compared by Mrs. Cunnington with a similar disk found in a rock-cut tomb at Knossos in Crete dating from about 1500–1400 B. C., that is, from about the time when the blue paste beads would have been carried westwards. ' The gold and amber disc found at Knossos

[1] Sir A. J. Evans, *The Palace of Minos*, 491 seq., for a full discussion of the evidence.

is of the same size, and is almost identical with the one from Manton, except that the gold bordering appears to be plain.'[1] This evidence, coupled with that derived from the beads, and also from the chalk drums of the Wolds, is emphatic in suggesting a strong influence from Crete during the period of the Bronze Age, about 1500 B.C., which corresponds with the Eighteenth Dynasty in Egypt.

The evidence therefore suggests that the two main phases of early civilization in England depended primarily for their inspiration upon Egypt of the Twelfth and Eighteenth Dynasties. Both these periods coincide with great increases in the external activities of Egypt, and with fresh outbursts of Cretan civilization. In both countries the two epochs marked the ends of periods of disorder. It is significant, to say the least, that Crete should thus keep step with Egypt, and this fact points to an intimate relationship between the two countries, with Egypt as the leader in invention. If Egypt inspired Crete, why should not Crete, in its turn, have inspired the Western Countries of Europe? It is impossible to detect any advance in Cretan civilization except as the result of Egyptian influence, a point which is constantly insisted on by Sir Arthur Evans in his *Palace of Minos*. Is it likely, therefore, that a backward country like Portugal could have been the place of origin of a new civilization that spread far and wide in Western Europe, and finally developed a type of tomb that bears a startling resemblance to those of Crete and elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean? It is far easier to believe that the processes begun in Egypt in the Twelfth and Eighteenth Dynasties were responsible for the great periods of civilization in Western Europe.

[1] *The Antiquaries Journal*, 1925, p. 70.

Books for Reference

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II

BRITAIN AND THE ROMAN EMPIRE

R. G. COLLINGWOOD

BRITAIN became a Roman province because it was impossible to treat the Channel as an Imperial frontier. When Julius Caesar conquered Gaul the tribes inhabiting its north-eastern region had lately carried out a successful invasion of South-Eastern England. Detachments of these tribes now lived on both sides of the Channel, and there appears to have been much inter-communication between them. A cultural map of the period immediately preceding the Roman conquest of Gaul would not show the Channel as a frontier, but would include South-Eastern Britain and North-Eastern Gaul in a single patch of colour.

The policy of Augustus was to stabilize, so far as possible, the frontiers of the Empire; and in order to do this he drew his frontiers along natural lines of demarcation such as rivers. A river is a very poor obstacle, except to an army with heavy transport and artillery, but it is an excellent line of demarcation. The same is true of the English Channel. To sail a boat across, given a fair wind, is the easiest imaginable feat of seamanship; any one who can creep along the coast from harbour to harbour can cut across the Channel without feeling that he has undertaken an adventure out of the common way. The conditions which make the Channel crossing an adventure to ourselves are purely political; the foreign language, and the strangeness of buildings and costumes, make us feel that we are not at home, and the formalities of passport and customs create artificial difficulties in a journey which

has no more natural difficulties than the trip from Gourock to Rothesay. Therefore the Channel could only be used as a frontier if it could be so fortified as to break down the solidarity of the tribes inhabiting its two shores; and this the Romans do not seem to have attempted. They might have treated the Channel somewhat as they treated the Rhine or Danube; but at first they over-estimated its efficiency as an obstacle, and left it alone; and it was only by degrees that they faced the dilemma of either fortifying the Channel or annexing Britain.

It is not necessary to repeat the often-told story of the conquest. But we are, perhaps, concerned to estimate its motives. The Romans may have thought the conquest of Britain an easier task than it really was; they may have failed to realize how large a part of our islands is composed of mountainous country cut up by arms and straits of the sea, difficult to conquer and hardly worth the conquering. They certainly did intend to annex the entire British Islands, and the recall of Agricola by Domitian seems to mark the definite and final renunciation of that policy. But in the main they clearly regarded Britain as a country worth annexing in itself, and also as a country which must be annexed if Gaul was to be properly governed. The good fertile lands and the somewhat highly civilized inhabitants of South-Eastern England were a valuable addition to the Empire, and even beyond this region it was known that minerals[1] were to be found; in short, England so far as the Romans knew it was a country at least as suitable for annexation as the north of Gaul, and in view of its mineral wealth perhaps even more suitable. And the Romans were probably right in thinking that it would pay them better to conquer Britain than to fortify the Channel.

[1] The information is usefully summarized in an appendix by Haverfield to Anderson's *Agricola*, pp. 173–82.

Nor was Britain in the time of Claudius so rough a country as it had been when Caesar invaded it a hundred years before. A great advance in civilization [1] had taken place during that century; and this advance had already set on foot the process of Romanization. Roman fashions, Roman manufactures, even the use of Latin, had made considerable headway in south-eastern Britain before the conquest began. Hence, when it did begin, the conquerors found themselves in a country not altogether alien from themselves in manners and speech, a country whose aristocracy, at least, knew a good deal about Roman ways and was not by any means ill disposed towards the newcomers. Nothing could be more misleading than to compare the Roman conquerors to a European force of a generation ago, plunging into the forests of the Congo basin or the Gold Coast, or to a Cortes invading the domains of a Montezuma. The tribal kings of Britain were neither Montezumas nor Prempehs, but rulers already in part Romanized, who were both willing and able to become more so, and to rule henceforth as viceroys of Claudius. No doubt this state of things was confined to the south-east, and even there it was not necessarily universal; but the fact that it did happen in the well-attested case of Cogidubnus at Chichester shows the level of civilization that had been reached in pre-Roman Britain.[2]

In the main, then, the tribes of the south-east were ripe for closer contact with Roman civilization, and welcomed

[1] Some pertinent details are given in Haverfield's *Romanization of Roman Britain*, p. 74.

[2] For Cogidubnus, king before the conquest and viceroy afterwards, see Tacitus, *Agricola*, 14, with Anderson's note *ad loc.*, and *C. I. L.* vii, 11, an inscription in the finest Roman style of the period shortly following the conquest, and indicating by this fact the quality of the artistic and constructional work being done in Britain at that time.

it. Nor is this disproved by the revolt of Boudicca; for, in the first place, that revolt was an isolated phenomenon, strictly local in its effects and wholly unsupported by anything like a 'sympathetic' rising in other parts; and secondly, its cause was not the unpopularity of Roman government as such, but the violent and oppressive administration of certain Roman officials. The fact that some Romans, after the conquest, became individually the objects of a just hatred which led to a revolt against the Imperial government, does not prove that the original institution of Roman rule was unwelcome.

Roughly, it would appear that this comparative readiness to accept the new order extended over the whole southern belt of England, south of the Thames, from Kent to Dorset and Somerset; north of that, a region embracing the eastern fringe of the Midlands, East Anglia, and perhaps Lincolnshire; and in the west, another outlying region consisting of the Cotswolds. This area, taken as a whole, remained for at least three and a half centuries the civilized part of Britain. Aldborough in the north, Leicester in the heart of the Midlands, Caerwent and Wroxeter on the Welsh border, and Exeter in the south-west, remained outposts, rather than centres, of civilization; and everything north and west of this was outside the pale—a mere frontier district, given over to the military and showing only rare and faint signs of a civilized life. When we speak of Romano-British civilization, therefore, we are speaking of something whose geographical extent is quite small and which covers at most one-half of England.[1]

[1] Cf. the maps of the military and civil districts of Britain given by Haverfield, *Romanization of Roman Britain*, p. 25, or *Roman Occupation of Britain*, pp. 150, 151. The civil district as shown in these maps includes a considerable fringe of what in the text are called 'outposts' of civilization.

So far as concerns this area Britain entered fully into the life of the Roman Empire. This does not mean that her own civilization disappeared, giving place to a purely Roman culture. Nothing of that kind ever happened. Britain was seamed with Roman roads, studded with Roman towns and villas, adorned with Roman works of art, and governed by Roman methods; but that is only half the truth. The roads were not, as the untutored popular imagination supposes, kept up for the benefit of the legions. They never, after the conquest, rang to the nailed boots of legionaries at all, except on the occasion of a very few emergencies such as the Pictish war of the late fourth century. The army went where it was wanted, shipped direct to the Humber or the Tyne, and the roads of the south were used for peaceful traffic. The towns, again, were Roman, but they were also and equally British; indeed, they were almost all more British than Roman, if the distinction must be made. They were not planned and built according to any pattern uniformly adopted throughout the Empire; there was no such pattern; they were planned and built on a pattern evolved by crossing Roman ideas with British habits. So for the villas; and the British gentry who lived in these villas were the lineal descendants of those British gentry who, even before the conquest, had begun to use Roman pottery brought across the Channel. As before the conquest, so after it, the population of this civilized part of Britain was divided into a landowning gentry and a peasantry; and the Romans did nothing to deprive the landowners of their rights or to interfere between master and man, except so far as British custom was modified by grafting upon it the principles of Roman Law.[1] The

[1] The reader ought to be warned that this view differs slightly from that maintained by so great an authority as Professor Vinogradoff (*The Growth of the Manor*, ch. 1 and 2), who holds that

conquest brought increased security to the owners of property, it did not involve their expropriation.

On its artistic side,[1] Romano-British civilization was affected by the importation of objects, on a vastly increased scale, from abroad, and also by the importation of new techniques, resulting in the decline of the old. The beautiful metal-work of pre-Roman Britain disappears, except so far as it lingers in the uncivilized north in diminished splendour. But the place of this ancient British craft is taken by stone-cutting, a craft of which earlier generations of Britons knew nothing. And with the new craft comes in, not unnaturally, a new style. The Britons did not perpetuate in stone the trumpet-patterns and spirals of their champlevé enamels; they began to build classical temples and to carve classical tombstones and classical statues. To a hasty eye it might appear that they had lost all their remarkable artistic originality and had suffered a total submersion beneath the uniform cosmopolitan culture of the Empire. But the cosmopolitan culture of the Empire is a myth. The Empire was a vast exchange of ideas. Within its limits any religious or artistic or other movement that had life in it could propagate itself indefinitely in any direction; but in propagating itself, it necessarily underwent modification. The Orontes could disgust Juvenal by discharging itself into the Tiber, and the waters of the Tiber, so contaminated, could and did flow into the Thames; but the resulting mixture was always first and foremost Thames water, and tasted very different from a mixture of Tiber-Orontes with Cinyps or Ebro. When one begins to compare the various regions of the Empire in respect of their artistic work, the

the great landowners of Roman Britain, whether Romans from abroad or Romanized Britons, were brought into existence by Roman rule.

[1] Cf. the chapters on art in Haverfield's *Romanization of Roman Britain* and the present writer's *Roman Britain*.

individuality of each leaps to the eye. And, judged by this test, we find that Roman Britain in its civilized portion—I exclude work done outside the area determined above as civilized—is closely akin to northern Gaul and Germany, less akin to southern Gaul, and strikingly unlike the rest of the Empire; and further, that the resemblance to northern Gaul is not so complete as to exclude some differences. The civilized portion of Britain, in fact, might be described as not only racially but also culturally an outlying province of Gaul, with a somewhat nebulous individuality of its own. Thus, both before and during the Roman occupation, it is true to say that there is more homogeneity over an area that includes north-eastern Gaul and south-eastern Britain than over an area including all Britain, or even all England, and nothing outside it. This can be tested by any one who compares the sculptures collected in such museums as those of Trier and Bonn with the works of the same kind found in the civilized part of Britain. In the main the similarity is remarkable; yet we miss in Britain some qualities which we find on the Continent, and, to a less degree, we miss on the Continent some qualities that we find in Britain. In this connexion the famous Gorgon of Bath has been much discussed; not more, indeed, than it deserves, but enough to convey the suggestion that it stands altogether alone as evidence of a distinctively British element in Roman Imperial art. To assert that it does stand alone would be to exaggerate; but it is equally easy to exaggerate the amount of evidence and the degree of individuality which it indicates. That we are dealing, in Britain, with an art very different from that of the classical Greco-Roman tradition is clear enough. Even in architectural ornament the Celticizing of Greco-Roman motives is too obvious to be overlooked.[1]

[1] Thus Professor Lethaby observes: 'Provincial Roman building was something very different from the grammars

But when we have said that the art of Roman Britain is not Roman but Celto-Roman, we have still to judge the precise degree of individuality belonging to this art as distinguished from that of the district across the Channel. Some individuality it certainly had; otherwise the Bath Gorgon, to go no farther, would be unexplained. And the difficulty is largely due to the paucity of the evidence. We have abundant remains of the Roman period in the north and the west, but strangely few in the only part of the province that was civilized; this is because most of the towns in the civilized region—London, Canterbury, Colchester, Winchester, Chichester, Cirencester, Bath, and so forth—have been built over very completely from an early period, and their Roman remains sealed up or re-used and so destroyed. In the one case, Silchester, in which it has hitherto been found possible to excavate a town in this region, there was a disappointing shortage of sculptures, and, for that matter, of architectural fragments, inscriptions, and similar relics. The fine sculptural and architectural fragments from Bath and elsewhere show that Silchester was not typical in this respect.

A similar conclusion would be reached if space permitted a survey of the religious life of Roman Britain. Here again, we should find not a Roman but a Celto-Roman religion, in which native gods and Roman gods are fused together and worshipped under double names. The evidence for this, being wholly epigraphic, is especially abundant in the military region; but such cases as that of Sul-Minerva at Bath make it clear that the principle was at work also in the civilized part of the province; and other cases in this region could be quoted. Celtic religion

propounded by architects. As we may study it in the fine museums of Trèves, Lyons, and London, it seems more like proto-Romanesque than a late form of "classic"' (*Londinium*, p. 11).

was an affair of local cults,[1] and it is the exception to find a single god worshipped over a wide area; when this does happen it is generally due to a traveller's desire to worship the gods of his native place. So transplanted, a worship may take root and thrive. Examples could be given of this in the Celtic provinces of the Empire, but they do not upset the general rule that Celtic gods are worshipped each in a comparatively small area. For this reason the Celtic element in Romano-British religion presents us with a group of deities different, in the main, from those worshipped in the adjacent parts of Gaul. But it would be a mistake to argue that therefore Romano-British religion was wholly or in principle different from that of Roman Gaul.[2] The local cults of Britain differed from those of Gaul only in the same kind of way in which they differed among themselves. The military districts of Britain were a perfect museum of religious curiosities; but with the cults of the Roman army we are not here concerned.

The same blend of Roman and Celtic elements is very strikingly present in matters of government. The Imperial legate and his staff represent the Roman side; but the student who approaches the subject from the point of view of a modern empire is surprised to find that there are no traces of a civil service staffed by nominees of the central government and responsible for the administration of 'districts'. That observation applies, more or less, to the whole Empire; apart from the Emperor's financial

[1] For example, in Britain the cult of Sul was confined to Bath, that of Nodens to Lydney; Cocidius was worshipped in the central region of Hadrian's Wall, where, if we may argue from the entry Fano Cocidi in the Ravenna Cosmography, he had a central temple like those of Nodens and Sul; Belatucader was worshipped farther west, in North Cumberland.

[2] For a short and easily accessible account of Celtic religion in Gaul, see M. Jullian in *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, vol. ii.

officers, who might in certain cases—like Pontius Pilate—govern a district, the civil service had no work of this kind. Nor, on the other hand, was Britain a country of self-governing towns, like Italy. The civilization of the Mediterranean basin has always been in the main an urban civilization; its unit has been the town, and its natural development has proceeded from the independent city-state to the self-governing municipality. But in our country there has never been an urban civilization. The fundamental fact in ancient Britain, in Anglo-Saxon England, in the England of the Middle Ages, and in the England of to-day has not been the town-dweller but the country-dweller. Even the industrial revolution has only disguised this, and has not at bottom altered it; and at no date before the industrial revolution could any one for a moment have doubted that the centre of gravity of English life lay in the country-side. Now the Romans, those incorrigible worshippers of the *genius loci*, were sensitive to a fact like this. They made no attempt to Italianize British institutions by organizing a system of self-governing municipalities. They built towns, or fostered and directed a town-building movement which may perhaps have originated in that period of progress which preceded their arrival; and these towns became, it is true, centres of government. But they became, not municipalities, for in all Britain there was never more than one municipality,[1] but county capitals, each the administrative and social centre of a country district. And these country districts were not mapped out by Roman governors according to an arbitrary scheme; they were simply the territories of the ancient tribes. Each tribe was thus a self-governing community, whose chief men

[1] Verulamium. The *coloniae* of Colchester, Lincoln, York, and Gloucester belonged rather to the Roman than to the British aspect of Roman Britain; they were settlements of time-expired legionaries, not centres of tribal self-government.

met together in its chief town for the conduct of its own affairs. No doubt it was the business of the Imperial legate to see that the tribal authorities did their duty; but it was not for him to relieve them of this duty.

We have seen the beginning of this policy, in the case of King Cogidubnus, at the beginning of the occupation. It was a policy consistently followed from the reign of Claudius to that of Honorius. In the early third century a statue was set up in the county capital at Caerwent by the 'Republic of the Tribe (*civitas*) of the Silures, by order of its Senate (*ordo*),'[1] which gives us an insight into the forms and terminology of tribal government. Still more remarkable, because a century earlier in date, is the inscribed slab recently found at Wroxeter, telling how some great building was erected in A. D. 130 by the tribe (*civitas*) of the Cornovii in honour of the Emperor Hadrian. This shows that the system of tribal self-government was already in full swing in the early second century, not only in the highly civilized south-east but in the comparatively wild and remote district on the north Welsh border. And in a sense the most striking evidence of all comes from Hadrian's Wall, where a series of four inscriptions[2] shows that portions of the great frontier-work were erected by the corporate action respectively of the Dumnonii, the Catuvellauni, and the Brigantes. It has been supposed that these inscriptions commemorate the presence of forced labour-gangs; but a forced labour-gang would never be allowed to sign its work in precisely

[1] *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, ix, no. 1012; the inscription is figured and discussed in Haverfield's *Romanization of Roman Britain*, pp. 59–61.

[2] *C. I. L.* vii. 775 (*Civitas Dumnon*), 776 (*Civitas Dumni*), 863 (*Civitate Catuvellaunorum Tossodio*) and 897 (a stone now lost, whose reading, evidently corrupt, is given as *capudpi civitat bricic*, and no doubt conceals the name of the *civitas* of the Brigantes).

the same way as a legion; and, if it had done so, it would not have called itself a *civitas*. In short, here as at Wroxeter, we have clear evidence of tribal government as early as the reign of Hadrian. And the very last thing we hear of Roman Britain is that in 410 Honorius told these same *civitates* to arrange for their own defence; that is, authorized them to undertake no longer local government only, but that organization of the armed forces of Britain which had till now been the special duty of the Imperial governors and their staff.[1]

Here again the unity of Britain with northern Gaul is complete. To quote Haverfield:[2] 'in northern and western Gaul, Roman municipalities (strictly so-called) were wanting. Nevertheless, towns sprang up here, some through Roman official encouragement and some of spontaneous growth. These towns were a cross between Roman and Gallic. They were the "chefs-lieux" of native cantonal areas and their local government was native. But the titles of their magistrates were borrowed from the Roman municipal terminology and their government was assimilated to the Roman municipal pattern.' Nothing could be more precise as a description of the local government of Roman Britain.

All this may be summed up by saying that, for the Roman Empire, the English Channel did not exist. A man going northwards from the western Mediterranean crosses one important boundary where southern Gaul ends and northern Gaul begins; the next important boundary is that which marks the end of civilized Britain and the beginning of the military frontier-district. Between southern Britain and northern Gaul there are, as

[1] Zosimus, vi. 10. The rescript of Honorius assumes that the *civitates* were still going concerns; that is, no reorganization of the Empire had superseded the system of tribal self-government.

[2] *Romanization*, p. 21.

we have seen, differences of detail like those which separate district from district in both countries. There is also a broad, though not a very strong, difference of degree. Of the two countries, Britain was the remoter, less civilized, less wealthy, less prominent—apart from the prominence due to a large army—in the commonwealth of the Roman provinces. Its towns were less numerous and, on average, less magnificent than those of northern Gaul, and the works of art which they contained were on the whole inferior in quantity and quality. It never produced a literature or learning of its own, but neither did northern Gaul; and it would be unjust not to mention the heresiarch Pelagius, a Briton in whom, though dimly descried in the distorting mirror of controversy and blackened by so great a rhetorician as St. Augustine, we can discern a speculative genius of the highest order. In short, whatever individuality belongs to civilized Britain as distinct from northern Gaul is discoverable, if at all, only by the closest scrutiny. And this bond between the two countries is reflected in their political history under Roman rule. Apart from such accidents as the outbreak of Saxon piracy in the Channel which brought about the isolation of Britain under Carausius, the fates of Britain and northern Gaul were never different. When a usurping emperor controlled the one, he must of necessity control the other also.

Yet this substantial identity of character and fortune only lasted till the first quarter of the fifth century. The Teutonic tribes that invaded northern Gaul were so far absorbed into the framework of Romano-Gallic civilization that their Charlemagne could successfully aspire to the title of Roman Emperor; those which invaded Britain never came to regard themselves as heirs to a Romano-British civilization. That heritage, so far as concerned its visible substance, had perished before it ever came into

their hands; and when a great Saxon king like Athelstan borrowed the Imperial title, he did so only in the attempt to find a language to express the relation in which he had come to stand towards subjects not of his own immediate race.[1] In spite of repeated attempts, it has never been successfully demonstrated that Anglo-Saxon England owes to Roman Britain anything tangible in the way of law, institutions, religion, or art, or that the rural or urban life of the one was in any sense a direct continuation of the urban or rural life of the other. The towns of Roman Britain were already decaying through the activity of Pictish and Scotic raiders before the end of the fourth century; the life of its rural aristocracy was even more severely damaged, for the majority of its villas seem hardly to have revived after the great Pictish inroad in the reign of Valentinian I. Traces of the occupation of Roman town-sites in the earlier Anglo-Saxon period are so rare as to be negligible; traces of similar occupation on the sites of Roman villas are altogether wanting. 'Between Roman Britain and Saxon England', writes Haverfield, 'there is a great gulf fixed.' What can we do towards filling up that gulf and describing the state of the country in the 'lost two centuries of Britain'? It is a question that nearly concerns our present purpose, for we cannot be indifferent to the fate that befel Romano-British civilization when we are attempting to envisage the unity of European history.

It is possible to construct a fairly plausible narrative of the Saxon conquest from ancient literary sources. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, Gildas, Bede, Nennius, and other early authorities give us a story whose main outline is

[1] Athelstan calls himself 'Basileus of the English and Emperor of the kings and nations dwelling within the bounds of Britain'; Cod. Dip. 349, quoted in Green, *Conquest of England*, p. 241; but this was a mere experiment in terminology and was not maintained.

consistent and, on purely *a priori* grounds, not wholly incredible; though its details remain open to question. According to this story the destruction of Roman Britain falls into two parts. First, there was a period, beginning late in the fourth century and extending to 446—that being the date of Aetius' third consulship, which must surely be the year of the message sent, according to Gildas, by the Britons 'Agitio ter consuli'—when the Picts and Scots were the only enemies. During this period the story places the building of the walls of Hadrian and Pius, and the forts of the Saxon Shore, which works are ascribed to Roman forces coming over to help the Britons. In 446 the Romans refused further aid; whereupon the Britons pulled themselves together and defeated the Picts and Scots by their own efforts, but on the removal of this scourge fell into a luxurious and slothful corruption. The second period begins with the landing of Hengist and Horsa in 449. Originally brought in as allies against the Picts, they turned against their hosts and a long and bitter warfare began, which according to the *Chronicle* lasted to the end of the sixth century. During this period Romano-British civilization was destroyed piecemeal by the sword of the Saxons, and by the end of it nothing was left of Roman Britain except in the western fastnesses.

A great part of this story has long been dismissed as fable. Yet the remainder, which is unfortunately the worse attested, has till lately formed the backbone of all theories concerning the Saxon conquest. But evidence has rapidly accumulated within the last generation which makes any such story incredible. If the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle had been even approximately accurate, we should find early Saxon cemeteries on the east and south coasts, and much later cemeteries inland, especially on the sites of the great battles. Further, beginning from the other side, we should find evidence of long post-Roman

occupations at such places as Gloucester, Cirencester, and Bath, all of which the *Chronicle* describes as taken by the Saxons in 577. But the facts are very different.[1] The early remains of the Saxon settlers are not confined to the coast but are scattered freely over the country, not in dense patches but in smaller quantities, occurring especially on the banks of navigable rivers. This evidence, collected and discussed by Mr. E. Thurlow Leeds in *The Archaeology of the Anglo-Saxon Settlements*, is only intelligible on the hypothesis that the first settlers came, in comparatively small bands, sailing up the rivers or travelling along the roads, through a country-side that was either unable or unwilling to resist them, and picked out a spot favourable for a settlement. Of such small and peaceful settlements, perhaps not unwelcome to a population with land to spare and with enemies to fight, the tale of Hengist and Horsa describes a typical example. There must have been a stage in the conquest when the Britons

[1] Attention may be called to two examples of the evidence we possess on this head. First, the *Chronicle* says that in 571 the West Saxons defeated the Britons at Bedford and got possession of the plain round Oxford, having gradually worked northwards to the Thames from the south coast; archaeology makes it clear that the Oxford plain had by then been inhabited by Saxons for at least a century (*Archaeologia*, lxxiii, pp. 174–6), and Mr. Leeds in an unpublished paper has convincingly argued that these were the original West Saxons and that they came from the Wash overland. The route by which they are said in the *Chronicle* to have reached the Thames is wholly destitute of the relics we should expect on such a route. Secondly, if Gloucester, Cirencester, and Bath fell to the Saxons in 577, it is difficult to see why Gloucestershire and Somerset should possess several of those place-names in -ing which, by common consent, belong to the very earliest stage of the Anglo-Saxon settlement (Ekwall, *English Place-names in -ing*, p. 70; on p. 114 Prof. Ekwall notes the discrepancy between the *Chronicle* and the place-name evidence).

and the Saxons lived side by side in separate villages, like Christians and Moslems in the Near East to-day, each practising their own type of agriculture and each ruling themselves according to their own law and custom. At first the British tribal authorities may have been, theoretically at least, the supreme power, and the new settlers may have done them some kind of homage, perhaps promising to fight in payment for their land, as it is recorded of Hengist and Horsa. But the actual power of the British tribes had been shattered by the raids of the late fourth and early fifth century. From the Roman side, there is good reason to think that the chief towns were destroyed or abandoned at dates which can hardly fall later than the early fifth century; for the latest relics found in them are generally dated about 400, and any really long occupation after that date must have produced new types of household goods which could be recognized as post-Roman developments. Archaeology suggests that Romano-British civilization received its death-blow about the years 360–80, and that in the generation following 390 it was dying a lingering death. In view of the evidence on this head, it seems reasonable to suggest that the tribal authorities whom Honorius in 410 instructed to defend themselves had no longer any real power to do so.[1]

[1] It may be desirable here to mention Professor Bury's view that the evacuation of Britain took place not in 407–10, as is generally supposed, but after 428, and perhaps as late as 442 (*Journal of Roman Studies*, x, pp. 131–54). I have discussed the question, with special reference to this view, in the same *Journal*, xii, pp. 74–98, and given my reasons for adhering to the accepted date. Professor Bury has kindly commented on my observations, again in the same *Journal*, xiii, 149, foot-note 3. He speaks as if my case rested solely on the absence in Britain of coins later than 410, which I should not admit (cf. *J. R. S.* xii. 87, where I adduce three separate arguments), and replies that this is due to ' the fact that during the reign of Honorius the Channel

Literary sources modify, but do not necessarily overthrow, this conclusion. When St. Patrick revisited his home—possibly at Daventry—about the year 430, he found life going on much as usual among his Romano-British friends and relations; and when St. Germanus in 429 came to Britain to counteract the epidemic of Pelagianism, he is said to have healed a tribune's daughter and to have helped in organizing the British forces which defeated Picts and Saxons in the so-called 'Alleluia battle'. But though these stories show that a semblance of Romano-British civilization was left twenty years after the departure of the Romans, they do not prove more than that; we cannot argue that St. Germanus' friend the tribune actually had at his command the machinery of government which his title might seem to imply. Relics of the old Romano-British organization no doubt existed as late as 430 and later; but they were no more than relics.

The evidence of Romano-British archaeology thus confirms that of Anglo-Saxon. Both emphatically discredit the idea of a war lasting a century or more; both suggest

became so unsafe, through the operations of the Saxon pirates, that the trade of Britain with the continent declined and presently ceased altogether'. This argument requires us to believe simultaneously (i) that the pirates were strong enough to destroy all trade, but not strong enough to interfere with the movements of governors and military units; (ii) that all coin normally crossed the Channel in trading vessels, and that when this became impossible no one thought of shipping it under armed escort; (iii) that for thirty years governors preferred to carry on the administration of Britain without uttering a single new coin, when with the stroke of a pen they might have revived the London Mint and fed it with the yield of the richest silver-producing province in the Empire (A. J. Evans, 'Notes on the Coinage and Silver Currency in Roman Britain from Valentinian I to Constantine III', in *Numismatic Chronicle*, series iv, vol. xv, pp. 501–2).

that the settlement was in the main a peaceful business, in which waste land was taken up by settlers to whom as a rule the local authorities, where local authorities still existed, offered little or no opposition. And here a third strand of archaeological evidence comes in. Mr. O. G. S. Crawford has lately proved the existence, on the Wessex downs, of an elaborate system of ancient field-divisions, wholly unlike Saxon field-divisions and resembling rather the enclosures of a Highland croft or a farm in Wales or Cornwall. These fields, he has shown, are organically connected with the Roman roads, and therefore contemporary with them; and to them is attached a complete system of Romano-British villages.[1] Now Mr. Crawford has compiled maps of Salisbury Plain, showing respectively the Romano-British and the Saxon village-sites; and whereas the Saxon settlements lie thick along the banks of all the rivers, the Romano-British villages are scattered evenly over the uplands. The two systems are so utterly distinct that it would be theoretically possible for both to have existed simultaneously. Did they actually do so, or not? Mr. Crawford thinks they did not, because excavation has never revealed any Saxon objects in these British villages of Wessex. On the other hand, it is impossible to believe that the Romano-British population simply disappeared.[2] If the evidence of Anglo-Saxon archaeology

[1] 'Air Survey and Archaeology', *Geographical Journal*, May 1923, reprinted (enlarged) as a pamphlet by the Ordnance Survey.

[2] The Rev. E. H. Goddard has made some valuable criticisms on this head, which Mr. Crawford has printed in an addendum on p. 11 of the pamphlet quoted. Mr. Goddard's points are roughly (1) that there are practically no pagan Saxon remains in Wiltshire; (2) that the Wiltshire Romano-British sites may quite well, archaeologically speaking, have been inhabited into the Saxon period; (3) that Beddoe, not in the *Races of Britain* but in the *Wilts. Arch. Mag.* xxxiv. 15–41, traces a large neolithic survival in the modern

is sound, the settlement was not of a kind that could involve the destruction or wholesale displacement of the former inhabitants. Nor can we imagine the British population to have been exterminated in the raids that preceded the settlement. These raids no doubt weakened it, impoverished it, and reduced its numbers; they may well have de-Romanized it to a certain extent by destroying its most Romanized portions; they almost certainly destroyed its administrative centres, and by doing so undermined its political cohesion and rendered it incapable of organized self-defence; but it is impossible that they should have wiped it out. In short, the only hypothesis that seems credible, when all the archaeological evidence is taken together, is that there was a period during which two populations lived side by side in England: a Celtic population, once Romanized but now showing hardly any traces of its old civilization, and a population of English settlers. In some districts these two populations dwelt in distinct regions, the British on the uplands and the English along the river-banks. This was certainly the case in Wessex, and very likely elsewhere; but it cannot be assumed as a universal rule. Between Britons and English there may have been at first little or no communication; but by degrees, and probably from a very early period, the English began to absorb the Britons. This process went on, no doubt, at varying rates and in various manners, and involved various degrees of friction; but in the main it may well have been a peaceful process. Whatever fighting occurred was not so much the waging of full-dress wars—for that, neither side was sufficiently organized—but local friction between village and village, or trouble between a band of settlers and a British com-

population of Wiltshire: hence it is to be inferred that in the very heart of Wessex a large British element was absorbed by the Saxons.

munity which tried to keep them out. In any case, the process of absorption involved the gradual desertion of most of the British villages and the gradual disuse of the British language; and this must have been to some extent effected before the English could form themselves into distinct states and make regular war upon their neighbours.

The evidence of place-names adds weight to this hypothesis. 'The numerous British place-names found in England', writes Professor Ekwall ('The Celtic Element', in *Introduction to the Survey of English Place-names*, p. 31), 'prove that the British population cannot have been exterminated or swept away even in the parts first occupied by the Anglo-Saxons. In some parts a British element must have survived for a considerable time after the conquest, and the Britons seem to some extent to have lived in villages of their own.' The place-names which yield this inference are of two kinds. First, there are strictly British names; secondly, English or even Scandinavian names which record the presence of Britons. In the first class fall such names of districts as Kent, Thanet, Wight, Elmet, Loidis, Craven, and, curiously enough, the names of the Anglian kingdoms Deira and Bernicia. Deira (Deivr, Deur) means the 'watery' country, the river-land of southern Yorkshire; Bernicia (Brenneich) is said to come from a lost Briganticia, 'land of the Brigantes', and this is doubtless possible, though the original Bernicia lay farther north than any territory which we know to have been occupied by the Brigantes, and seems to have been inhabited not by them but by the Otadini. Other names of this type which occur freely all over England are town-names like London, York, Lincoln, Dover, Winchester, Dorchester, Gloucester, Wroxeter, Manchester, and so forth; and many names of rivers, hills, forests, and other natural features. British

names of villages and homesteads are less common, except in the west; even in districts like Elmet, where the Britons lived almost undisturbed till the seventh century,[1] there are very few British village-names.

The other class of names which is valuable for our present purpose is that of non-British names recording the presence of Britons. Of these the commonest are Walton and Walcot (Wealatun, Welshmen's farm; Wealacot, Welshmen's cot). In Lewis's *Topographical Dictionary* there are twenty-eight Waltons and six Walcots. Of these, one Walton, on Hadrian's Wall, is Walltown; the rest are pretty evenly distributed over an area whose four corners are Lancashire, Norfolk, Surrey, and Somerset. Lewis's *Dictionary* omits numerous other examples in which the name belongs to nothing more extensive than a single house or a very small hamlet; but against this must be set off the fact that in a few cases these names may have a different derivation. Other names that fall into the same class are Walworth, Walwick, Wallasey, Bretton, Cumberworth and Kimberworth, and many others. But all these are early English names, and only prove that in all parts of England there were Britons still recognizable as such, still unabsorbed in the Anglo-Saxon population, in the earliest centuries after the settlement. Far more remarkable is the fact that the Danes and Norse, settling in the ninth and tenth centuries,

[1] Elmet was annexed by Edwin *c.* 616. 'Occupavit Elmet et expulit Certic regem illius regionis' says the Appendix to Nennius; cf. *Annales Cambriae*, p. 616, 'Ceretic obiit.' But if the king was expelled, the population was not; Angles only began to settle in Elmet *c.* 650; cf. W. G. Collingwood, *Angles, Danes and Norse in the District of Huddersfield*, p. 59. Beddoe, it is true, failed to find Romano-British traces in the present population of Elmet, though he found plenty in Craven (*Races of Britain*, p. 251). But the Elmet place-names forbid us to accept his inference that Edwin expelled the population.

found that there was still an unabsorbed British minority in existence. This is proved by the name Birkby, which twice in Cumberland, once in Lancashire, and once in Yorkshire is known to be a corruption of Bretby (*D. B.*, Bretebi), 'Britons' village'; elsewhere it ought probably to be explained in the same way. It is noteworthy that of the Cumberland Birkbys one is almost a suburb of the Roman fort at Maryport, the other a well-known and unusually large collection of ancient dwellings, of the type called British settlements; the one in Lancashire is in Cartmel, a district which with 'all the Britons with it' was given to St. Cuthbert in 685;[1] that in Yorkshire, in the British kingdom of Elmet. The final absorption of the Britons, even within the area of Anglo-Saxon settlement, may not have been complete till the eve of the Norman Conquest.

It has often been imagined that the absence of Celtic words in English proves the destruction or expulsion of the British population; for if such an absorption of Britons as we are supposing had taken place, it is assumed that the language, as well as the stock, would have been mixed. But this assumption is far from sound. In the case of Elmet, a population of wholly British blood and speech is known to have remained intact till the seventh century, and we have seen that there is reason to suppose that it was not driven out or exterminated; in the case of Cartmel, no one will suggest that St. Cuthbert's men killed off or expelled the Britons who were handed over to them late in the same century. In these two cases—they are not the only ones that could be quoted—a solidly British district was thrown open to English settlers at a late period, and it may be regarded as certain that the British inhabitants, though mixed with such settlers, remained substantially undisturbed. The people who live in Elmet and

[1] *Hist. de Scto. Cuthberto*, Surtees Soc., vol. li, p. 141.

Cartmel to-day are therefore predominantly descended from seventh-century Britons; but they have not preserved their original language, and in neither case is their speech anything but a typical English dialect.[1] They have assimilated themselves to an English element which probably never outnumbered them or even equalled them in numbers. If this could happen in districts where the Britons remained sole inhabitants till the seventh century, it could happen elsewhere.

There is, in fact, nothing improbable in the view that the Britons, all over England, forgot their own language. The same thing happened in Gaul after the Roman conquest; the original Celtic language has left only the slenderest traces in modern French.[2] Cornish, which has died out quite recently, has left hardly any trace in the vocabulary of Cornishmen. The same is true of many other languages. Windisch has pointed out that a general law can be laid down, to the effect that people learning a foreign language borrow words from this language in speaking their own, but do not import words from their own into the foreign language. Thus a Gaelic-speaking Highlander uses numbers of English words in his Gaelic, but his English is pure; and the same principle holds good of Breton and other examples. This principle explains why a vanished language like Cornish does not leave traces in the speech of the people who have forgotten it. Thus the Britons, in learning Anglo-Saxon, would naturally tend to speak it in a pure form; and since they adapted themselves to the Saxons' way of life and not vice versa—that is proved by the history of agriculture, of law, and so forth—there was

[1] The 'Anglo-Cymric' sheep-scoring numerals of north-western England are a genuine survival of ancient British speech; but it is not in Elmet that they have survived.

[2] How very slight these traces are may be seen from any such review of the subject as that given in Nyrop's *Grammaire Historique de la Langue française*, vol. i.

no need for the English to acquire a stock of British words in the way in which Englishmen in India acquire a stock of native words.[1]

It is well known that in Wales, and to a less degree in Devon and Cornwall, remnants of Roman civilization continued to exist long after the beginning of the fifth century, But it is not here, in the Celticized Latin names, in the bilingual Latin and ogham tombstones, and in the legends of a later age, that the true continuation of Romano-British history is to be sought. It is rather in England, where a Celtic population long accustomed to self-government under the tuition of Rome, and preserving, it may be, even in an age of national disaster some inherited memory of past achievement, mingled its blood with that of the new-comers from overseas to create the English nation. Historians who have realized the completeness of the destruction which overtook the more civilized elements in Roman Britain have concluded that everything English must be traced to the Anglo-Saxons, and that modern England lay preformed, as it were, in the villages of the Low German coast-land.[1] How rash that conclusion is, may be seen from a single instance. The earliest real blossoming of the English mind was in the kingdom of Northumbria, with its splendid artistic, intellectual, and religious achievements. Bede, the greatest scholar of his age; Alcuin, the teacher of kings; Cædmon, the singer of creation; the sculptors who carved the Bewcastle cross and a hundred others; all these were men of the first rank, and the spiritual movement which they represented was the greatest thing of its time in European history. But

[1] The argument of Windisch may be found in Jespersen's *Growth and Structure of the English Language*, pp. 38–9.

[2] Conversely, one could name writers who, realizing that this conclusion is untenable, have argued that therefore the Romano-British civilization survived more or less intact, and conquered its conquerors: an even rasher inference.

that movement took its rise round Jarrow, Monkwearmouth, and Hexham, in the country between Tees and Tyne; a country falling between Bernicia on the north and Deira on the south—the country, that is to say, where the British element was stronger than anywhere else in Northumbria. 'It is not to be thought that the Celts, left alone, could have produced the age of Bede; they did not do so in Wales; but neither could the Teutons, who did not do so in Germany. Here nature found the right proportions for the mixture which created the golden age of the earliest English history, in the land between Tees and Tyne.'[1]

Nor is this an isolated case. The irony of fate has led the Anglo-Saxon Chronicler, while recording the wars of conquest and extermination waged by Saxon against Briton, to ascribe British names to quite a large number of Saxon leaders—Cerdic, Ceadwalla, Mul, Cada.[2] This makes nonsense of his story as it stands; but it makes perfectly good sense if we interpret it as meaning that some at least of the men who rose to prominence among the Saxons were of mixed Saxon and British descent, and that the leaders who bore these names did not, as the Chronicler thought, lead the new-comers at their first arrival, but rose to their high position after the settlement was at least

[1] W. G. Collingwood, 'The First English in Northumberland', in the *Vasculum* (Newcastle-on-Tyne), January 1925.

[2] Professor Chadwick (*Origin of the English Nation*, p. 32) suggests that Cerdic may be a mythological person, whose name is a 'back-formation' from place-names like Cerdicesford (Charford); but, he continues, the change of the *t* in Coroticos to *d* can hardly have taken place before the seventh century, so that 'we shall have to suppose that a Welsh population still survived in some parts of Hampshire at the beginning of the seventh century'. The other British names quoted he explains by suggesting that the West Saxon wars of conquest began 'by their interference in one of those internal feuds among the Britons of which Gildas complains'. Cædmon, it may be added, is the British Catumanos.

a generation old. And this agrees with the suggestion of archaeology that the original settlement was a scattered infiltration of small bands which only later united into states. Even if names and incidents are alike imaginary, it is no less significant that when a Saxon wished to name an early chief of his own tribe he could give him a British name. In either case, it is impossible to escape the inference that the great kings of Wessex were of mixed origin, and could have traced their descent to Romano-British ancestors.

The view to which these evidences point may be summarized by saying that the English settlers found a British population all over England; a population that had once been Romanized and whose habits and institutions still bore the stamp of Rome, but whose cohesion and civilization had been shattered by the destruction and abandonment of all, or almost all, their chief towns, and the extermination, or reduction to poverty and powerlessness, of their Romanized aristocracy. Weakened and thinned by Pictish and Scotic raids, this population as a whole was unable to resist the new-comers, and indeed, in large measure, welcomed them. There was land enough for them to take their share; and thus, peacefully in the main though no doubt with plenty of local friction, the settlement began. By degrees, as the English increased, they began to absorb the Britons and form themselves into states under leaders of mixed origin; and this involved, in many cases, definite warfare against elements which resisted absorption, and aggressive measures against neighbours. This led to conflicts like the battles of Dagsastan in the north and the Mons Badonicus in the south,[1] both arising out of the attempt to settle relations

[1] To this phase may be ascribed the construction of Wansdyke, the great earthwork which traverses Somerset and Wiltshire. If this was thrown up by a West Welsh confederacy resisting

between British communities on the west and English communities, containing a large and half-absorbed British element, on the east. Such a view of the settlement not only tallies with the evidence of archaeology and place-names, which cannot be reconciled with the theory of a systematic conquest like that of the Danes and a displacement or extirpation of the Britons; it also goes some way towards explaining why, though the original settlement was scattered and peaceful, later tradition represented it as an affair of widespread conquests by powerful kings. For that tradition may represent not unfairly the later stages of the settlement, and it is natural that the memory of these should colour the accounts of its beginning. Still later, traditions arose, like the Arthurian legend, which further emphasized the amount of fighting done; but in considering these it is well to remember that some at least of them arose in, or were modified by, the Viking Age, and tend to project the events of that period backwards into the narrative of the Anglo-Saxon settlements.

a West Saxon advance, it dates perhaps from the period when after the siege of Mons Badonicus the Britons had peace for at least forty-four years (Gildas, *Historia*, xxvi; for the difficulties about the date of the siege, commonly placed in 516, I may refer to Oman, *England before the Norman Conquest*, pp. 200–1, note). Pitt-Rivers showed Wansdyke to be late Roman or post-Roman (*Excavations in Bokerly Dyke and Wansdyke*, 1892), and its design convinces me that it is not Roman. The MSS. of Gildas put the Mons Badonicus near the mouth of the Severn, which might pass as an account of the position of the western end of Wansdyke; but Mommsen in his edition of Gildas treats this statement as spurious. A few early Saxon place-names on the British side of this earthwork, in Wiltshire and Somerset (Ekwall, *English Place-names in -ing*, pp. 69, 70), are intelligible enough if the earliest settlement was a peaceful business and carried out by small isolated bands; for in that case a Saxon element might easily be contained in a British confederacy which, as such, only took shape later.

There is a sense in which Anglo-Saxon England is nearer akin to ourselves than either Roman Britain or medieval England. The age in which we live is—perhaps one ought rather to say, has been—an age whose main political effort has been spent in the building up and consolidating of that unit which we call the national state. In such a period, the inhabitants of our country remember that it is an island, and they use that fact as a lever for internal consolidation and external detachment. From the departure of the Romans to the coming of the Normans Britain was an island and the Channel was a political fact, and the same is true of the period since the close of the Middle Ages. But in the days of the Roman Empire, as we have seen, the Channel was merely a geographical accident. Britain was indissolubly one with northern Gaul. And there is no need to insist upon the reality of a similar union in the Middle Ages. There is a further parallel. As the Anglo-Saxon period, if the argument of this essay is sound, nourished in comparative isolation a seed sown on British soil during the period of unity with the Roman Empire, so modern England has, again in comparative isolation, worked out the results of that fertilizing contact with the mainland which gave us the whole fabric of our medieval life. It can hardly be in our own time, it may not be for centuries, but a time will come when people again realize that Hampshire and Normandy, Picardy and Kent, are each to the other flesh of its flesh and bone of its bone; when the Channel is no longer, as in time of distrust and danger it must be, a barrier, but rather a bond; when the pendulum of history points once more to that unity between England and France which existed in the days of the Caesars.

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III

THE MIDDLE AGES

A. J. CARLYLE

THE last chapter has described in detail the question of the relation of Britain to continental Europe in terms of the Roman civilization, and has explained the degree in which this unifying process was carried out. It is at any rate true to say that in the centuries which preceded what we used to call the Anglo-Saxon Conquest Great Britain had formed an integral part of the unity of the civilized world. It is, however, also true that Britain was the first great part which was cut off from the unity of the Empire. We might be inclined to say that the history of Britain in the Middle Ages is dominated by these early differences between the civilization of these islands and those of the Continent. For it is not only true that the relation between Britain and Rome was brought to an end earlier than the decay of Roman civilization in Continental Europe, but it is also true that, as we now generally think, not much of the Roman civilization survived in Britain.

There has been much discussion as to the degree and extent of the direct survival of Roman institutions in Britain. It is some forty years ago that the admirable and interesting work of Mr. Seebohm for a time persuaded many historians to think that more had survived than had been formerly thought; but the later discussions, especially of the system of the manor and of villeinage, have undoubtedly tended towards the conclusion that

while Mr. Seebohm's suggestions were important and interesting, the balance of evidence goes to show that the manorial system and the villeinage of England in the Middle Ages was not directly descended from Roman institutions, but rather had independent origins of their own. Apart from the suggested survival of the land system of the later Empire there is not much in the characteristics of the civilization of the early Anglo-Saxon Britain which can be with any confidence attributed to a Roman origin. We no longer, indeed, think of the British population as having been exterminated by the Anglo-Saxon invaders. On the contrary, we are generally disposed to think that the Anglo-Saxon invaders settled down among them as a conquering and dominant race, and that in the composition of the English people of later times the British race has in a large measure survived. But this is matter rather for further consideration than for dogmatic statement.

To speak in the most general terms, it is true to say that Britain was the first to be separated from the Roman civilization, and that in Britain the Roman civilization in the main disappeared. It might therefore seem to be a natural conclusion that at the very outset of our history there lies some great difference between Continental Europe and Britain. We must, however, ask ourselves whether this is as true or as important as it might appear to be. It would seem to be on the whole, generally speaking, true to say that the Roman civilization between the fifth and the seventh centuries of our era disappeared in the main in Continental Europe also. We can no longer seriously maintain that the Roman civilization survived directly to any very great extent except in a few places north of the Alps, and it is becoming more and more doubtful how far it can be really said to have survived even in Italy. The distinction between the conditions of

the new and semi-barbarian Britain and those of Continental Europe is probably more apparent than real.

In order to consider this matter a little more in detail, for it is important, it will be well to look at the general condition of Western Europe, as well as of Britain, after the fall of what we sometimes call the Western Empire. It cannot be seriously maintained that if we consider these conditions, whether from the point of view of literature and art, or from the point of view of intellectual standards and political conditions, much of the Roman civilization had survived. The political organizations of the new world were not those of the Empire, but they were in the main homogeneous. And if this is true of the political organizations, it is also true of the general level of intellectual culture. I venture to suggest that it was the same in literature, and, with perhaps some qualification, in art. The new world was not Roman, nor was it held together by the unifying political and intellectual power of Rome, but it was very much more homogeneous than people have sometimes thought.

One thing, indeed, survived, and that was a common religion. No doubt it may be urged that in England, at least for a time, Christianity disappeared, but it must be remembered that it disappeared only for a short time. With the arrival of the Latin missionaries from Rome and that of the Celtic missionaries from Scotland and Ireland, which were more or less simultaneous, England once again became a Christian country. It is true that in the Christianizing of England the Irish and Scottish missionaries played at least as important a part as the Latin. But it is again true that the distinction caused by this was not long continued. The Irish element in English Christianity was living and vigorous, but after all it was rapidly absorbed by the great Roman system. It is also true, and very interesting to observe, that the intellectual and artistic

culture of England came to it in large measure from Ireland and Scotland; but this culture was rapidly diffused, on the Continent as well as in England, by those Irish missions, whose traces can be followed throughout Western Europe and Italy.

It might again seem as though the great attempt at the re-creation of a united political system of Europe by Charlemagne, as it did not include England, might have separated England from Continental Europe. But the attempt at the re-establishment of a united Europe was very short-lived. It did not last long enough to effect any very material change in the general characteristics of the political organization of Europe. It fell to pieces rapidly, and Europe, like England, was overrun by the new barbarian invasions of the ninth century. It is true that the fortunes of the new barbarian settlements might seem rather different on the Continent and in England, and it is possible to contend that for 100 years before the Norman Conquest England was tending to diverge, both in its political structure and in its general system of culture, from the Continent. But these tendencies, such as they were, were ended by the Norman Conquest. And with that Conquest England again became an integral part, both in politics and in general culture, of the European system. Europe, including England, from the end of the tenth century, was once again homogeneous, though not united.

What, then, were the characteristics of this new world—the world of the Middle Ages proper? And what is the relation of the characteristics of the new England to those of Europe? We may consider these from three points of view—the characteristics of religion, the characteristics of literature and art, and the characteristics of political organization.

The Norman Conquest completed the union between

England and the great organization of the Roman Church. Not that England before the Conquest had been in any proper sense separated from it, but it is probably true to say that England had not shared completely in that great revival of the religious spirit, that great reconstruction of ecclesiastical discipline, which marks the latter part of the tenth century and the earlier part of the eleventh century in Europe. With the Norman Conquest the relation was again completely renewed, and carried out in detail. And whatever may be the opinions of different people about the character of the great Church system of the Middle Ages, it cannot be denied or doubted that it was a great system of moral and religious discipline, a great and highly developed institution, masterful and dogmatic no doubt, but also living and penetrated by a profound religious spirit. Behind or within the great ecclesiastical system and the great moral discipline, it is evident that the Medieval Church represented a profound and passionate spiritual force. With the Norman Conquest the Church in England became an integral part of this great system, and it is also clear that it was often at any rate animated by the same profound religious temper, for if it produced ecclesiastical statesmen like Lanfranc or Thomas à Becket, it also produced great theologians like St. Anselm, and men of a profound religious temper like St. Hugh of Lincoln and Robert Grosseteste. The religion of England in the Middle Ages was therefore in all its more important respects the same as that of Continental Europe, animated by the same spirit, controlled by the same system, and profoundly devoted to the Roman See.

We turn, then, to the general characteristics of culture and of the arts. It is easy to see that the characteristics of England were similar in most respects to those of Europe as a whole. The great and characteristic art of the Middle Ages, that is, its architecture, no doubt

developed in England what may be called some distinctive characteristics, but whether you look at the great Norman cathedrals and abbeys, or at the later ecclesiastical architecture of the developed Gothic, English work represents with the work of France the highest level of the achievements of medieval architecture. No doubt the English cathedrals developed certain characteristics by which they may in a measure be differentiated from those of Northern France, but the differences were, for two centuries at least, unimportant as compared with the resemblances. It was not, at any rate until the end of the thirteenth century or perhaps more strictly the middle of the fourteenth century, that what we call the Late Decorated Gothic developed in England into what we call the Perpendicular, while the French developed in the form which we know as 'Flamboyant'. If this is true of architecture, it is true also of the related art of sculpture. It is possible that certain differences may be traced between the developed sculpture of England and that of France, but it is very difficult to say that there is any real distinction between the sculpture, let us say, of the west front of Wells Cathedral and that of the cathedral of Chartres. It is not our place here to deal with the superb qualities and characteristics of this great sculpture, but those who are at all familiar with it will be the first to recognize the immense significance of this achievement of medieval art.

In one point, indeed, the surviving monuments of medieval art in England surpass those of the Continent, and that is in the humbler but in their way as highly developed beauty of the smaller parish churches. It is only here and there in Continental Europe that you can find anything to match the infinite variety and exquisite if homely grace of the smaller English country churches. It may even be doubted whether in some respects these

country churches do not represent in a more convincing form the high development of medieval culture than the great cathedrals. But it must not be supposed that this development represents anything properly peculiar to England. Their survival in England, while they have to such a large extent disappeared on the Continent, is obviously in large measure due to the fact that England never suffered during these many centuries from the destruction caused by invading armies and barbarous civil strife, as almost all Continental countries have done; and secondly to the fact that although the movement of the Renaissance affected England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, just as it did Continental Europe, it was not so wantonly destructive of the monuments of the Middle Ages.

Of the lesser decorative arts we cannot indeed speak with such confidence, because unhappily the remains of these are comparatively scanty, but there is no reason to suppose that these lesser but not unimportant arts were in England in any substantial sense different from those of the rest of Western Europe.

The relations of literature in Medieval England to the literature of the Continent present us with a more complex question. As it happens, what is probably in the main an accident, the earlier literature of the Middle Ages has survived in England to a far greater degree than on the Continent. It is true that it is only some remains of the great Anglo-Saxon literature which have come down to us, but far more has come down than in Germany, while in France the vernacular literature was much later in its development. But when we examine the characteristics, especially of the epic literature of the early Middle Ages in England; when, for instance, we compare the characteristics of the epic of Beowulf with those of the surviving fragments of the epic literature of Germany, it is reason-

able to say that we recognize that they have the same general characteristics. The Anglo-Saxon literature, as it would seem, may have been declining before the Norman Conquest, and with the Norman Conquest it clearly becomes comparatively unimportant, and the vernacular literature of England for some two centuries was below the level of Continental literature. For it was during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries that first the epic literature of Germany and France, and then the great romantic literature, reached its highest level. And there is during those times little which is really quite comparable with this in England. It may therefore at first sight seem as though in relation to literature there was in these centuries some profound difference between the characteristics of England and those of the Continent; but this is really a misapprehension. There was a literary movement in England really parallel to and coincident with that in France, but this literature, although produced in England, was not written in the English vernacular but in the Norman-French. For two centuries the language and the literary traditions of the educated and cultivated classes in England were substantially the same as those of France. If then, as we ought to do, we recognize this Anglo-Norman literature as being properly an English literature, we shall see that it passed through the same stages, assumed the same forms, and developed somewhat the same perfections as that of France. It is only necessary to recall the admirable poetic qualities of the work of Mary of France in her 'lais', written almost certainly at the English Court and for English people, to see that there was no substantial difference between the literary development of the educated or cultivated class in England and that of France. But in order to understand what really happened we must carry our view somewhat farther. For the modern poetry of England finds

its origins and beginnings, not in Beowulf, or the other Anglo-Saxon writers, but in the work of Chaucer. It is from Chaucer that English poetry derives its character. It is Chaucer who first illustrated and developed something like the whole quality and capacity of the English people in poetry, and Chaucer is emphatically and characteristically English. But it must also be observed that if we look at his work from the point of view of its origins, the literature of Chaucer represents the transposition of the immense progress of the literature and poetry of the Continent into an English form. The background of Chaucer is Europe, not England, and the characteristics of the great poetry of Chaucer, though they are wholly English, are yet also wholly Continental, for Chaucer did not represent some provincial or detached element in the European literature of the fourteenth century, but was one of the most important and significant representatives of that literature. Not that we should venture to claim that he was so inspiring or profound or universal a poet as the great Dante in Italy; but there is about him an immense humanity, a great and genial humour, a sense of the significance of all the aspects of human life which was not surpassed by the Continental artists. He was no doubt in some important respects a follower of Boccaccio, but it may also be said that he was a greater and more powerful artist than Boccaccio. It is then evident that if we look at the characteristic qualities of England in the Middle Ages with relation to art and literature, we are dealing with a culture which was homogeneous with that of Europe at large.

We turn then finally to the political aspect of civilization in England. And here it is at last that we shall find in the end a great and significant divergence. But this divergence must not be over-stated, nor must its nature be misapprehended. I would venture to say that until the

end of the thirteenth century the political civilization of Europe was in the main like its literature and its religion, homogeneous—that it finds its main characteristic in the great conception of the supremacy of law, in the principle that the ruler derives his authority ultimately from the community itself, and in the strict limitation of that authority by the greater authority of the law. The great phrase of Bracton that the King has two superiors—that is, God and the Law—corresponds with the principles that are set out in all the political jurisprudence of the Middle Ages. It is further true that not in England alone, but in all European countries, these great and far-reaching political principles tended to find for themselves expression in the institutions of government, and finally in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in the development of the great system of representation. But it is quite true that with the end of the thirteenth century it is possible to trace the beginnings of a great divergence. In England the political movement tended towards the system of a constitutional monarchy subordinated to the law and restrained by representative institutions, while in France, and later in Continental Europe as a whole, it tended towards the development of absolute monarchy. It is curious to see how sharply in the fifteenth century a great lawyer like Sir John Fortescue could distinguish between what he calls the political and regal authority of the King of England, who governed indeed, but governed in accordance with laws made by the community, and what he calls the regal government of France, where, as Fortescue thought, a little prematurely perhaps, the King governed according to laws which were of his own creation.

It is then with this divergence that we close our attempt to set out in these summary terms the place of medieval England in the general system of European civilization. But it may be added that if in these political

divergences we find the first clearly marked distinction between the civilization of England and that of the Continent, it must also be remembered that what was really happening was that in England were being preserved those great principles and those great forms of political society which were appropriate to the Middle Ages, and that it was England which restored those principles to Continental Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The position of medieval England, therefore, has its own interesting and important characteristics, but they are the characteristics of a great and growing national State, not separated from or cut off from the common experience of western civilization, but most intimately related to it.

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IV

THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

A. J. GRANT

THE sixteenth century, for those who seek some principle of unity in history, must necessarily have many depressing features, for it is pre-eminently a century of disruption. All that the medieval world had done to draw together the different parts of Europe disappeared, and in the place of elements of unity came forces of repulsion and of discord. The services of medieval ideas and institutions to European unity have perhaps even yet never been sufficiently recognized. It is true of course that the national sentiment did not then really exist, but as we look back to the Middle Ages from our own century, so full of fierce national antagonisms and wars and the threats of wars, the absence of international bitterness is a striking and welcome feature. The forces making for European unity were many and strong. Foremost among these was the Catholic Church. Its achievements are amazing both in extent and success. By the end of the thirteenth century the Church had given to the Western European world a common faith, a common language, a common ethical standard, a common form of worship. From Poland to England, from Sweden to Spain, men could communicate with one another with fewer practical or emotional difficulties in the thirteenth century than in the twentieth. If the Church had realized the practical problem that waited for solution, it might have given to the world some much larger measure of unity even than

it did. Alongside of the Church, but much weaker and far less important, was the ideal—we can scarcely call it the fact—of the Holy Roman Empire, which, in spite of much that was fantastic and absurd about it, gave to the world the idea of political unity as something that should be striven for and aimed at; and, along with these central institutions, the Universities, the orders of chivalry, various commercial organizations, and generally the social life of Europe exhibited a European and never an exclusively national spirit.

With the sixteenth century all that is altered. The forces that made for unity disappeared and gave place, as we have said, to forces of disruption. The religious world was split in two from the moment when in 1517 Luther affixed his challenge to the cathedral door of Wittenberg. From that time forward more and more Europe was divided into two camps, which we may label the Catholic and the Protestant camps. All efforts at conciliation failed, a relation of permanent hostility was set up, and religion, which had in the Middle Ages been a force working, however inadequately, for peace, became now an additional incentive to war. And, further, it must be noted that, in those countries which adopted some form of Protestant faith and practice, the new faith had little effect in promoting either national unity or international friendship with other countries of a like religious character. There had always been a certain amount of religious persecution in Europe and that amount had increased since the thirteenth century, but it became worse when the Catholic Church found itself definitely challenged by the movement of the Reformation. It believed that stringent measures of self-defence were necessary to its continued existence, and those measures took the form often of the most cruel treatment of its religious opponents. The spirit of religious persecution too was not only seen

between Catholics and their opponents; it was seen also between the different sections of the Protestant camp—what the great Catholic apologist Bossuet has called the Protestant variations. In no country was freedom of worship or freedom of teaching allowed. The State claimed the right of determining the faith and worship of its people. Elizabeth did not permit variations of religion in England any more than Philip II in Spain. There was in Germany after the Peace of Augsburg an appearance of religious toleration, but it was an appearance only. The political unity of Germany was broken up, and in each section religious uniformity was insisted upon. It was in France, and in France only, that a real attempt was made to base the national life on the co-existence of two religious bodies in the same State. The effort of the French Government to induce Protestants and Catholics to live side by side has never had sufficient justice done to it. There were seven Edicts of toleration there during the course of the century, culminating in the great Edict of Nantes in 1598; but these Edicts were rarely successful. The peace they established was always soon broken by renewed civil war, and even the last and greatest Edict lasted for less than a century. The general impression that we get then if we take a general survey of religion in the sixteenth century is that religion increased the antagonism between State and State, and even between members of the same State.

In the political life of Europe there is the same growth of antagonism. The Middle Ages are of course full of wars. The Holy Roman Empire was an ideal that hardly touched the conduct of nations at all, but with the sixteenth century national antagonism becomes a more conscious force and produces a series of wars that have really never ceased down to our own day. What we see is, firstly, the rise of the State to independent national

existence. The modern State, said Dr. Figgis, is a product of the Reformation. It has been answered that rather the Reformation was a product of the modern State. The truth seems to be that each assisted and stimulated the other. At any rate by the sixteenth century we see the statesmen of Europe claiming complete authority within their own frontiers, recognizing no superior in religion or in government, referring their quarrels to no arbitrator or tribunal, and driven by the natural play of the forces of the time into constant conflict. It is the sixteenth century that sees the rise into definite recognition of the idea of balance of power. There has been much misconception and misrepresentation of what the balance of power really means. It was not a system and not a principle. It was little more than the spontaneous and inevitable relationship of entirely independent States, which recognized no other rule than their own strength and prosperity, and had not learned to conceive of their own welfare as being closely related to that of other States. Among States thus unrelated and egoistic it was inevitable that any very powerful State should be regarded as an enemy. Its power, men thought, would necessarily be used to the injury of its neighbours; and we see therefore, first upon the soil of Italy and then upon the wider arena of Western Europe, the relations of the European powers mainly governed by the desire of the weaker States to unite for purposes of defence against the stronger one. It is this which gives us the clue to international relations right down to our own time. First Spain and then France, and then the maritime strength of England, and then France again under Napoleon, and then Germany, have seemed to be powers which threatened the independent life of their European neighbours, and therefore all other States have joined against them, until in the end they have been weakened or overthrown. The

beginning of the working of this idea may be clearly seen as early as the fifteenth century; it culminates in the sixteenth; and it cannot be eliminated from our European life until some principle of order or recognized authority is admitted among the nations of Europe.

In the social and commercial relations of European States there was also a growth of bitterness and of strife. There had always been competition between individuals and groups and cities, but the actual *international* competition of the Middle Ages was slight. In the sixteenth century it became keen and constant. National trading associations took the place of international. It is significant that the German Hansa, which was not an exclusively German organization, was broken by the competition of English traders. The discovery of the New World acted also powerfully in the same direction. That discovery was inevitable, and no one would wish Europe to have remained in ignorance of the rest of the earth's surface. We are right in thinking of the great discoverers—Columbus, Da Gama, Magellan, Drake—as benefactors of mankind; but it is necessary to recognize that the immediate result of the discovery of the New World was, firstly, to bring destruction upon some of the native races and the interesting civilizations that were found there; and, secondly, to fling before the States of Europe a prize that stimulated them to the fiercest discord. The English wars with Spain in the sixteenth century, as the English wars with France in the seventeenth and eighteenth, and other wars later than that, had the struggle for the prize of the New World as their main motive.

Such is then the general character of the sixteenth century, a century of disruption and of strife, a century in which the unity of the human race and its common interests were hardly mentioned or, if mentioned, found

little attention. Yet in spite of all, Europe remained a unity, the contacts between States in spite of their wars, and sometimes because of them, were constant and important; and it is the task of this chapter to point out some of the ways in which the States influenced one another, and in which England gave and received in her relations to the States of Europe.

If we begin with religion, it is interesting to recall the intimate relation that existed between our own saintly Sir Thomas More and the great German or Dutch scholar Erasmus. It is a friendship charming because of the character of the two men, interesting because of the interaction of the Universities of Europe which it reveals, pathetic because it shows us how that intellectual and spiritual co-operation of Europe was interrupted by the Reformation. The phrase 'The Oxford Reformers' applied to More and Erasmus by Mr. Seebohm has been criticized, and if the phrase is taken to mean that More and Erasmus were in any sense Protestants or sympathized with the essential features of the Protestant movement it is obviously a mistake. For More died on the scaffold rather than give way in the least degree to the religious policy of Henry VIII, and was before all things a martyr to the idea of Catholic unity; and Erasmus, though he sympathized with much in Luther's attack on the abuses and the organization of the Church, refused in any way to co-operate with his theological movement or to take the doctrines of Lutheranism in exchange for those of the Catholic Church. And in this friendship between More and Erasmus we may fairly say that whilst More owed much to the enormously greater learning and intellectual power of the Continental scholar, Erasmus gained much, which he was always ready to acknowledge, from the geniality and sweetness and piety of the English scholar and martyr. The breach with Rome made such co-

operation difficult, but the religious life of England when it had assumed a protestant character owed much to continental influences. The English Church indeed, in spite of efforts that were made both in and outside of England, never consented to come into line with the Lutherans of Germany or with the Calvinists of Geneva and of France. It went its own way, standing more than any other religious body in Europe midway between the past and the future, maintaining unbroken the ideas and the traditions of the past, but attempting, and not unsuccessfully, to harmonize them with the demands of the present and the needs of the future. But although the religious life of England thus did not merely re-echo the ideas of Luther or of Calvin, or of Zwingli, it was constantly influenced by Continental thinkers. From the end of the reign of Henry VIII with increasing strength the influence of Geneva especially was strong in England. There were a great many Englishmen, perhaps a majority, who failed to understand the *via media* of the English Church. Rome they knew and Geneva they knew, the two great enemies that challenged and thundered against one another; but how any Church or organization could stand between Rome and Geneva owing much to both but refusing to co-operate with either, that was a point of view difficult to the ordinary man to conceive. Inside the Church as well as outside, the Presbyterian and Puritan movements, which in all their forms are really directly traceable to the influence of Calvin and of Geneva, gained many adherents. Late in the century Hooker in his *Ecclesiastical Polity* gave the theory of the English Church in a book of monumental eloquence and grandeur of thought and expression; but for more than a century yet it seemed inevitable to most Englishmen that those who broke from communion with Rome could hardly stop short of the ideas in theology, in Church government, and perhaps

above all in the discipline of life, that were represented by the Genevan reformers. It was not only Germany and Geneva which influenced English religious life. A considerable number of Italian reformers were also resident in England, and Queen Elizabeth is said to have been particularly fond of their writings, and subject to their influence. It is well also to remember that the Genevan school of the Reformation is nothing but the French school transplanted for the purposes of safety to that beautiful city which has played so important a part in the religious, intellectual, and international life of Europe.

If we turn to politics we see the state going its own way, pursuing its own advantage with little regard to any considerations of religion or of morals. The union of the Protestant states proved as impossible as the union of the Catholics. France and Spain were at constant strife; all efforts to bring Germany and England, or Protestant France and England, into alliance and harmony proved impracticable. It is never easy to say how far the book or the ideas of one man influences a period, or how far those ideas are themselves the reflection of the period, but the sixteenth century can hardly be understood by any one who does not know something of Machiavelli's *Prince*. That amazing work has much in it that is admirable intellectually and even morally, but it is the supreme illustration of the theory that in the life of the state there is no standard of right except success, and that what is called morality in the life of the individual has no binding force upon the statesman. There is an interesting story, though a little difficult of acceptance, that Thomas Cromwell—Henry VIII's important statesman and the 'hammer of the monks'—told Cardinal Pole that the teaching of Machiavelli was worth more than that of all the fathers of the Church; and it is certain that Machiavelli's teaching, through whatever channels, made

its way into the thoughts and the actions of most of the statesmen of Europe.

The form which the state took in Europe tended everywhere towards absolute, or at any rate authoritative, monarchy. There was no enthusiasm, generally speaking, for parliamentary institutions. So far as there was a popular movement in any state in Europe it usually took the form of a desire to strengthen the hands of the King. Monarchy, it has been said, was the medieval form of democracy, and there was much in the monarchy of the sixteenth century also that was democratic in character. 'The new Messiah', says Michelet, the French historian, 'was the King', and nowhere was the royal power more acclaimed or more readily supported than in England. The royal power, and that alone, gave a sense of unity, of order, and of safety, and seemed capable of preserving the country from the civil strife that was always menacing it. The Tudor monarchy is in many respects characteristically English, but the outlook of the Tudor kings was not in essence different from that of the Valois kings of France and of the House of Hapsburg in Spain and in Austria, or of many a German prince upon his own territories. It was not Divine Right of Kings in the sense in which that phrase was used in the seventeenth century; for our Tudor kings, and especially Queen Elizabeth, could not possibly have defended their presence on the throne on the basis of such a theory. It was essentially a popular dictatorship for the maintenance of national unity and order; and at no time in our history until the nineteenth century was there so much resemblance between the forms of government in England and in France; for whilst in England the monarchy gained a great acquisition of strength, in France, while no one proposed to destroy the monarchy, the national representative institution, which was called the States

General, was frequently summoned and put forward claims that went beyond those of the contemporary English Parliament.

There is one feature in the political life of the time which deserves special note. That is the growing entente and alliance between England and France. That alliance has in our own days been a force of such immense and welcome importance that it is interesting to examine those periods in the past in which the two countries have been most drawn together, and amongst these periods the sixteenth century must hold a high place. As we have said, there was a close resemblance between the institutions of the two countries. In both countries the population was deeply divided between the religious parties of the time; but it was really neither religious nor constitutional sympathy which drew them together, but rather, and it is important to note it, the common enmity and fear of Spain. A correspondent of Lord Burleigh's, who is quoted by Froude, spoke of Spain towards the end of the century as a 'Colossus stuffed with clouts', but few people could see that the foundation upon which the power of Spain rested was weak. To the eyes of most statesmen she was the one great power with enormous possessions in Europe, bestriding the Continent from Germany to Lisbon, and from Amsterdam to Naples; and outside of Europe she possessed enormous and indefinite claims to the whole of the New World. England and France were drawn together by the operation of the idea of the balance of power, and by common fear and enmity to this immense power. It is the one thing constant in the fluctuating international relationships of the last half of the century that any threat of Spain against England brings France inevitably to our side, and similarly France can always count upon the support of England when her national existence is threatened by Spain. Fear of Spain

was the obsession of French and English statesmen in the sixteenth century.

In the domain of culture the relations between England and the Continent were throughout close. The end of the era of the Renaissance was approaching; and a certain unity was given to the cultured world of Europe by the common devotion of all countries to the Greek and Latin classics. At the beginning and at the end of the century European scholars found a welcome in England. Oxford and Cambridge did their best to come to a level with Paris and the great Universities of Italy in their pursuit of the new learning. Devotion to the ideas of the Renaissance has been regarded in some quarters almost as a substitute for the Catholicism that was disappearing. But how inadequate a substitute! It only touched a small section of the upper classes, and upon international ideas and action it had no influence at all.

There were also intimate relations with the Continent in the domain of pictorial Art. England was full of artistic life and delight in beauty, but our country produced few painters of note. There was great painting done in England, but it was done by foreigners. We need only recall the magnificent series of portraits of the Court and Society of Henry VIII, which we owe to the German Holbein, and which have made the men and women of that age as familiar to us in personal appearance as our own contemporaries. In the latter half of the century no such great name as Holbein's is to be found among those who painted in England, yet still foreign pencils and brushes were employed rather than those of our own countrymen. The portraits of Queen Elizabeth, inadequate and lifeless as they are in comparison with those of Henry VIII, were painted for the most part by Zuccaro and Moro, an Italian and a Dutchman.

In Literature we went our own way and struck out a line of the utmost possible importance not only for our-

selves but for the culture of the whole of Europe. It was, as we know, a great age in literature in Europe generally. We have in France the great names of Rabelais and Montaigne; in Spain, Calderon and Cervantes; while Italy produced Ariosto and Tasso; but these great writers, whose importance has to-day become universally recognized throughout Europe, had little international significance for their own time. The Italians were the most generally admired. It is impossible to find any tribute to Shakespeare from a foreign pen in the sixteenth century, and England was slow to recognize the merits of French or of Spanish writers. But even in the domain of literature there was international stimulus and connexion. Italy had played the most prominent part in the Renaissance and it is due to this that Italian examples had so much influence with us. We know how many of the plays of Shakespeare owe their origin to some Italian novel or play. We may recall too that there are many passages in Shakespeare which show that he was familiar with the writings of Montaigne.

It was a great age in Science. Copernicus and Galileo in astronomy, Paré in medicine, Mercator in geography, make the age illustrious. These men influenced England, but there was not on our side of the water any very large contribution to the work in which they were engaged. We had to wait for the next century.

To sum up, though it was a century of disruption the European world was still an essential unity in which the history of no part is intelligible without reference to the other parts. To the disruptive forces of the time we contributed largely. The breach with Rome was here a very different thing from what it was in Germany or Scotland or Holland, or any other Protestant land, and the effort of the English Church to mediate between the old and the new, between the splendid traditions of the past and the new forces which were difficult to harmonize

with that past, has already been noted. Our example was not imitated. The nearest parallel to it was to be found in the Gallican Church of France, and there were moments during the civil wars, and especially when, at the end of the century, Henry IV of France, though reconciled to Rome, was on strained relations with the Papacy, when it seemed as though France might follow the example of England in setting up a Church that should be at once Catholic and national—but other counsels prevailed. The diplomacy of England was in no way superior, nor in any striking way different from that of the Continent. We too followed egotistic aims, we too were mainly influenced by considerations of self-preservation and the idea of the balance of power, nor were we, in making and in breaking international pacts, more scrupulous than the statesmen of France, of Spain, or of Italy.

To the better side of the time we contributed powerfully. We recall the name and the work of Sir Thomas More, whose *Utopia*, though not indeed the first work of its kind known to European literature, was destined to give a great stimulus to the imaginative reconstruction of society. It was, too, perhaps the greatest age of English music, and we have been celebrating this year the fourth centenary of the work of the great English musician Byrd. It was not an age of great Church building, but domestic architecture, influenced largely by continental ideas, achieved many noteworthy masterpieces.

I have left, of course, by far the greatest of all English contributions to the common spiritual wealth of Europe to the last. Hardly any age in England, since the time at least of Chaucer, has failed to produce great poetry, and the English contribution to the poetry of Europe has been unsurpassed in volume and in value by that of any other country. In the sixteenth century splendid work was done in lyric, in narrative, and of course

above all in drama. The other names are great but they all of them sink into insignificance by the side of Shakespeare. Any estimate of his value or of his originality could be nothing but ridiculous here, but what I want to emphasize is that England made through him and through his compeers a contribution of unsurpassed magnificence to the culture of Europe. It was slow in gaining recognition, but that recognition has fully come and the poetry of Shakespeare has been a powerful force in drawing the hearts, even of countries that have been politically at strife with us, in admiration towards our land. It has not only given to the individual life of Europe a new sense of beauty and a new source of joy, but it has in very truth been one of the forces drawing Europe together and making for that greatest of all aims, the conciliation of the nations.

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V

THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

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WE will begin by taking a general survey of the century and its main features, following somewhat the lines on which we dealt with the sixteenth century. The religious condition of Europe did not fundamentally change. For unity there had come division, and all efforts to efface that division by force or by persuasion failed. The antagonism between Roman Catholicism and the different movements which may be loosely labelled as Protestant was for the first half of the century rather more bitter than less so, for the Roman Church had gathered its forces together under the leadership of the Company of Jesus, and, encouraged by the divisions, the decline of enthusiasm, and the weakness of many of its opponents, dreamt that the work of the Reformation might be undone. The counter reformation, as it is called, did indeed gain great victories, and mainly by peaceable means. In the south of Germany, in Austria, in Poland, and elsewhere, the Jesuit missionaries were wonderfully successful in winning back the hearts of the population to loyalty to the Roman Catholic Church, and the desire to carry forward this work by the force of arms and to stifle the Protestant movement in the country that had given birth to it is one of the great and main causes of the Thirty Years' War. It would be absurd to deal with the Thirty Years' War in detail. It is essentially the last great war in which religious questions play a decisive part, and when

the Peace of Westphalia came in 1648 the result was obviously a drawn battle. From that time onwards Catholicism has never been able seriously to hope for the forcible suppression of its great opponent, nor, on the other hand, have Protestants ventured to think that their ideas could drive out Catholic convictions from all European lands. Only slowly the Catholic and the Protestant bodies came to accept this condition of things, and to try and find a form of thought and feeling that should allow them to exist in friendship side by side.

The great central conflict continues then at any rate for the first half of the century with unabated bitterness, and in the Protestant lands no sort of religious unity was reached; rather the movements for disruption in religion tended ever to widen. In Germany the first fervour of Lutheranism had passed, and the movement lost a great deal of the liberal and humanitarian feeling which it had at first. There, and elsewhere in Europe, the true fighting force of Protestantism in its struggle with its great opponent was to be found among those who accepted the ideas of Calvin—the Evangelicals, as they were called in Germany, the Presbyterians or Puritans, as they were known in our own country. Between the Lutherans and the Calvinists there was much bitterness of feeling, and their incapacity for real co-operation was one of the causes which gave hope of complete victory to the Catholics during the Thirty Years' War. In England exclusive power lay in the hands of the English Church, controlled through the bishops by the English State; but the maintenance of religious unity proved difficult, and in the long run impossible. Even in Elizabeth's reign the opposition of the Presbyterians had been strong and invincible both inside and outside of the Church. Their aims were not merely theological; they had a political significance as well. A great part of the Presbyterian

movement is really to be explained by a desire for self-government in religious matters, a desire to be freed in matters of the conscience from the dominion of the State. At first all the efforts of Presbyterianism were rudely crushed. 'No Bishop, no King,' said James I, with a large amount of insight, and he declared that Presbyterianism was as easy to harmonize with monarchy as God with the devil; but in the reign of his successor, more unfortunate and not wiser, Presbyterianism gained its great victories. The Long Parliament championed its cause; it gained for a time an almost complete control of the State Church, and great hopes were entertained in the Northern kingdom that in religious matters England would come into exact line with Scotland. These hopes were indeed fallacious, and English Presbyterianism was always of a very different kind from Scotch. And alongside of Presbyterianism, or underneath it, other movements were to be descried. The movement of Independency claimed for religion a greater liberty than Calvin or Knox would have approved, demanding that each congregation should be allowed to manage its own affairs and worship in its own way. And alongside of the Independents there were other movements, and we may notice especially that of the Quakers. Religious liberty gains no decisive victory until the end of the century, but by the middle of the century it was already apparent that it would be extremely difficult for the State to coerce or control the powerful fermentation in religious matters.

If we turn from religion to politics, we may state briefly the main features of the time. The independent State is the all-important fact, for all European States had adopted the central principle of Machiavelli that the State was an end in itself and need recognize no rule except the rule of success. The seventeenth century gives us classical examples of the balance of power. The States grouped

themselves, especially after the Thirty Years' War, not according to religious sympathies and not in the least according to racial or cultural affinities, but in order to make effective common resistance to whatever power seemed for the moment most dangerous. And the one supremely powerful and successful State, and therefore, according to the ideas of the time, which are also the ideas of our own time, the most dangerous State was the French monarchy. The seventeenth century is for European history pre-eminently the French century. The power of Spain was crippled and broken, and she was incapable of playing again a leading part in European politics. France took her place and rose higher than Spain had ever done, provoking the admiration and the imitation, but also the hostility, of nearly every country in Europe. We have a series of wars all springing from this root principle of passionate hostility to France. If we take, as we may, the seventeenth century as lasting down to 1713 and the end of the war of the Spanish Succession, we may say that those efforts were successful during the century. The presence of intermittent war as the rule of the political life of Europe was beginning to provoke some solitary thinkers to consider whether means might not be found to remedy or to check so serious an evil. Thus, at the beginning of the century, we have in the Memoirs of Sully his interesting but fantastic project of a European federation. We need not discuss how far it corresponds with the real intentions of his royal master Henry IV; we need only notice it as the sketch of a plan which would never again be quite absent from the conscience of Europe until it received a very large measure of fulfilment in the League of Nations. To the early part of the century too belongs the great name of Grotius. It seems that war at its worst is necessary to make men ensue peace with any activity or success, and Grotius was inspired, he has told us, by the

spectacle of the monstrous inhumanities of the Thirty Years' War to think out a way to peace. We may not even look at his epoch-making speculations; we must only notice that through him begins the modern era of international law.

If we turn now to the social life and culture of the century, the one supreme fact again is the predominance of France. It was not only in arms that France dominated Europe, she seemed to most men of that age to be doing the most important things in art and thought and literature, and especially to have set up a standard of politeness and manners superior to anything known elsewhere in Europe. We shall return again to the direct and indirect influence of the French model upon other European countries.

The commercial life of Europe was inspired internationally by fierce and unconcealed competition. The nations of Europe saw in the new world to the east and to the west inexhaustible possibilities of wealth, and yet, great as these possibilities were, they were unwilling to share them with any other power. It was competition in trade, and especially in trade in the New World, which drove England again and again to war with the Dutch, the people which in character, in religion, and in social organization was most like our own. Let us notice too that the East India Company was during this century laying the foundations of our great power in India; that the Eastern seaboard of North America was filling up with English colonists destined to a greater future than any one at that time even dreamed of; and let us note that France was our rival in both arenas, that she had got her settlements in India which seemed for a long period to be the successful rival of our own; that in America, Canada and the lower basin of the Mississippi were both in French hands; and we shall understand that in this rivalry we have the

seeds of great wars which, however, belong rather to the eighteenth than to the seventeenth century.

We have now to turn to the main purpose of this course and to ask what was the position of England in relation to Europe, what were her contributions and what were her debts, what she took and what she gave. Her religious life was isolated and independent. The English Church neither influenced nor was much influenced by continental movements; though towards the end of the century it is interesting to note that what is known as the Jansenist movement in the Church of France was not without influence upon English thought, as we may very clearly see from the writings of the Whig Bishop Burnet. But for the most part both the official and State religion of England, and also the Nonconformist movements in England, bear a very decided national character. Presbyterianism and Puritanism (which is closely connected, though not always identical with it) have of course a foreign origin. They came into England from Geneva and from Scotland, but they always had in England an essentially national character, as the Scotch found when they tried to bring England into line with their own religious movement. Still more is the Congregational and Independent movement in England an essentially national growth; it indeed often looked abroad for its theology and for its social discipline, but there was hardly anything more characteristically English than those religious movements which came to the front during the last part of the civil war, and which are illuminated by the great names of Cromwell and of Milton. After the Restoration the example of France threatened to be an important force with us once more. Charles II came back to the throne from his travels profoundly impressed with the superiority of the French model, and anxious to introduce it into this country. The clue to his policy and outlook on life is

afforded to us perhaps better by the negotiations for the secret Treaty of Dover than by any other incident or series of incidents. He proposed then, with the help of French money and of French troops, to establish in England a form of government and of religion like those which he knew in France, that is to say, Catholicism and monarchical absolutism. He has been visited for this intention by unlimited execration from all historians and writers ever since; yet probably his own conscience acquitted him of blame. It was probably a platitude with him that not only for the comfort of the King, but for the advantage of the nation, the French model was the best both in Church and State.

In politics too the French influence is important throughout the century. I think we can hardly understand the career of Strafford unless we remember that just at this time France was being raised to a position of undisputed supremacy in Europe by the 'thorough' policy of Cardinal Richelieu, and I cannot doubt that Strafford was self-consciously desiring to do for England what Richelieu had done for France. I shall turn to this point later; for the moment we only need note that though Charles I is not a man either in character or in ability inferior to Louis XIII, and though Strafford may in energy and character and skill sometimes seem to us to rival the great Cardinal himself, his experiment upon English soil proved an entire failure and led up directly to the civil wars. How much Charles hoped from France during the civil wars we well know, but the civil wars were destined to run their course without material interference from outside of our own islands. It is, however, interesting to remember that Cromwell himself in his tactics and organization of his army received material assistance from abroad. The Thirty Years' War had developed many features in military art that made the fighting of the sixteenth century seem

old-fashioned and ineffective. Scott's novel, *The Legend of Montrose*, will remind us through the character of Dugald Dalgetty of the influence of the great soldiers of the Thirty Years' War upon Scotch warfare. The influence was not much less upon English warfare, and Cromwell used methods that had been first thought out by Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus. Towards the end of the century the two brothers who reigned on the restored throne of England had France always uppermost in their minds. Charles II had hoped to realize his purpose with the help of Louis XIV, and Louis XIV was an ever-present force in the mind of James II, though his obstinate and in some ways rather honourable refusal to accept the help of Louis XIV in 1687 was partly answerable for his ignominious failure in 1688.

We must remember too how much the English Revolution owed to the great Dutchman who championed the cause of liberty both religious and political. The century is one, as we have said, somewhat self-centred so far as England is concerned—more so than the sixteenth, more so, I think, than the eighteenth—and yet this, the most characteristic of English political movements, could hardly have been carried through with the success that it achieved, had it not been for the courage and skill, military and diplomatic, of its great Dutch leader. He cared indeed very little for English political ideals; his mind, it has been said, was pre-eminently an international mind; it was dominated by the balance of power and hostility to France; but we cannot be sure that the Parliament would have achieved its victory if it had not been for the help of the great Dutchman.

In the domain of culture also we in England received great and valuable assistance from the Continent. Here too France is more important than all other European countries, and her influence was of the highest significance

and value. It was under the guidance of French models that our prose began to lose something of the roughness which had accompanied its vigour and eloquence in the sixteenth century, and adopted something of the delicacy and refinement of the great French writers. The influence of France too was visible in a less satisfactory manner in the development of our drama. It is one of the strangest chapters in the history of literary taste The mind of England grew insensible to the greatness and glory of the Shakespearian stage. If Shakespeare's plays were still acted they were presented with such changes and adaptations as destroyed a great deal of their most characteristic charm, and whilst our own great drama was neglected or forgotten the influence of French drama grew ever stronger with us. And it is a curious thing that we imitated not always what was best in the French drama. The great school of French tragedians, of whom Corneille and Racine are the best known, is distinguished not only for dignity and concentrated interest but also for moral purity; and the great comedian Molière, though coarse passages may be found in his writings, is also on the whole singularly delicate and inoffensive in his tone. These qualities are notably absent in the writers of our Restoration period who were directly under the influence of French models. Dryden and Congreve and Wycherley, while they reproduced something of the wit and brilliance of their French models, give us coarseness far beyond anything that is to be found in the best French writers. The Restoration drama has a large number of admirers at the present time, yet few will dispute that it represents a lower plane than that of the previous century, and a lower plane than that of its French models. I need not go further into the subject here than to insist how great and direct was the debt of these writers to France. In pictorial art too we received much from the Continent, not indeed from

France but rather from those Belgian lands where art in the seventeenth century flourished as nowhere else in Europe. First Rubens visited us in the days of Charles I and left in our islands many of his masterpieces, and then later there came his pupil and successor Vandyck, and it is to him that we owe the best portraits of the Court and era of Charles I. In science and philosophy the Continent too had much to teach us and found us willing learners. It is the period of Descartes, and the thought of Descartes in mathematics and philosophy was in England a powerful example and stimulus, and his is by no means the only name of importance. Bossuet and Pascal and the writers of the Jansenist school exercised a fascination upon many English minds.

We received then from Europe great and valuable things but we had also much to give, and I turn now to consider some of the most characteristic of our contributions. The seventeenth century was for England a great period of art and culture. In music and in painting we doubtless gave far less than we received. The name of Purcell is indeed a great one and modern taste seems more and more inclined to recognize his merits. Sir Peter Lely is the most prominent name among our painters but, however interesting his portraits of the costumes and faces of the courtiers of Charles II's reign may be, he is no rival of Rubens and Vandyck and the painters of the Continent. But in poetry we more than hold our own. It is no depreciation of the great names of France to say that among the poets of the seventeenth century Milton must easily hold the first place. It is true indeed that his worth was not fully recognized even amongst us in his own age, and outside of our islands he was hardly known at all, but we need not hesitate to say that in him appeared one of the great poetical geniuses in the history of the world. A great Roman critic said of Cicero that a man

might judge of his own advance in good taste by the pleasure that Cicero's writings gave him, and with much more truthfulness may we say that a man's appreciation of Milton's poetry is an almost unfailing criterion of his taste for poetry as a whole. This is no place to attempt any analysis of his genius or any survey of his works, but his importance for England in the seventeenth century is almost as great as that of Shakespeare in the sixteenth.

Our contribution to science was also of immense importance. Here it is enough to recall that we have at the beginning of the century the great name of Bacon. Science still disputes as to the relation of Bacon's writings to the subsequent movement of scientific discovery. He seems to be rather a prophet of the modern scientific movement than an actual worker in science, but Europe has not been slow to recognize his greatness and to submit to his influence. And towards the end of the century there came an even greater name, one of the very greatest of all, the man who along with Milton and with Cromwell may be regarded as the truest glory of seventeenth-century England. I allude of course to Sir Isaac Newton. If we are thinking of the achievements of England in the seventeenth century, above all if we are thinking of what England received and gave, we must lay great stress upon Newton's work, for he carried forward both mathematics and astronomy over an immensely important stage. During the next century his work and example were a powerful stimulus to the mind of Europe, and we may fairly apply to him what Burke said of Chatham and say that ' he kept the name of this country respectable in every other on the globe '.

Lastly, in this slight sketch of English contributions to the culture of the time we must not omit to mention the names of the great philosophers. Here too Bacon's name must be the first, and after Bacon, though others call for

our attention, the next must be the name of Hobbes. He has been called the greatest of English political philosophers and certainly in the domain of political philosophy there is no more remarkable, no more challenging or provocative writer. We in the Unity School of History are probably most of us pledged to what one may vaguely call the liberal view of life, we are in favour of free criticism, of free thought, of free utterance, and of the co-operation of the people in the tasks of government. It would be for nearly all of us a very useful and I hope even a strengthening exercise to read Hobbes's splendid, eloquent, impassioned denunciation of most of what we hold dear; his plea for unity in politics, in religion, in thought; his denunciation even of those very parliamentary liberties which are the basis of our English life. Hobbes represents for us the intellectual reaction after the Puritan civil war. At the very end of the century we have in John Locke the philosopher of the revolution of 1688. He is a smaller man, a weaker man than Hobbes, and his philosophy and his style have none of the rich splendour that belongs to the author of the *Leviathan*; but he did a work of immense European importance, for he provided the believers in Parliamentary government and in political and religious liberty with irresistible arguments in their defence; and he contributed powerfully to that growth of belief in liberty which marks Europe during the next century.

And yet great as were our contributions to almost every phase of European culture, it is not there that we find the most characteristic contributions made by England in the seventeenth century. I want in conclusion to pay a little more attention to two great experiments of our national life in religion and government. Firstly, I would call your attention to English Puritanism, one of the most characteristic and one of the most important phases through which

the English mind has ever passed. It may be regarded doubtless from many points of view—the theological, the political, the ethical. I would suggest one point of view which is not exactly any of these. The Reformation movement had at first been a rebellion against the Catholic discipline of life; it had demanded freedom in every direction; it had destroyed the monasteries, the regulars as we may remember they were technically called. Many cried out in the early days of the Reformation that it was destroying all ideas of right and wrong in matters of conduct. Well now in the Puritan movement we see a tremendous reaction against this looseness and individualism in the conduct of life. Monasteries had been destroyed in England in the sixteenth century and now in the seventeenth a great English party, supported at last by the English parliament itself, strove to make all England a sort of monastery, to impose upon the whole country a sort of cloistral life, to make us all follow a rule almost as strict as that of the monastic orders themselves. We know that this failed. We have all heard of the evil effects of Puritanism upon the artistic and intellectual side of English life, though for my own part I cannot think that a movement was entirely hostile to art or thought which produced the work of a Milton and a Bunyan. Without any question the rigidity that Puritanism attempted to impose produced a violent and dangerous reaction. There is no likelihood of the twentieth century trying to go back—even in our age of revivals—to Puritan standards and methods; but it is more important for us to see the greatness that there was in Puritanism, the services that it rendered to English life and character and society, than to insist on its failure or analyse its causes. There can be no doubt that at its best it carried life on to a higher plane, that it gave it more dignity and more meaning, that it inspired those who

voluntarily adopted it with an energy and a power which otherwise would have been lacking to us. The Puritan movement remained in essence an exclusively English movement, though its origins are traceable to Geneva, and you may find among the Huguenots of France and among the Moravians of Germany, and in many other quarters, something of the same kind; but local and national though it remained, limited though its scope was, though it was in the end a failure, it is more important to insist upon its services than upon its defects, and though we are here as historians and not as prophets, I will venture to say that the English and the European world, without returning exactly to the methods or to the aims of Puritanism, will before long see some return in whatever form to a greater discipline of life, a greater definition of aim, both in private and in public conduct. Our own age is one of the most anarchical and undisciplined that Europe has ever known, and history usually shows us that it is after periods such as ours that the return to discipline is strongest and most assured.

If Puritanism was one great English contribution to Europe, another and of more unquestioned value was what we did for liberty, for liberty of thought as well as for liberty of action. I have already said that the seventeenth century was dominated by France and the French monarchy; and the French monarchy, let us make no doubt about that, was a very splendid and a very remarkable political experiment. For nearly the whole of the century it seemed to most observers that the French model was the proper model for all nations to pursue, that a country was strongest and happiest, most prosperous, under a unified and centralized government which admitted of little or no criticism and only asked the opinion and the advice of a few selected counsellors. It was not until at any rate the third quarter of the century that the

weakness of the French system began to show itself. If we compare England in the days of Charles I and Strafford with the contemporary France of Louis XIII and Richelieu it is almost absurd to see the efficiency of France and the weakness of England. English statesmen in comparison with the great diplomatists of France are like amateurs playing against professionals. The French diplomatists have a knowledge of facts, a shrewdness of judgement, a dexterity of handling which is altogether absent among the statesmen of England; and we cannot wonder therefore that when Charles II came to the throne, although he had to accept the parliamentary régime (for by that he was called back to England), he was always of opinion that the French model was the right model for England to imitate. All over Europe it seemed as though there was a general trend towards centralized royal institutions. From this point of view the Revolution of 1688 in England is a matter of immense European importance. We have already glanced at the influence that it had upon international relationships, but it is not of that that I am thinking here. I am thinking of the example that it afforded of a new type of government, a government of balance, a government that allowed criticism, a government in which a certain section of the people were called into partnership with the rulers, a government, that is to say, the very opposite, in character and aim and theory, of the government which had been established for so long and with such remarkable success in France. As we read after the lapse of three-quarters of a century the dithyrambic chapters of Macaulay on the work of the Whig revolution, we are tempted to smile a little pityingly. We cannot accept his view that the Revolution of 1688 established the *popular* element in the English constitution; we see that what it really did was to give power to the aristocracy and landholding element among the English people. But at any

rate it established a form of government whereby a large section of the people shared in the tasks of administration and of legislation ; it opened the way through which wider sections of the people made their way into partnership in the State ; and it thus leads the way not only to the democracy of England in the nineteenth century but to the French Revolution and all liberal movements of the Continent. And it was thus influential because the government which it established was successful. England was the leader in the war against Louis XIV, and when in 1713 his power was overthrown, it was felt that English statesmanship and English money, and to a less extent English soldiers, had played the most important part in bringing about this result ; and England remained successful—though not always in a way that the twentieth century likes—throughout the whole of the eighteenth century. There was a revulsion in favour of Parliamentary institutions and against centralized monarchies, a revulsion that led up to the French Revolution of 1789. English thought and English example were by no means the only forces that were working for that end, but they were amongst the most powerful forces and the relation between 1688 and 1789 is a very real and important one.

Not only political liberty but also religious liberty secured a large measure of success before the end of the eighteenth century, and here too we see the passing of influence from France to England. It seems that each country in turn takes its part in advancing the cause of liberty, and doubtless other causes as well. France had held up before the eyes of Europe a wonderful example at the end of the sixteenth century. In the Edict of Nantes (1598) France had shown Europe that one State might contain two different religious bodies, and the following years showed that they could live side by side with great mutual advantage and without serious difficulty. The

Protestants of France had contributed a large share, more than their proportionate share probably, to the glories and the commercial success of the France of Louis XIV. By the middle of the century one might have thought that it would have become apparent to the eyes of French statesmanship that the experiment was a great success, that it had brought to France many advantages and no drawbacks at all. The Roman Catholic Church in France was flourishing as it had hardly ever flourished before, and its leaders exercised a great intellectual influence in Europe; and yet France threw away this source of power and honour, and in 1685 turned back to the old ways of religious unity and therefore of religious persecution. It is not necessary here to attempt any full analysis of the forces that brought about this disastrous result. It was essentially the extension into religion of the centralized political system of the French monarchy. France had only one government, unchecked and uncriticized, in politics; it was natural that the King and his advisers should desire to sweep on one side the constant criticisms, the constant opposition, which the existence of the French Protestants implied in matters of religion. There were other forces of course. Theology had never found any logical basis for religious toleration. The religious minds of France—and there were great religious names in France at that epoch—were at one in believing that there was one right path in matters of religion, and that all citizens should be forced to take that path, and that path only. Besides this the King's private life, which had been first loose and little influenced by religious considerations, changed towards the end of the century, partly under the influence of Madame de Maintenon; and it seemed to him a religious duty to purge France of the heresy that had sullied it for more than a century. So we get in 1685 the revocation of the Edict of Nantes; and just at the very

time when France took this decisive step towards enforced religious unity, England took steps not so dramatic, but equally decisive, in the opposite direction. When James II made his attempt to give to Roman Catholicism a position of freedom and of favour he hoped that he would be able to secure the support of the English Nonconformists. With a sure political instinct they refused for the most part to accept the bait that was offered them, and it was their support of the cause of political liberty that contributed to the victory of the Revolution of 1688. The Marquess of Halifax had in one of the great pamphlets of English history promised them if they supported the Parliament that their cause would be favourably considered when the victory was won. Victory came, but the religious settlement of the revolution seems to us now an extraordinarily lame, illogical, and unsatisfactory settlement; and the Whigs in their triumph did far less than they ought to have done for the cause of religious liberty. Yet they did much, and they did it in a characteristically English way; in a way, that is to say, which declared no new principles, which held up no new ideals, but which achieved a great and valuable practical result by means of compromise. For the Roman Catholics of England nothing was done, though they were in England as harmless a population as the Protestants had been in France. They were left a body of outcasts excluded from the social and from the political life of England, and they had to wait, we must remember, a century and a half before their wholly just and innocent claims were granted. It was only Protestant Nonconformity that was considered by the Whig reformers, and what they did was to leave the old persecuting statutes still in existence, and simply to declare that as regards the Protestant orthodox Nonconformists those statutes would no longer be enforced. A lame and unsatisfactory solution! We see that very clearly now,

but we must also recognize that it was a very important contribution to a problem that was more difficult than we can now easily understand. It challenged no great interest; it produced no violent opposition; it created no reaction, and the system of liberty gradually worked its way into our social life. More ought to have been done in 1690, far more ought to have been done during the eighteenth century, but for our present purpose it is important to insist that what was done was very important and led the way here also to the much greater contribution made to the same problem by the French Revolution.

We end then by noticing that our country was foremost in the seventeenth century for the contributions that it made to liberty, just as France was foremost in the next century, and Germany in the sixteenth. It is curious to see how slowly and with what difficulty the States of Europe came to accept liberty either in its political or in its intellectual aspects. I have already noticed some of the obstacles in the way. Liberty of religion and also liberty in the sense of partnership in the government seemed to conflict with the idea of unity in the State, which was the most strongly rooted idea in Europe during this epoch. The case for liberty is a difficult one to make out, though doubtless it can be made out and has been made out successfully and convincingly. It is, however, important to recognize that it came into our life, not so much by argument nor as a gift of philosophy or speculation or religion, but as a result of practical experience. The religious leaders did not like it, the philosophers found it hard to approve of, the rulers of the world at first believed it wholly contrary to their interests; but as a result of hard experience they had to recognize that enforced religious unity raised more difficulties than it solved, and that the partnership of the people in power, though it seemed to threaten the solidity of the State, was in

fact a source of strength and a security of stability and order. That must be reckoned among the greatest discoveries of the human mind, a discovery not due to any single individual, whether thinker or statesman, but one that has gradually come into the consciousness and convictions of Europe. For we have now discovered that freedom of thought, freedom of worship, freedom of criticism, the participation of the people in the work of the government, instead of leading to anarchy, the ruin of law, constant change and fluctuation in government, is really the sole basis upon which an ordered and stable State can be built. The appearance of permanence and of order which despotism gives has been proved by history to be wholly fallacious; it is liberty that is the real antiseptic of corruption; and the recognition of that has been one of the great achievements of the last century. We must not think that our people made the only contributions to this great discovery, but it is a matter of legitimate pride that our contribution was so large and so effective.

VI

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

G. P. GOOCH

ENGLAND'S place in the world during the eighteenth century may be conveniently studied from the three angles of politics, economics, and culture. For the purposes of our survey the new era opens with the close of the long wars against Louis XIV and ends with the fall of Napoleon.

The accession of the Hanoverian dynasty inaugurated a series of far-reaching changes in our national life, of which the first was to diminish the prestige of the Crown. Though a singularly unimpressive personality, Queen Anne had nevertheless inspired a certain measure of dynastic loyalty, and a portion of the divinity that doth hedge a king still clung about her. With her death the throne lost every scrap of mystical consecration, and the divine right of kings was buried in her grave. The Revolution of 1688 and the Act of Settlement had dethroned legitimism and exalted expediency. Bolingbroke's flirtations with the Pretender had killed the old Tory Party created by Clarendon, and handed over undisputed control of the country to the Whigs, whose creed was the subordination of the royal prerogative. The deliberate exclusion of the elder line on the ground of national interest brought the conception of monarchy down from heaven to earth, and symbolizes the transition from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century.

Even had the new ruler been a man of commanding

gifts and attractive character, he would have bulked less largely in the public vision than his predecessor; for George I was a foreigner, who had never set foot in England and could not speak the language of his subjects. The aged Electress Sophia might have appealed to the heart and imagination of the British people; but her son was utterly destitute of charm, and made no effort to win friends or disarm enemies. Though not below the usual standard of German princes in ability or character, he was neither respected nor beloved by his Hanoverian subjects, and he remained a stranger in England to the day of his death. The sinister memory of the prisoner of Ahlden hung about him, and his Hanoverian mistresses were disliked even more for their looks than for their trade. He made no secret of his preference for Hanover, and of his lack of interest in his new kingdom except as a pawn in his game. It was a *mariage de raison* and nothing more. We are conscious of the same atmospheric change in passing from Anne to George I as in the substitution of Louis Philippe for Charles X. We leave poetry behind us and enter the flat levels of the realm of prose.

Among the unforeseen reactions of the Hanoverian accession was the emergence of the Prime Minister. It had been the practice of the sovereign to preside at the meetings of the Cabinet, where it was difficult for ministers to express opinions contrary to those of the ruler. The new King, on the other hand, knowing no English and too old to learn, was not tempted to attend discussions which he could not understand. A second reason for his absence was his lack of interest in the problems of domestic politics. The vacant place was filled by the chief Minister who, in the person of Walpole and his successors, was henceforth to be the real ruler of the country, with the exception of the first two decades of the reign of George III. When King and Prime Minister communicated in dog

Latin, we may be sure that all but the most important business was transacted without reference to the Crown; and during the long visits of the King to Hanover the machinery of State functioned without reference to the royal authority. The presentation of 10 Downing Street by George II to his great Minister was accepted by Walpole not as a personal possession but on the understanding that it should remain the official residence of the Prime Minister. There had been times when a single Minister, like Clarendon, Danby, or Harley, had towered above his colleagues; but it was not till the arrival of George I that the Prime Minister became *ex officio* the most important factor in the government of the country.

The first foreign contact in the eighteenth century is the accession of the German dynasty. The second is concerned with the wars of the two middle decades, which witnessed some further rounds of the age-long pugilistic encounter with France in the course of which the British Empire came into being. After the exhausting struggle with Louis XIV Great Britain needed repose, and Walpole, a man of peace both by temperament and conviction, gave us twenty tranquil years to recuperate. The long calm was terminated by the outbreak of the Spanish war of 1739, which moved the Prime Minister to the scornful comment, 'To-day they are ringing the bells; they will soon be wringing their hands.' A year later the death of the Emperor Charles VI and the swoop of Frederick the Great on Silesia opened the war of the Austrian Succession which, with its sequel the Seven Years' War, revised the frontiers both of the Old and the New World. Because Frederick robbed his neighbour, wrote Macaulay in a famous rhetorical passage, red men scalped each other on the shores of the Mississippi and black men fought on the coasts of Coromandel.

It was of no immediate importance to Great Britain who

reigned in Vienna or Breslau; but while Austria and Prussia fought for a province, Great Britain and France strove for the mastery of the world. The expansion of England, to employ the title of Seeley's celebrated book, was the main result of a devastating conflict out of which most of the other belligerents came with empty hands. Great Britain had pitched her tents in America and Asia long before Chatham; but it is with the Seven Years' War, when Horace Walpole asked every morning what fresh victory had been won, that the British Empire was born. The expulsion of France from Canada and India erected the fabric of British rule on the ruins of French colonial dominion. Australasia, the only important part of our overseas territory that was not acquired by war, and South Africa, were to be added later; but the conquest of Canada and India laid the foundations broad and deep of the greatest Empire in history.

The third dominating event in the eighteenth-century drama of Britain's place in the world is the revolt of the American colonies. The eviction of France from Canada relieved the colonists from the danger of exchanging one master for another. The struggle quickly developed from a local quarrel between the mother country and a dependency into a renewal of the boxing-match with the Bourbon monarchies. It is possible that the American colonists might have ultimately obtained independence without war; but at the time of their revolt they could not have won without the aid of France. The loss of the thirteen colonies followed so quickly on the conquest of Canada and India that for a time it seemed to balance or even outweigh that double achievement; and the war of 1812, at the height of the struggle with Napoleon, was to provide a further illustration of the insensate folly of George III and Lord North. It is an ironic coincidence that, on the morrow of the foundation of the Empire by

the greatest of our Imperial statesmen, the blunders of his successors were to call into existence an Anglo-Saxon community which in the fullness of time was to rival the mother country in wealth and power. While Britain was able to hold her own in desperate conflicts with one after another of the Great Powers of Europe, she was doomed by her own errors to be passed in the race by a community sprung from her loins and speaking her own tongue. Thus the eighteenth century speaks of loss as well as gain, and it required the triumphs of the Napoleonic war to reinforce the credit side of the account and to enlarge still further Britain's place in the sun.

When we are told that the maintenance of the Balance of Power against any State which threatened to annihilate Europe has been the governing principle of our foreign policy since the rise of great national States in the sixteenth century, we may admit the broad truth of the statement; but we must not forget that other motives have played their part. The preservation of equilibrium is a negative, not a positive aim; and both the British people and its rulers have at times obeyed the imperious instinct of expansion which has sought expression in resort to arms no less than in colonization and trade. Moreover in the nineteenth century, as we shall see later, a new motive of disinterested humanitarianism makes its appearance, mingling with the older ideals of security and conquest.

However mixed may have been the motives which led Great Britain into earlier and later contests, her participation in the Great French War of 1792–1815 was due exclusively to the principle of the Balance of Power. Disregarding the frenzied appeals of Burke to suppress the 'armed doctrine' of Jacobinism, Pitt watched the opening phases of the French Revolution without emotion, and early in 1792 reduced the estimates of the

fighting services on the ground that he anticipated a prolonged period of peace. Not till the French armies overran Belgium and tore up the public law of Europe by opening the mouth of the Scheldt did the British Premier gird on his armour for the fray. Where the speculative danger to property and institutions failed to move him, a threat to the North Sea ports turned his mind to thoughts of war. Once again, as in the wars of William and Marlborough, Great Britain entered the lists, not for spoils but to avert the danger of an enemy in overwhelming strength at her very doors. That the struggle ended in victory and left us with South Africa, Ceylon, and other fragments of the Dutch Empire, to say nothing of minor acquisitions such as Malta, does not alter the fact that it was in essence defensive. It is useless to discuss whether the war was started by the expulsion of Chauvelin after the execution of the King, or whether the French declaration of war which the expulsion provoked must bear the burden of responsibility. The Girondins of 1792 and the Jacobins of 1793 were equally bellicose, and the experiences of the next two decades were to prove that if a country wished to preserve its independence it must be prepared to fight for it.

In 1815 England's position in the world was far more imposing than in 1714. On the defeat of Napoleon she was beyond comparison the strongest of the Powers. Her flag waved in every continent. In the proud phrase of Pitt, she had saved herself by her energy and Europe by her example. The Grand Fleet had stood between Napoleon and the domination of the world. The Peninsula victories had wiped out the memory of Quiberon and Walcheren, and Waterloo had ratified the verdict of Trafalgar. Wellington had repeated the achievements of Marlborough and had shown that even the cross purposes of a Coalition cannot deprive a great soldier of victory. No single Power

was strong enough to break the yoke of the mighty Emperor; but of all the members of the Grand Alliance by which he was overthrown none had played such a decisive part as the country which had defeated him on sea and land, had blockaded his ports, and had carried on the deadly conflict, with a short breathing-space of ten months, for over twenty years.

In another field the eighteenth century exhibits even greater changes. British expansion overseas began with the Tudors, and has continued from that day to this. In the sphere of economics, on the other hand, we have to record a transformation not in degree or in pace but in kind. The century of Walpole and Chatham opened on a rural community and closed on an England of towns and chimneys. At the very height of agricultural prosperity, when the great landowners bought out the yeomen in order to swell their profits, and when Coke of Norfolk was raising the standard of stock, the industrial revolution swept over the country like a tidal wave. Aided by the researches of Black and improving on the efforts of Newcomen and other pioneers, Watt invented the first practical steam-engine; and the business talent of Boulton, with whom he entered into partnership, enabled the invention to be turned without delay to the best use. No sooner was the steam-engine available than Arkwright, Crompton, and Cartwright invented textile machinery which swept away the domestic system of spinning and weaving and substituted large-scale production.

The scientific inventions of the third quarter of the century inaugurated the England that we know, and the natural resources of the country began to be turned to account. Textiles were the principal industry, as they have always remained, and the coalfields began to reveal their wealth. Macadam constructed the first hard-surface roads, and Brindley built the first canal for the

Duke of Bridgewater. The policy of enclosures, which increased production at the expense of national well-being, broke up the economy of the country-side and drove the younger generation into the towns, where the insatiable demand for cheap labour bred the horrible novelty of the child wage-slave. In the industrial revolution lay the germ of nearly all the economic and political changes which the nineteenth century was to work out. Here was the source of the wealth which aided Great Britain to finance the struggle against Napoleon and to become the richest country in the world. Here originated the aggregation of human beings into towns which was to involve the transfer of power from the landed aristocracy first to the bourgeoisie, and then to the whole community. Here was the seed of the revolt of the struggling masses against dear food which was to sound the death-knell of the Corn Laws. And finally, hovering in the distance, was socialism, the gospel of the Fourth Estate, as democracy was the watchword of the Third.

No words can exaggerate the importance of the industrial revolution for the history not only of England but the world. A new type of civilization—urban, industrialized, capitalist—came into being, which, after the interruption of the Great War of 1792, was copied by our neighbours and rivals in both hemispheres. The two most momentous contributions of our country to the life of the modern world are representative government and capitalist industry. The former is generally accepted as the best form of political organization for civilized communities, and, whatever modifications are necessitated by experience, there can be little doubt that it has come to stay. The latter has as many foes as friends, and busy brains were at work on schemes for its supersession within a generation of its birth.

Passing from political expansion and economic develop-

ment to the tranquil fields of culture, we regain the sense of the unity of civilization which wars and national rivalries tend to obliterate. In the process of empire-building the dominant principle is the struggle for existence; in the life of the mind it is mutual aid. The cultural record of a great community calls up the vision of a cistern, fed by pipes running in from different corners, while others carry off the fertilizing stream to every point of the compass. It is a story of giving and getting, of rising and falling, of continuous renewal, of creation and imitation. The Middle Ages knew nothing of the hard-and-fast lines of division, the water-tight compartments, the doctrine of national self-sufficiency, which constitute the political framework of the modern world. Every State of Central and Western Europe formed part of the *Respublica Christiana*, of which the units were linked to one another by a common system of religious and political ideas. The unity of Catholic Christendom was broken by the Reformation, and for five or six generations religion was an apple of discord, not a bond of union. With the cooling of the theological temperature at the end of the seventeenth century it became possible gradually to restore the cultural contacts of the past, and the eighteenth century registers an enormous advance. Countries were more ready to learn from their neighbours, and national cultures were enriched by grafting and cross-fertilization. The ennobling conception of European civilization as a co-operative achievement, a joint heritage, a common responsibility dawned on thoughtful minds like Lessing and Herder, Hume and Voltaire, Turgot and Condorcet. The distinction was no longer between orthodox and heretic, but between the civilized man and the barbarian; and it was no longer thought an eccentricity or a disgrace if a British or French citizen was at the same time a citizen of the world.

In no branch of culture was the influence of Britain more potent than in political philosophy. Locke's treatises on Civil Government, though written in the seventeenth century, exerted an incalculable effect on the mind of France and the American colonies for a hundred years. While the interpretation of the Social Contract by Hobbes as an irrevocable surrender of power by the people led, as it was intended to lead, straight to despotism, Locke's argument that the people had merely delegated their authority, and could resume it if the compact were broken, justified not only the Whig revolution of 1688 but the radicalism of 1789. Rousseau's *Contrat Social* has been defined as Locke in penny numbers, and though the description is incomplete it is not wholly inaccurate. Beyond the Atlantic Locke, Harrington, and Algernon Sidney were the stars by the light of which American publicists steered their bark towards national independence and democratic institutions.

Bolingbroke's gospel of a Patriot King found an eager disciple in George III ; but an attempt to go behind 1688 was already out of date, and he founded no school at home or abroad. Hume's political essays were too academic to exert practical influence, and it is not until Tom Paine's *Common Sense* that an English thinker again made history. Emigrating as a young man, Paine reached America in time to inform the revolting colonists that they were fighting for independence and nothing less. When the battle was fought and won the American Fathers adopted as much of the theory and practice of British government as they could adapt to a federal republic. Blackstone's *Commentaries* supplied the foundation for the fabric of American law, while the authors of the *Federalist* and the framers of the Constitution studied not only the actual working of British institutions but their reflection in the pages of Montesquieu's *Esprit des*

Lois and in the treatise on the British Constitution by the Genevese Delolme. Both observers found the secret of excellence in the system of checks and balances, the separation of the powers of the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary.

The most influential of British political thinkers—perhaps the greatest political thinker since Aristotle—redeems the eighteenth century from barrenness. Equally eloquent and profound both in his Whig and Tory days, Burke left an abiding mark on the history of his time as well as on the thought of the modern world. The *Thoughts on the Present Discontent* mobilized opinion against the cunning attempt of George III to restore the power of the Crown; the speeches on American conciliation formulated the doctrine of partnership for the relations of the mother country to her colonies; and the speeches at the trial of Warren Hastings laid down the principle of trusteeship to regulate the rule of white over coloured races. The cataclysm of 1789 turned the conservative Whig into a philosophic Tory, proclaiming the gospel of the organic nature of society and the continuity of civilization. In answer to the French theorists and their British disciples who attempted to shape the world anew according to the dictates of pure reason, Burke defined society as a partnership between the dead, the living, and the unborn, emphasized the value of custom, tradition, and experience, and pleaded for the principle of cautious advance. That he under-estimated the rottenness of the *ancien régime* in France, that he pitied the plumage more than the dying bird, that he threatened to stifle the creative energies of the present under the dead hand of the past, was pointed out with cogent argument by Mackintosh and Tom Paine. But while the *Vindiciae Gallicae* and *The Rights of Man* are to-day only read by the student, the *Reflections on the*

French Revolution retains canonical authority, while the truth of its gospel of continuity has received fresh confirmation both from the political successes and the failures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In addition to his enduring influence on the thought of the modern world, Burke claims a place among the authors of the Great War of 1792. While Liberals and Radicals all over the world rejoiced in the downfall of Absolute Monarchy in France and looked forward with hopeful expectation to a better world, Burke frowned on the revolution from the outset and committed his gloomy forebodings to paper as early as 1790. No work since *The Prince* was so widely read by the great ones of the earth, by rulers and their counsellors, by the nobility and the higher clergy, by those who, to use a time-honoured formula, had a stake in the country. 'It is a book which every gentleman should read,' declared George III, who seldom read anything; and read by 'every gentleman' it was. Translated into the chief languages of Europe, the *Reflections* helped to inflame the passions of feudal Europe against the iconoclasts on the Seine, and to arm the counter-revolution for the desperate struggle which broke out in 1792. The war would have come without the book, but the book added to the violence with which the conflict was waged.

While Burke used his influence not merely to his arguments but to the incomparable splendour of his style, Bentham conveyed his message in language as crabbed and forbidding as that of Kant himself. Yet his significance for the modern world is scarcely less than that of Burke. While the main task of the Irishman was to commend the mystical value of the existing order, the prosaic Englishman called on his readers to test existing institutions, laws, and customs by the touchstone of utility. Caring as little for tradition as Tom Paine

himself, and, attacking the Declaration of the Rights of Man with scarcely less ferocity than Burke, he pointed to a path along which men of all parties might advance. Everything, according to this high priest of empiricism, had to justify itself and to prove that it was of use. Not the privilege of the few but the well-being of the many should be the goal of the statesman and the philosopher. 'The greatest happiness of the greatest number', a phrase invented by Priestley, became the inspiration of reformers all over the world. Each was to count for one, and nobody for more than one. Thus Bentham pleads the cause of the humble citizen with no less force—though from a different angle—than the Abbé Sieyès and his fellow authors of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. His place among the prophets of modern democracy is secure, and the Utilitarians are rightly numbered among the most effective reformers of the modern age. Rendered into elegant French by Dumont, the friend of Mirabeau, his writings were studied all over the world, and legislators in both hemispheres resorted for advice to the philosopher of Queen Square. It was the association of Bentham and Dumont which inspired Macaulay to declare France the interpreter between England and mankind.

The French Revolution compelled not only Burke, Paine, and Bentham, but every other publicist to declare his attitude to the ideas of 1789. The idea of perfectibility, which haunted many of the noblest minds of the eighteenth century and found classical expression in Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, reappeared in Godwin's *Political Justice*, in which British empiricism is submerged by the rationalistic idealism of the *Aufklärung*. Godwin's ideas were too extravagant to cause more than a momentary ripple; but in 1795 Mary Wollstonecraft, soon to become his wife, published a book which forms a milestone in the advance of

society. *The Rights of Woman*, though rhetorical in form, sets forth the argument for the equality of the sexes with eloquence and conviction, and inaugurated a campaign whose victories fill the annals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Equal citizenship for men and women was implicit in the ideas of '89; but the cause was at that time only championed by a few enlightened spirits in Western Europe, among them Friedrich Schlegel, Condorcet, and Bentham. Not for a couple of generations did democrats realize that equality of opportunity for the sexes was an essential part of their creed.

Eighteenth-century England can boast not only of the greatest of modern political thinkers but of the first and greatest of economists. Buckle described *The Wealth of Nations* as the most influential book ever published; and its place among writings which have made history is incontestable. In opposition to the narrowing theory and practice of Mercantilism, the Glasgow Professor sought the sources of national prosperity in the productive energies and consuming capacities of a prosperous world. Enlarging the stage from national to international dimensions, he reached the conception of humanity as an economic unit, each part of which derived advantage from and conferred benefit upon every other. He trusted less to Government control than to the play of individual energies, seeking profitable outlets wherever they could be found at home and abroad. The substitution of an international for a national economy carried with it the division of labour and the removal of tariff barriers. Published in 1776, when the Industrial Revolution was gathering momentum, *The Wealth of Nations* became the bible of modern England. Among its earliest disciples was Pitt; but the realization of an international economy was postponed for decades by the Great War of 1792, which threw political communities back on their own resources.

When the storm was over the development and application of Smith's ideas was resumed. In England the apostolic succession was continued by Ricardo and the Mills, in France by Bastiat and Say, in Germany by the framers of the Prussian Free Trade tariff of 1818. Few British thinkers have had a more vivid conception of the unity of the human family, or have done more to bring down the ideal from heaven to earth.

Scarcely inferior in importance and influence was the second great economic treatise of the eighteenth century. The *Essay on the Principles of Population*, published in 1798, has made the name of its author a household word all over the globe. Though not the first economist to discuss the question, he was the first to treat it in detail, to collect material for a judgement, to compel attention to its immense significance, and to utter a grave warning that the natural increase of population tended to outrun the sources of supply. The improvement of transport, the exploitation of new food-growing areas, and the stimulation of the fertility of the soil by chemical manures during the nineteenth century have led some critics to argue that the apprehensions of Malthus were unfounded, while others maintain with equal confidence that they postpone the danger without invalidating the doctrine. Whatever may be the final verdict on the soundness of his teaching, his work ranks high among the influences which have led us to realize the common nature of the problems by which the modern world is confronted.

Passing from political and economic theory to philosophy, we meet the two great names of Berkeley and Hume, as in the seventeenth century we are confronted by Hobbes and Locke. The subtleties of the bishop have never been the object of extended study beyond our shores; but the writings of Hume derive their fame not only from their intrinsic merits but from the fact that they

awoke the greatest of modern thinkers from his dogmatic slumbers. Kant, in whose veins ran Scottish blood, had been brought up in the tradition of Leibniz and Wolff, and it was not till he read the onslaught of the great sceptic on the fashionable idealism that he was driven to examine the foundations afresh. Nothing could be more unlike the *Treatise on Human Nature* than the *Critique of Pure Reason*; yet there is no more interesting contact in the history of modern philosophy than that between the Scottish thinker and the oracle of Königsberg.

The eighteenth century claims the proud title of the Age of Reason, and reason is commonly supposed to be the enemy, or at any rate the rival, of religion. The dominant intellectual interest of the sixteenth century was the strife of Catholic and Protestant. The dominant pre-occupation of the seventeenth was still religious controversy, not only between Rome and her critics, but within the precincts of the rival camps—between Jansenist and Jesuit, Arminian and Calvinist, Puritan and Anglican. By the opening of the eighteenth century the fires had almost burned themselves out, and the *Aufklärung* derived its name from the frontispiece of a volume by Wolff which depicted the sun dispersing the mist. A new age with new interests and standards dawned with Bayle's *Dictionnaire Critique*, of which two English translations appeared, and reached its fullest expression in Voltaire. While the seventeenth century looked backward as well as forward, the eighteenth deliberately turned its back on the past, and looked with confidence to the opening of a fresh chapter in the story of mankind. The secularization of thought, which began with the Renaissance and was interrupted by the Reformation and the Counter-reformation, was resumed and proceeded apace. Interest in the unseen world waned rapidly, and belief in man was substituted for belief in God. To some observers it was

an age of superficiality and materialism, while Leslie Stephen on the other hand commends it as an age of sound common sense. Whether we praise or blame, we shall agree that religion played a far smaller part in the life of Europe in the eighteenth than in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth centuries.

We connect the Enlightenment with France and Germany rather than with England; but England was by no means unaffected by the cool breeze blowing through Europe. Rationalism, in its technical sense of wholesale unbelief, counted but few adherents, though Hume was a host in himself. The prevailing variety of the new spirit was Deism, which retained a shadowy belief in God while repudiating Christian dogma. Such was the creed of men like Toland, Bolingbroke, and Gibbon, who preferred 'natural' to 'revealed' religion, and laughed at miracles as superstition. The bishops and clergy, unlike some of their comrades in France, remained orthodox; but practical religion was at its lowest ebb, ecclesiastical dignitaries were often absentees, and the Erastianism of Tillotson and Hoadly reigned supreme. Dr. Sacheverell's cry, The Church in Danger, which convulsed the country in the reign of Anne, would have been impossible even ten years later.

Yet even in the age of reason genuine religion was not unknown. As the Pietism of Spener and Francke stands out like an oasis in Germany between the arid dogmatism of the seventeenth and the equally arid rationalism of the eighteenth century, so the *Serious Call to a Devout Life* and the *Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed* breathe a deep and delicate piety in the gross age of Walpole and Hogarth. But while Law, the disciple of Jacob Behmen, and Butler were little read beyond our shores, the names of Wesley and Whitfield mean scarcely less to the United States than to England and Wales. It is an interesting

point of contact with the religious life of the Continent that Wesley journeyed in company with Moravian Brethren to Georgia, that he received an ineffaceable impression from the tranquillity with which they confronted the perils of the storm, and that he owed his 'conversion' to their evangelical mysticism. Among the links which continued to bind the two chief portions of the Anglo-Saxon family after their political separation was the influence of the greatest religious leader of the eighteenth century.

In the sphere of literature there are noteworthy contacts, old and new. It was in the eighteenth century that the genius of Shakespeare was announced to the Continent by Voltaire, who mixed praise with blame, and still more by Lessing, who boldly claimed pre-eminence for his hero over every poet of the ancient and modern world. The neo-classical tradition embodied in Voltaire and Alfieri, with its rigid insistence on the unities of time, place, and action, was gradually driven off the field by the inspired naturalism of Shakespeare, to whom Goethe paid reverent tribute in the pages of *Wilhelm Meister*, and whose glories were revealed to Germany by the translation of Schlegel and Tieck. Of the literature of the eighteenth century itself, *Robinson Crusoe* and *Gulliver's Travels* begot a numerous progeny of adventure and satire; the *Spectator* was the parent of innumerable periodicals; Pope's *Essay on Man* supplied Rousseau with materials for the religion of the Savoyard Vicar; and Sterne found as many admirers abroad as at home.

In the second half of the century a still closer connexion was established between the three leading literatures of the West. After nearly a century of the classicism which dominated the stage from Dryden to the death of Pope, sentiment and imagination reasserted their claims in the middle of the century. The Romantic Movement began

with Richardson in England, and was continued by Rousseau and Bernardin de St. Pierre in France and Goethe in Germany. The immense influence of English models and above all of Richardson's novels has been worked out in Texte's admirable book, *Rousseau et les Origines du Cosmopolitisme Littéraire*. While *Tom Jones* appealed to Englishmen alone, the struggles of Clarissa Harlowe and the villain Lovelace, translated by the Abbé Prévost and many another admirer, moved readers to tearful sympathy not less keen than the love of Julie and St. Preux, the fate of Paul and Virginie, or the sorrows of Werther. From sentiment to romance was but a step. Percy's *Reliques* revived the forgotten world of folk-song and ballad poetry, and 'Ossian', translated into every tongue, was placed beside Homer. A generation later the second act of the Romantic movement opened with the Lake poets, who found inspiration not only in nature but in the emancipating doctrines of the French Revolution. Never since the Elizabethans imitated the sonnets of Ronsard had the literary contact of the Western peoples been more intimate than in the age of Wordsworth's *Excursion*, of Canning's anti-Jacobin satires, of Scott's spirited rendering of Bürger's *Lenore*, and of Coleridge's translation of *Wallenstein*.

Art is even more cosmopolitan than literature, and the eighteenth century is filled with examples of our debt to foreign models. The coming of Handel to England was an event of immense significance in a country which could boast of no successor to Purcell, which learned to regard the *Messiah* and the Dead March in *Saul* as among its most cherished possessions, and which has ever since paid far more reverence to the composer than he has received in the country of his birth. In architecture the reign of Renaissance, inaugurated by Inigo Jones and perfected by Wren, continued unchallenged. Robert Adam, the

greatest of the 'Adelphi', sought inspiration in Italy, and devoted special attention to Diocletian's palace at Spalato. Nowhere was Palladio more reverenced than in England, where Wood transformed Bath into an Italian city. A visit to Italy was indeed an essential part of the education of a British artist. Reynolds spent three fruitful years in the peninsula, and Flaxman, the collaborator of Wedgwood, brought classical models of sculpture from a seven years' residence in Italy, as Thorwaldsen transplanted them to Copenhagen. Angelica Kaufmann exhibited in the Royal Academy, and has left traces of her handiwork on the walls of our lordly mansions. Fuseli came to us from Zurich, Hoppner was the child of German parents, Zoffany was of Czech descent, and Roubiliac was born in Lyons.

The history of science, like every other branch of intellectual activity, illustrates the inter-connexion of the foremost nations of the world. Voltaire devoted part of his exile in England to the study of Newton's discoveries, which he proceeded to popularize on his return home. The Hanoverian Herschel settled in England in the middle of the century, and after earning his living for a time as organist in a church in Bath, turned to astronomy, discovered Neptune, and mapped the heavens in greater detail than any of his predecessors. At the end of the century Newton's theory of light provoked Goethe to the prolonged if unprofitable studies which found expression in his *Farbenlehre*. No British scientist of the calibre of Harvey, Newton, or Darwin adorned the age; but Halley's observations of comets, Black's discovery of latent heat, and the identification of oxygen and hydrogen by Priestley and Cavendish helped to build up the imposing fabric of modern science.

In no respect is the cosmopolitan tendency of the century more clearly displayed than in the social relations

between cultivated citizens of different countries. Men like Evelyn had travelled and observed in the seventeenth century; but it was not till the eighteenth that the Grand Tour became *de rigueur* for the young nobleman who was to play his part in public life. French, Dutch, German, and Italian pictures, furniture and statuary found their way to the great English mansions, and the first Lord Spencer filled the Althorp Library from the treasures of the Continent. The Masonic movement spread from England to almost every part of Europe. British celebrities like Hume, Gibbon, and Horace Walpole were welcome guests in the salons of Holbach, Madame Geoffrin, and Madame Necker, and in Voltaire's library at Ferney; and the correspondence of Horace Walpole with Madame du Deffand is at once a monument of a memorable friendship and an illustration of the close ties between the polite society of London and Paris.

The attraction of England for French Intellectuals was no less powerful. Voltaire's *Lettres sur les Anglais* embody his impressions of a fruitful three years' visit and founded the fashion of Anglomania. Montesquieu and Delolme came to study our institutions. Lord Shelburne welcomed to Bowood thinkers like the Abbé Morellet and statesmen like Mirabeau. Rousseau, it is true, carried away disagreeable impressions of his visit; but they were due not to his English friends, who were kindness itself, but to the persecution complex from which he suffered. At the end of the century the French Revolution brought to our shores the Émigrés, who were received as kindly as their Liberal and Radical predecessors. Brilliant figures like Madame de Staël, Talleyrand, and Narbonne found temporary refuge, and General d'Arblay was fortunate enough to win the affections of Fanny Burney. The greatest French writer of his age received aid from the Royal Literary Fund, founded in 1787 by David Williams;

but the fact is known, not by any breach of its rule of secrecy by the society, but by the confession of Chateaubriand himself. We may also mention the two Italians who played diverse parts in the life of Johnson—Baretti, the author, who was his friend, and Piozzi, who aroused his wrath by marrying Mrs. Thrale.

The last department of activity to which reference may be made is that of philanthropy. The attention of John Howard was called to the state of our prisons, and the horrors he found in them led him to travel through Europe on tours of investigation. His reports aroused widespread interest, and set in motion forces which were gradually to lead to the removal of the worst of the physical and moral abuses which he had revealed. Of even greater importance was the beginning of the campaign against slavery and the slave trade, inaugurated in England by the Quakers and supported by the Société des Amis des Noirs, led by Condorcet and other radical reformers. The liberation of the slaves in the French West Indies by the Convention in 1794 was the result of propaganda in both countries, just as the abolition of the slave trade in the British Empire in 1807 was due not merely to Wilberforce, Clarkson, and their friends, but to the object-lesson of other countries. Humanitarian sentiment was still in its infancy; but Voltaire's denunciation of religious persecution and Beccaria's appeal for a milder criminal code helped to strengthen the general demand for a larger measure of mercy and pity in the relations of men.

VII

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

G. P. GOOCH

ENGLAND'S place in the world during the nineteenth century may be surveyed from the successive angles of politics, economics, and culture; and we may define our period as beginning with the fall of Napoleon and ending with the war of 1914.

In the domestic field Great Britain continued to play her traditional part as the home of ordered liberty. The French Revolution interrupted the Reform movement for a generation and scared the possessing classes into a stagnant Toryism; but soon after the return of peace in 1815 the Whigs began to raise their heads, and radical opinions, driven below the surface by Pitt's reign of terror, once more found expression. No one could say of Grey, what Gibbon said of Fox, that 'his inmost soul was deeply tinged with democracy'; but the Whig leader stood at any rate for Parliamentary Reform, which was the indispensable preliminary to further advance. The passing of the Reform Bill in 1832 was an event not only in British but in world history, and its acknowledged success gave new hope to reformers in every country who were battling with vested interests and the powers of darkness. Synchronizing with the French Revolution of 1830 it announced that the era of the counter-revolution was at an end and that the nineteenth century was to be the age of democracy. Foreign Liberals like Dahlmann and Cavour turned longing eyes

towards the island kingdom where constitutional monarchy combined order and liberty, and where the bourgeoisie occupied the political position to which their numbers, wealth, and education entitled them. That England passed virtually unscathed through 1848, the Year of Revolutions, seemed to onlookers to confirm the wisdom of her statesmen. The enfranchisement of the urban worker in 1867, of the agricultural labourer in 1884, and of women in 1918, completed the machinery of political self-government; and the demands of the Chartists, which seemed so ominous to timid minds in the second quarter of the century, were all fulfilled in the course of the next two generations, with the negligible exception of Annual Parliaments.

The edifice of democracy, resting securely on adult suffrage, has been enlarged and strengthened in various directions. The Crown has gradually lost every vestige of political power; the House of Lords has subsided into a debating society; the press is cheap and free; religious equality is complete; Trade Unions have been legalized; elementary education is universal and free; and finally, as Dicey used to remind us, we are governed by the Rule of Law, not by the *droit administratif* to which Continental States freely resort. The steady advance towards self-government, combined with the distinction of our statesmen and the prosperity of the nation, enhanced the prestige not only of Great Britain but of the Liberal principles for which she stood. In the nineteenth century, as in its predecessor, her greatest gift to the world was the spectacle of the successful operation of free institutions. In the course of experience unexpected dangers, such as the caucus and the syndicated press made their appearance, and warning voices were raised by Conservatives like Fitzjames Stephen and Sir Henry Maine; but democracy found universal acceptance in the new constitutions of

Western Europe, and commanded increasing authority throughout the world till the dislocation of the Great War gave birth to rival forms and theories of government in which the rule of the majority was dismissed as the shibboleth of a bygone age.

The principle of the Balance of Power continued to influence the minds of British statesmen, and carried us into the Crimean War, the only occasion between Waterloo and 1914 on which we took part in the struggles of the Continent. But we shall never understand the course of our foreign policy during the last hundred years if we seek the key in this principle alone. Lord Newton once observed in the House of Lords that Great Britain was the only sentimental country in the world; and, with the possible exception of the United States, the statement is true. Fox is the founder not only of the Liberal Party but of the Liberal tradition in foreign affairs, which approaches European problems not solely from the angle of British interests but from the point of view of disinterested humanitarianism.

From the time that Fox hailed with enthusiasm the fall of the Bastille a vein of idealism has run through our policy which was unknown in the eighteenth century. Enjoying, as we did, the twin blessings of national independence and political self-government, leading statesmen of both parties have again and again employed the moral influence of a Great Power to foster the cause of liberty abroad. Canning's veto on the reconquest of the Spanish colonies of South America and his decisive share in the liberation of Greece from the Turkish yoke; Palmerston's creation of an independent Belgium, and his encouragement to Turkey to resist the demand of Austria and Russia for the surrender of the Hungarian refugees in 1849; Lord John Russell's outspoken approval of the efforts of Garibaldi and Cavour to win Italy for the

Italians; the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1863; Gladstone's sympathy with the Christian subjects of the Turk; Salisbury's approval of the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria in 1885; the unwearying efforts of Lord Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey to secure reforms for the sorely tried population of Macedonia and the Congo basin:—such incidents and decisions are not to be explained on the principle that our statesmen were motived by a cold-blooded calculation of material advantage. No one would dare to suggest that the doctrine of the unity of Christendom and of the moral obligations binding on its members, proclaimed with eloquence and conviction in Gladstone's speech in the Don Pacifico debate of 1850, has always guided our action; but we have at any rate paid more frequent homage to a great ideal than any of the Great Powers of the world.

In addition to our relations with independent States, which is what we usually understand by the term foreign policy, we have developed during the course of the nineteenth century a colonial policy which is of vital importance in considering Britain's place in the world. The bitter experience of the loss of the American colonies taught its lesson, and the British Empire is anchored in an ever-increasing degree to the same principle of government by consent on which our domestic liberties are based. The Durham Report forms a landmark in history, and the affectionate loyalty of the Dominions to the Mother Country is a tribute to its far-sighted wisdom. The Liberal tradition at home and abroad postulates a certain confidence in the sanity of human nature, at which cynics and pessimists may mock but which has justified itself at home and abroad. The most striking act of faith in the annals of our Colonial Empire is to be found in Campbell-Bannerman's grant of self-government to the newly conquered Dutch Republics of South Africa;

and never was a statesman more richly rewarded than when Botha and Smuts held the sub-continent firm during the hurricane of the Great War. It was the crowning glory of Gladstone's career that he devoted his last efforts to the task of reconciling Ireland; and if Home Rule had been granted, as he wished to grant it, freely instead of grudgingly, before instead of after the rise of Sinn Fein, its results would have been more satisfactory. If free institutions are to produce their full healing effect they must be given in the right spirit and at the right time.

Though the extension of autonomy to the Dominions has only been accomplished in the teeth of opposition, it is now generally agreed that nothing else was worthy of the traditions of a free people. The problem of governing those portions of the Empire inhabited by coloured races, on the other hand, presents more difficult questions. It was not till after the Mutiny and the transfer of authority from the Company to the Crown that the problem of Indian self-government began to be faced; and a clear note was at once struck in the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, which announced that no disabilities on the ground of race or religion would be recognized. From that time onwards almost every decade has witnessed an advance towards associating the Indian peoples with the control of their destinies. Lord Ripon owed no small part of his popularity to his extension of local self-government. The Morley-Minto reforms included the admission of Indians to the Viceroy's Executive Council and the Council of the Secretary of State in Whitehall. Finally the declaration of August 1917, followed by the Montagu-Chelmsford reform scheme, set the feet of India on the path that leads through successive stages of trusteeship towards colonial self-government.

The British Empire differs from all its predecessors and rivals not only in regard to its liberal institutions but

also on account of the principle of Free Trade. Beginning, as other empires began, by tying the colonies to the apron strings of the mother country, we gradually learnt the wisdom of allowing them to make their own fiscal arrangements not only with the rest of the world but with ourselves. In the non-self-governing portions of the Empire the same tariff is imposed on goods from Great Britain and her competitors. Whatever resentment may be aroused by the spectacle of such a large portion of the earth's surface under the British flag is diminished by the knowledge that other countries can buy and sell in our markets on equal terms. The hopes of Cobden and Peel have been in many respects disappointed; yet the British Empire still stands for commercial equality, not for selfish monopoly.

More perhaps than any of the Great Powers, Great Britain has shown a disposition to recognize the growing unity of mankind. The Great Exhibition of 1851, followed as it was by the Crimean War, has come to be regarded as the symbol of the facile optimism of the early Victorian era; but the ideals of work, peace, and co-operation which inspired the Prince Consort and his colleagues were sincerely held. It involved no sacrifice of national pride to any country to join in the Postal Union or to take part in the Berlin and Brussels Conferences on the welfare of the nations of Central Africa; but our record in relation to arbitration inspires legitimate satisfaction. The Jay Treaty of 1794, providing for the settlement of the boundary between Canada and the United States, is usually taken as the first example of arbitration between two great States; and the reference of the Alabama dispute to a tribunal of jurists sitting at Geneva was one of the noblest achievements of Gladstone's life. While short-sighted critics grumbled at what then seemed to be the heavy damages of three millions which Great Britain

was called upon to pay, men of keener vision realized that the healing of a running sore was cheaply purchased at the price. The precedent was copied in the Venezuela controversy and the Behring Sea Fisheries dispute, with similar satisfactory results; and the first Hague Conference of 1899 was saved from ignominious failure by the creation of the Hague Tribunal, of which Lord Pauncefote, the chief British delegate, was the principal architect. Though Lord Salisbury had no great belief in the utility of the Conference, he at any rate refrained from the contemptuous hilarity in which most of the Great Powers indulged on receiving the Tsar's invitation.

Turning from politics to economics, we find the nineteenth century engaged in reaping the harvest, both of wheat and of tares, sown in the eighteenth. The lead that was gained by Watt and the inventors of textile machinery was maintained for more than a hundred years, when the United States and Germany, with their larger population, began to pass us in the race. As we were first in the field with capitalist industry, so we were first with railways. George Stephenson inaugurated a second revolution which, with the aid of British brains and British capital, quickly spread over the civilized world. Thomas Brassey constructed railways for France, and the development of Argentina and Brazil was fostered by British banks. The first steamship crossed the Atlantic in 1838; twenty years later the Atlantic was bridged by cable; and in 1876 Graham Bell invented the telephone. In the great series of inventions which revolutionized transport and communication Britain played the foremost part, though in telegraphy and the conquest of the air other countries have taken the lead. Wealth was accumulated with a rapidity which the world had never seen, by exploiting the coal and iron of our own soil, by working up imports of raw cotton and wool and exporting the finished article,

by a mercantile marine which secured the larger part of the carrying trade of the world, by the investment of capital in profitable enterprises abroad. The repeal of the Corn Laws and the Navigation Act, the introduction of a tariff for revenue only, and the skilful finance of Gladstone during the third quarter of the century accelerated the production of wealth. London became the nerve centre of the financial world. All eyes turned to the country which was at once the freest and the richest in the world, the classic land of unfettered trade, of untaxed food, of private initiative.

Behind this glittering façade of power and wealth lay an abyss of suffering which some regarded as the inevitable price of large-scale industry, while others believed that its worst features might be gradually removed. If the most notable achievement in the realm of economic theory during the eighteenth century was the formulation by Adam Smith of a theory of the Wealth of Nations resting on unfettered enterprise, its most striking novelty during the nineteenth was the elaboration of socialist alternatives. The father of British socialism, as Mr. Sidney Webb has reminded us, was not Karl Marx but Robert Owen, who, beginning with an experiment in 'patriarchal' management, advanced towards a complete system of co-operative control. His experimental communities were a failure; but the foundation of the first Co-operative Society at Rochdale in 1844 inaugurated a system of distribution which eliminated private profit, and which has grown into one of the most beneficent enterprises of the industrial age. Owen, however, was rather a pioneer and an idealist than a constructive thinker, and he was not a man of sufficient calibre to meet the standard-bearers of the classical tradition in the arena of debate.

Marx was the most influential publicist of the nineteenth century, as was Rousseau of the eighteenth; and

the German Jew not only spent the larger part of his life in England but built up his system on the situation which he found in his exile home. His friend Engels had published a terrible indictment of the industrial system in his survey of the condition of the English working-classes in 1834; and when Marx settled in London in 1848 the humanitarians were only beginning to attract attention to 'the condition of England' question. Studying both the past and present of British industry in the reading-room of the British Museum he worked out the theories presented to the world in the treatise on Capital, published in 1864. Whether or not he misinterpreted the trend of recent developments; whether his economic interpretation of history and his theory of value are correct; whether his doctrine of the class war is right or wrong, cannot be discussed here. It is enough for our present purpose, namely, the study of international contacts, to note that his researches and observations in England made a profound impression on his mind and left indelible traces on the Bible of Socialism.

As the nineteenth century drew towards its close the struggle was no longer between the Manchester school and Marxian socialism. The evils of unchecked industrialism had been recognized not only by Socialists but by Tory humanitarians like Shaftesbury and by writers like Carlyle and Disraeli, Kingsley and Mrs. Gaskell. *Unto this Last* and other works of Ruskin proclaimed with arresting eloquence that welfare, not wealth, was the goal and the test of civilization; and Mill himself, as his *Autobiography* revealed, moved ever farther away from the hard-shelled individualism in which he had been reared. The economic man turned out to be a figment of the imagination, and a new conception of citizenship, resting on a minimum standard of life, made its appearance. The partition between politics and economics was broken down, and

the conception of equality, implicit in the 'ideas of 1789', began to invade the economic sphere. By a startling coincidence the extension of the franchise to the working-classes synchronized with the growing conviction of the insufficiency of political power. At the opening of the twentieth century the tide was running strongly, in every industrial country except the United States, in the direction of nationalization. Democracy, it was argued, involved the rule of the people, and the people could not be said to rule so long as the sources of wealth were in the hands of a small and privileged minority.

From economic to political theory is but a step. The nineteenth century opened with the Utilitarians in command. Burke's philosophic conservatism had degenerated in the hands of his disciples into sterile reaction, against which the mind and heart of the country rose in revolt. The writings of Bentham and James Mill dissipated sections of the fog; but it was left to John Stuart Mill to expound the political philosophy of the Liberal age inaugurated by the Reform Bill. In *Liberty*, *The Subjection of Women*, and *Representative Government* he presented a system more complete and more humane than any other country could boast—an individualism which aimed at spiritual self-realization, a democracy which recognized the rights of the majority while safeguarding the conscience of the citizen. Mill's lucid expositions of the philosophy of Liberalism have inspired the thinkers and statesmen of two generations, and have been eagerly studied by the awakening mind of the East. His distaste for a dictatorial State and his preference for voluntary association were shared by Herbert Spencer, who retained to the end of his long life the doctrinaire individualism of an earlier age.

In the later decades of the Victorian era new varieties of political thought began to make their appearance. T. H.

Green's *Lectures on Political Obligation* and Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State* pleaded for a system which was equally far removed from Austin's conception of an armed policeman and from Spencer's notion of a meddlesome nuisance. Deeply influenced by the teaching of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, they conceived an authority which represented spiritual no less than material forces, and which was the embodiment and agent of the moral will of the community rather than an instrument of coercion. In the works of Mr. Graham Wallas the problem of complex modern societies has been approached from the standpoint of psychology; and the older issues of political science, such as the location of sovereignty, the relation of the State to the individual, and the sphere of government, have been supplemented by the study of the place of instinct in our community life and the subtle influence of our social heritage. Traditional principles are in the melting-pot, and the opening of the twentieth century witnessed the birth of new systems at home and abroad. Syndicalism, the shock-headed child of Georges Sorel, embodied a new reaction against the omnipotent State and the accepted methods of representative government, and urged the control of industries by their workers. A strong and impartial State, one would imagine, should stand above the Syndicates, reconciling their sectional demands and rescuing the consumer from exploitation by the organized producers; but the Syndicalists, whether of the school of Sorel or the Guild Socialists led by Mr. Cole, have little use for the State. The British people have never loved a great Leviathan; but the main task of the thought of our generation is to work out a satisfactory compromise between centralization and decentralization, between capitalism and socialism.

If Berkeley and Hume, the two great British philosophers of the eighteenth century, owed little to foreign

models, the thought of the nineteenth century is deeply tinged by alien influences. For half a century Comte occupied a position in the forefront of the stage, and the English school of Positivists boasted of distinguished names such as Congreve, Beesly, and Frederic Harrison. Nor was the influence of the French thinker negligible on Mill and Spencer, who declined to march beneath his banner. The middle decades of the century were indeed dominated by the positive spirit, which endeavoured to apply the methods and results of scientific research to the various branches of moral science. Herbert Spencer produced an array of massive volumes which treated the problems not only of biology but of psychology, sociology, and ethics from the standpoint of evolution; and the Synthetic Philosophy, after a brief reign in the country of its origin, found admiring disciples in the far places of the earth and in countries more backward than our own.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century a new and powerful current flowed in from abroad, sweeping the treatises of Spencer, Bain, and Sidgwick aside. 'German Philosophers when they die go to Oxford.' There was a germ of truth in the old joke, for the reign of Hegel was over in Germany a generation before it began in England. In Lewes's *History of Philosophy*, the favourite handbook of the empirical age, the German idealists cut a sorry figure; and it was not till the writings and lectures of Green that the enduring significance of Kant and Hegel began to be realized. His efforts were supported by Edward and John Caird, Wallace and Bosanquet, Bradley and Mactaggart; and by the end of the century almost every chair of philosophy in Great Britain was filled by an adherent of some variety of German idealism. But fashions change in thought no less than in literature and art. A younger generation came to feel that the idealists, and above all Hegel, had claimed too much for the human

mind; and, in the reaction against intellectualism, students turned to the Pragmatism of James, the *élan vital* of Bergson, and the New Realism of Bertrand Russell. Never have the contacts between British and foreign thinkers been more numerous and intimate than in the last half-century. The latest of our teachers is Benedetto Croce. Outside the realm of metaphysics we must record the epoch-making psychological researches of Wundt in the physiological laboratory, the clues of which are being followed up in Great Britain and America.

In no sphere of cultural life is there a greater contrast between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than in religion. The new age opened with the Evangelical school tempering the arid latitudinarianism which had prevailed since 1688. Wilberforce and his friends were products of the soil; but the Oxford Movement, which began in 1833, was not only a native reaction against 'liberalism' and indifference but a counterpart to the Catholic revival which set in with the Concordat, with Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme*, with the restoration of the Jesuit Order, the writings of Joseph de Maistre, the scholarship of Möhler and Döllinger, and the accession of Pius IX, and culminated in the Vatican decrees of 1870. Neither Keble, Pusey, nor Newman had any idea when they raised the flag of revolt that their movement would lead men back to Rome; but their emphasis on tradition, their love of the Fathers, their hatred of State control, their strict views on ecclesiastical property, their exaltation of the authority of the priest, and their detestation of the critical spirit were bound to carry them and their followers far away from their Protestant moorings. Though the movement ended in confusion and disunion, its influence was no less lasting than profound. Newman was the greatest religious figure in England in the nineteenth century, as Wesley in the eighteenth and Bunyan in the seventeenth;

and the effect of his teaching on the Church which he left gave it a new orientation. The long hiatus between 1688 and 1833, during which the English Church was definitely Protestant, was closed, and Anglo-Catholicism once more became its dominant characteristic. Erastianism received a mortal blow, and the Evangelical school began to wither under the combined attack of High Church, Broad Church, and Biblical criticism.

If Newman had known German, observed Dean Stanley in a celebrated aphorism, there would have been no Oxford Movement. The gibe is not literally correct, for Pusey had studied Hebrew at Leipzig without damage to his faith ; but it conveys in picturesque form the reminder that the Oxford Movement occurred before the application of critical methods to the Old and New Testaments, before Comparative Religion placed Christianity in a new perspective, and before natural science undermined the belief in miracles. It was the merit of the Broad Church leaders, among them Milman and Maurice, Stanley and Jowett, to offer hospitality to the new ideas, and not to identify the Christian religion with the defence of its crumbling outworks. Of the rival schools which competed for popular favour in the middle decades of the century, the Anglo-Catholic and the Liberal Churchman survive in undiminished vitality, while the old Evangelicalism with its belief in the verbal inspiration of the Bible, found its last doughty champion in Spurgeon.

The contacts between British and foreign science illustrate the co-operative activities from which many of the best results arise. Small-pox was combated by Jenner's vaccine. Davy invented the safety-lamp which was quickly introduced into the coal-mines of every land. By the discovery of chloroform Simpson proved himself the greatest of human benefactors. Dalton began the calculation of atomic weights which the Russian scientist

Mendeleeff was to classify into an elaborate hierarchy. Lyell gave a new orientation to geologists throughout the world. Joule shared with Carnot and Mayer the glory of discovering the law of the conservation of energy, which was summarized by the youthful Helmholtz in 1847. The independent calculations of Adams and Leverrier, based on the irregularities of Uranus, enabled astronomers to discover Neptune. Darwin suggested to Haeckel and Weismann the researches which filled their lives. Huggins developed spectroscopy from the observations of Wollaston and Fraunhofer, the discoverers of the dark lines of the spectrum, and from the later researches of Bunsen and Kirchhoff. Pasteur and Lister supplemented each other's labours in the art of healing. Perkins discovered aniline dyes in coal-tar, which the Germans erected into a flourishing industry. Wireless telegraphy originated with Clerk Maxwell and his Cambridge pupils, was developed by Hertz, discoverer of the Hertzian waves, and was perfected by Marconi, an Italian with an Irish mother. Liebig's researches in agricultural chemistry were utilized by British farmers, and Lord Kelvin's compass is the friend of every mariner. At the turn of the century the biological discoveries of Mendel, a Moravian monk, were explained and developed by Bateson and Punnett. Röntgen rays saved the lives of thousands of British and other soldiers during the world war. The Ford car is on every road. Thus, the weaver's shuttle passes backwards and forwards, each country learning and teaching, giving and getting, till the pattern of the world becomes plain to our wondering eyes.

The early years of the nineteenth century witnessed the activity of two British writers whose fame was at least as great abroad as at home. M. Maigron has written an instructive work on Scott's influence in France, and similar volumes might be devoted to other countries.

Translated into almost every tongue the Waverley novels were devoured by a hungry world in the latest of the three stages of the Romantic movement. Only less universal was the interest aroused by the poems and personality of Byron, whose genius was particularly admired in Germany, where the fashion of admiration was set by Goethe in the second part of *Faust*. A still closer contact with Germany was established by Carlyle, who continued the work of interpreting German literature begun by William Taylor, and who taught English readers to admire the wisdom of Goethe, the humour of Jean Paul Richter, and the prowess of Frederick the Great. While Thackeray was little read outside English-speaking countries, Macaulay's essays and the novels of Dickens found their way into every clime. Italy supplied the background of the later years of Shelley, Byron, and Keats; the *Risorgimento* inspired the muse of Mrs. Browning, Swinburne, and Mrs. Hamilton King, and was mirrored in Meredith's *Vittoria*, and Robert Browning found the material for *The Ring and the Book* on a stall in Florence.

In the later decades of the nineteenth century England received more than she gave. Nowhere was Tolstoi more diligently studied, nowhere did Ibsen's consummate technique contribute more powerfully to the revival of drama. In the opening decades of the twentieth century we have discovered Dostoievsky, while Anatole France, Maeterlinck, Blasco Ibanez, and Hauptmann are welcome guests on our drawing-room tables. Henry James made his home among us and finally became a British subject. In return we have added to the common stock the scintillating dialogues of Bernard Shaw, the problem plays of Galsworthy, and the brilliant improvisations of H. G. Wells.

Art, like literature, speaks to us of the wider life of

humanity. Our attention is directed to the resemblance between Turner and Claude. Our Pre-Raphaelites, as their name implies, sought their inspiration in the age of Fra Angelico and Botticelli, while Leighton turned to the civilization of classical Greece. Our home-bred painters are reinforced by distinguished immigrants—Rossetti from Italy, Whistler, Sargent, and Abbey from America, Herkomer from Germany, Alma Tadema from Holland. Impressionism, the child of modern France, has left its mark on English studios. In architecture the Gothic revival embodied in the work of Pugin, Barry, and Gilbert Scott was connected with the Romantic movement and the Catholic revival, both of which sought inspiration in the Middle Ages. Pugin, indeed, was a convert to Rome, and argued that Gothic architecture and Catholicism were closely allied. Sculpture has owed less to foreign influences than any of the sister arts. Alfred Stevens sought his models in the past rather than in the present, and we admire Rodin without attempting to imitate him. British sculpture has been conservative, and the originality of Epstein, a Russian born in New York, educated in France, and living in England, does not command universal assent.

In music we have been, as in the eighteenth century, learners rather than teachers. We have added Sullivan's operas and Elgar's *Dream of Gerontius* to the golden treasury; but we have had to depend in the main on foreign supply. Our very consciousness of insufficiency has made us the more eager to take the best that the world affords. Nowhere was Mendelsohn in one generation and Wagner in another more warmly welcomed, while foreign conductors like Hallé and Richter helped us in the task of interpretation. In our own day we have received Tschaikovsky and his Russian compatriots with open arms, and Debussy is hailed as a worthy successor of

Gounod, Berlioz, and Bizet. Both the earlier and later styles of Verdi have found admirers. Every singer aspires to render the masterpieces of Schubert and Schumann, Brahms and Hugo Wolf. To Joachim, England was like a second home, and Henschel long ago became a British citizen. Our present-day output is enriched by the talent of Delius and Gustav Holst.

In the great advance of critical scholarship, which is one of the glories of the nineteenth century, Great Britain has taken an honourable share. After a century of brilliant historical amateurs, beginning with Gibbon and ending with Macaulay, Carlyle, and Froude, we began to apply the critical methods which had been invented by Ranke and Waitz. The debt of Stubbs to his Teutonic masters is writ large across the pages of his *Constitutional History*. We possess no École des Chartes, but our medievalists can learn the use of authorities in more than one of our Universities. The study of English history owes much to foreign scholars, from Guizot to Pauli, Ranke and Gneist to Liebermann and Halévy. Max Müller's migration to Oxford as a young man was followed by half a century of fruitful labour in the field of Orientalism. In no country outside the Fatherland have such classics as Mommsen's *History of Rome* and Harnack's *History of Dogma* been more widely and diligently studied. Taking quality and quantity together, there is no comparison between British and German scholarship in the nineteenth century; but we can boast of books such as Lecky's volumes on the Grattan Parliament, Gardiner's narrative of the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century, Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*, Frazer's *Golden Bough*, and Trevelyan's studies of Garibaldi. In the realm of political biography we are above all competitors. The unity of the republic of learning was never more happily illustrated than in the *Cambridge Modern History*, in which specialists from

almost every country of Europe and America co-operated in narrating the development of our common civilization.

Though every department of mental activity binds together nations of the civilized world, nothing speaks so clearly to us of our spiritual community as the humanitarian movement. The abolition of the slave trade was decreed in principle at the Congress of Vienna. The abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire was followed a generation later by Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation and by the disappearance of serfdom in Russia. The newer form of industrial serfdom called into the field Shaftesbury and his fellow reformers, who limited the hours of work for the women in factories, and compelled their countrymen to realize the cruelty of employing women and children in mines and of sending little boys up smoky chimneys. The savagery of the penal code was mitigated by the writings of Bentham and the speeches of Romilly and Brougham. The pathos of the life of the proletariat found poignant expression in Ebenezer Elliott's *Hymn of the People* and Hood's *Song of the Shirt*. Elizabeth Fry continued on the path of prison reform. The promotion of public health by Chadwick and his successors was inspired by considerations not only of national efficiency but of human sympathy. Lunatics are pitied and cared for instead of being flogged. Florence Nightingale's work in the Scutari hospitals has borne precious fruit in every part of the world. The movement for adult education, inaugurated by Birkbeck and the Working Men's College, has developed in many directions, including the Adult School Union and the Workers' Educational Association. What Ellen Key has called the Century of the Child has witnessed the spread of baby clinics, school doctors, and health visitors. The intimate connexion between the home and the character of the tenant was emphasized by Octavia Hill. Martin's Act,

passed in 1823, inscribed the rights of animals on the statute-book. The Salvation Army has carried its methods of social and spiritual rescue all over the world. The temperance movement, strongest in the Anglo-Saxon countries, has saved numberless homes from destruction. The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Societies, founded soon after the abolition of slavery, have championed the cause of the dark races. A new variety of social service was invented by Canon Barnett, and Toynbee Hall can to-day look round on hundreds of University Settlements in England and America. It may be true that revolutions change everything except the human heart; but the progress of enlightenment supplies an ever-widening field in which it can find scope for its activities. The great humanitarians of every land have helped us to set up a higher standard of social ethics, and so close is the contact between civilized communities that the social conscience of one gradually moulds the public opinion of the rest.

At the opening of the twentieth century Britain's place in the world was absolutely, though not relatively, greater than at the end of the Napoleonic war. At that time her paramountcy in power and wealth among nations was unquestioned. A century later she was only one of the leading Powers, and some of her critics at home and abroad believed that she had passed her zenith. Yet the Great War proved that her sons had neither lost their military prowess nor their dogged determination. The German fleet, the only danger that had seriously threatened her since Waterloo, was at the bottom of the sea; and to outward seeming she is stronger than ever before. Yet no nation is strong enough to stand alone. The dangers which threaten us come less from foreign foes than from the material and spiritual problems with which the advance of civilization confronts every modern com-

munity. Spengler has recently argued in a remarkable book that western civilization, as we have known it since the Middle Ages, is on the wane. The moral of our rapid survey is that we are living in a world whose parts are connected with one another by a thousand visible and invisible threads; that, as the countries advance, the contacts increase in number and intimacy; and that the perils which beset us can only be overcome by the joint endeavours of men and women of good will in every land. The eighteenth century was the age of cosmopolitanism, the nineteenth of nationalism. The task of the twentieth is to find a synthesis which combines what is best in the one-sided ideals of its predecessors, and allows every branch of the human family to find security and self-realization in the larger life of mankind.

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VIII

ENGLAND AND THE BUILDING OF THE NEW WORLD

MISS L. M. PENSON

I. *The American Continents*

IN the history of the English nation there are many reasons for asserting that the sixteenth century was the zenith of English greatness. It was the age of Shakespeare and of Elizabeth, of Drake and Spenser. It saw the reformation of the Church, without the disruption of the State. It saw the extension of State responsibility in the regulation of industry and in caring for the poor. It was an age of great political development which no subsequent disunion overthrew. In many aspects it was a time of the vigorous growth of nationalism. It stands out in many ways pre-eminent among other periods. This was the time of the founding of the New World.

The sixteenth century has an interest almost melancholy for the admirers of English national greatness, for those who pride themselves like Elizabeth on being 'mere English'. It is the last of England from one standpoint. The 'spacious days' were the end of 'little England' for some centuries at least. Henceforth England stands not only as part of the Great Britain which James brought ultimately into being, but as the centre of a greater Britain, as linked indissolubly with the New World. The century marks therefore a line of division between two periods of development. Behind it lie the long years during which national unity was slowly forged. Before it

lies a period during which English-speaking peoples grew side by side. The first period ended gloriously: the end of the second is not yet in sight.

In both England has not been alone. The debt she owed to other peoples in the early period has been fully recognized. In the second it is still more clear, in spite of the difficulty of assessing it. In building up a new world England was not merely not alone, but, in order of time, she was slow to take her share in the work. The first successful colony of Englishmen in the New World, the Virginia of 1606, was not established until other European peoples had had a century of colonial experience. The New World, it seemed at the death of Elizabeth, would speak not English, but Spanish and Portuguese. New Spain was already a great Empire, stretching from Mexico to the southern continent. The Viceroyalty of Peru took in already the greater part of the eastern coast of South America. Already Portugal had marked the west coast as her own. Among the islands Spanish rule was established. A new Spanish-speaking world was already in being.

In spite of its political unrest, the seventeenth century saw the rise of England as a colonial power. Beyond the Spanish region, in lands less speedily productive, English settlers followed Gilbert and Ralegh and founded a line of English plantations. On the smaller islands whose littleness was despised by Spain, Englishmen also set their mark. Even on the South American coast a coast-line as yet unappropriated permitted an experiment in the footsteps of Ralegh. When the century closed with the wars of Louis XIV the position of England was already assured.

The seventeenth century marked also the appearance of new rivals. The French and the newly independent Dutch shared with England and Spain the northern continent, the islands, and the experiments on the Spanish

main. The wars of Louis XIV very nearly succeeded in eliminating the Dutch from the competition; for there remained to them only the Guiana coast by 1713. France was the more serious rival. For her the Treaty of Utrecht was only a temporary set-back. The highways of the northern continent, the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi, were to be for many years the sphere of France. In exploration the French took the lead: fur traders and missionaries of French race were the advance-guard of European penetration. In the islands France enjoyed, still, a greater control than England. Only here and there could be found evidence of decline—on the Hudson Bay coast, on the south side of the estuary of the St. Lawrence—in the loss of profitable trade privileges. The settlement of 1713 was the end only of the first round in the struggle.

The eighteenth century brought decision. It is to the elder Pitt that credit is above all due. The Seven Years' War which he directed put a limit to the growth of French influence. She was excluded from North America, her grip was loosened on the islands. The political control of France in the New World ended in this war, as did the reality of her dreams of an eastern empire. Here as in India her influence remained, but her rule ceased.

Fifty years after Utrecht, then, the New World by the Treaty of Paris was divided, roughly, between England and Spain. England predominated in the North, Spain in the South: Spain in the Pacific, and England in the Atlantic. Each had footholds in one another's regions. Portugal and even France and Holland were still of importance, but they were powers only of second rank in the New World. The year 1763 marks the triumph of England.

Success was soon followed by failure. The Paris settlement again was only for a time. France, seconded by Spain and Holland, in less than twenty years helped to limit English rule in North America. The first independent

state of the New World came into existence and the empire of Britain, like that of France, seemed to have fallen. It was the beginning of a general movement for colonial independence. A few years later and the French Revolution created another independent state, alien to the first in every respect, the black republic of Haiti. Again a few years and the hold of Spain and Portugal was removed. Latin America secured her freedom, aided by the United States and by England. The independence of the New World was nearly complete. A line of republics and one independent empire occupied the greater part of both continents. The story begun in 1492 seemed nearly ended in 1823.

II. *The New Structures of the Nineteenth Century*

In reality the history of the New World passed to a new phase. The genesis of the present position is to be found in the years immediately following the recognition of the Spanish American republics. Half a century had then passed since the birth of the United States. It is true that there the English tradition was still predominant, for the feverish immigration of the mid-nineteenth century had not yet threatened to swallow up English influence. A new channel, even, was being opened for its diffusion; for in the Spanish-speaking states of the south the United States seemed about to gain political control. The New World seemed likely ultimately to form one whole in culture and in international relations, a whole dominated by the former colonies of Britain, but free from any new infusion of European influence. That this new-world unity was not attained was due largely to England. In 1823, and right down through the nineteenth century, England stood in more than one sense between the Old World and the New. Once again she found a line drawn across the Atlantic

threatening to divide the world 'like an orange': once more, as in the days of Drake and Hawkins, she broke through it.

This time it was not by means of highwaymen of the sea. The interests of England in the New World were derived from many factors. They were dictated by trade: encouraged by the needs of European diplomacy. They were made vital by the still imposing remnants of her Empire. The Atlantic was to some extent still hers. The Atlantic trade was more English than anything else. As commanding the trade routes, England and her Empire stood between the Old World and the New. The political factor pointed the same way. The world of Metternich was one in which even the most reactionary of Englishmen felt a little out of place. In the New World there was an antidote to the inflexibility of Europe. And territorially the contact was inevitable. The history of the nineteenth century shows that frontier delimitation joined with trading interests to bind England and the New World together. The Oregon boundary and the West Indian trade necessitated diplomatic contact with the United States. The cotton industry and the vent of manufactured goods still made English trading interests look across the Atlantic.

In this period following 1823 there is another side to the new-world policy of England. With the world newly independent she was closely bound. But there was still a part which had not thrown aside the colonial status. For Spain, the remnants of her rule in Cuba and Porto Rico did little to perpetuate her influence. But for England, the smaller West Indian islands and the growing territories of Canada made English rule still a reality. And these remnants of empire were of first importance. They are the link between the era that began in the 1820's and the one that ended in 1783. They are the cause of the very

considerable continuity between the old Empire and the new. They were largely responsible for the trend of English new-world policy in the nineteenth century.

In the 1820's the outlook both in Canada and in the West Indies was depressing. The Canadian people were not yet one people, they were split between French and English. As yet a welding together in the future seemed impossible, and the position was made more ominous by a common, though a separate, discontent. In the West Indies the year 1823 marks the beginning of a period of danger and decline. It is the year of Canning's slavery resolutions, of the beginning of a new era of hope for the negroes and of grave difficulty for the whites. Colonial policy was in need of a thorough overhauling in 1823.

In shaping the policy of the nineteenth century other regions besides those of the American continents had an important share. The forty years between American independence and the recognition of the South American republics saw the foundation of three more new-world states. From South America across the Atlantic lay the lands of South Africa, until recently merely an entrepôt for the Eastern Trade. Here the wars of the Revolution substituted English for Dutch control, and made possible the founding of the Anglo-Boer colony at the Cape. In 1823 already English immigration was transforming a port of call into a European settlement. From South America across the Pacific the great Dominions of Australia and New Zealand were already marked out for British settlement. As yet only in New South Wales was there any stable colonization, but other spheres of penetration were already determined. The work of exploration was proceeding, and projects were on foot for further settlement. The new worlds of the past hundred years had come into being.

The needs of these newer worlds, the position of the

older new world in the West, brought to the front in the second quarter of the nineteenth century a movement for the reform of imperial thinking and of colonial action. The 'Colonial Reformers' of 1830, concentrating though many of them did on criticisms of the existing system, did in fact inaugurate a new era of colonial policy. The relation between the old country and the new slowly changed. The balance of responsibility and duty was being adjusted—and if the balance was in fact maintained neither better nor worse than in the eighteenth century the method of its maintenance was different.

The working out of these new relations was made easier by a factor little connected with the main issue. In the old Empire of the eighteenth century all colonies were, roughly speaking, on the same footing. Massachusetts and St. Christopher, far removed from one another in social, economic, and even in political organization, were looked upon by the home administration as having similar political status. In the new Empire this homogeneity was lost. Many factors combined to discredit the old assumption that colonial governments were all of one model, and the cleavage had begun to appear that now severs completely Dominions from Dependencies. The slave question was the predominant factor, and by 1833, when slave emancipation was proclaimed, the political bifurcation of the Empire was already accomplished. Crown-colony government, evolved in the time of the Napoleonic Wars, was beginning to be systematized by that date. James Stephen was applying to it his genius for administration, and a new scheme of colonial control was brought into operation. Henceforth the constitutional development of the Empire lay along two lines instead of one. For some colonies, starting with Canada, the progress was towards greater and wider freedom; for others, starting with the new colonies of the Napoleonic War period, questions

of development and administration took precedence over political autonomy. Dominion status and crown-colony government are the result. On one side lies the dependent empire, on the other the quasi-independent states of the New World. Dominion status as interpreted at the present day has brought the new colonial peoples of the Empire to a position of virtual national autonomy. It has given to each of them a place among the English-speaking peoples of the New World.

III. *The Imperial System in the Nineteenth Century*

From the first, the new colonial peoples stood in a different position from their predecessors of the eighteenth century. It was not merely that the new system of 'responsible government' gradually supplanted the old 'representative' scheme. This was a change of machinery, of importance certainly, but largely as reflecting other changes. More important than this, the functions of the mother country were altered, seemingly without intention. Still, as in earlier days, there were some things that she controlled, and some that each colony settled for itself. But on both sides the list was altered. The humanitarian movement, which in many ways ushers in the new era, left as a legacy to the new century a feeling of responsibility for backward peoples. Questions of race, wherever they were found, were no longer as in the eighteenth century left in the main to colonial adjustment. A tendency to interfere in these matters became apparent. On the other hand, one great change is to be noted on the other side. The control of trade relations passed in the main from the imperial to the colonial list. The new Empire grew up in the atmosphere of free trade, and gained in consequence much greater freedom in settling its own conditions of trade. But even such changes, important as

they are, leave the general position very much the same. Between the problems of to-day and those that faced the statesmen of George III there is more similarity than contrast.

Britain stands to-day at the centre of a ring of daughter states scattered in all parts of the world. One, but only one, has asserted her national independence with the sword. Yet all alike proclaim a national identity, and all alike are included within the number of the English-speaking peoples. They have all, without exception, inherited a common tradition in politics, in literature, and in thought from the place of their common origin. They have all mingled with it ideas and traditions from other sources. The influence of the French in Canada, and of the Boers in South Africa; the strength of geographical influences in the Pacific: these are factors that make for a national individuality in each of these members of a common stock. If in the history of the United States non-English immigration has done much to create a new people, so in all the national states of the Empire different factors are making for a national divergency. There is a family likeness between all the Empire states, but the individuality of each is growing daily more apparent.

This group of the British Commonwealth, bound together only by custom, tradition, and by sentiment, is the greatest gift of England to the world. Equality of partnership, co-operation in common ideals, these things if they are realized will provide the greatest object-lesson in international peace. But it is a gift which has yet to make clear its value. The common ideals have yet to be proved: the power of co-operation is not yet fully tested. The period of the growing together of the English-speaking peoples is not yet complete, and the end has yet to be made certain. In the history of the past, grounds for hope are to be found, but the hope is not sure. The fact

remains that England lost America, and that the New England states, which particularly resembled England, were prominent in the revolt. Similarity of tradition makes similarity of outlook possible, but it does not make it inevitable. It is true that to-day there are many differences. Oceans are not so wide in the time of steamships and telegraph. It is even easier to keep in touch with the Empire to-day, though it is much more scattered and far-flung. Moreover, the lessons of the past have not been wholly without effect. The argument of force that failed in 1775 would not be used at the present day. And perhaps, most important of all, centuries of imperial experience have fostered tacit agreements which have advanced farther than those of the eighteenth century.

In the time of George III and Grenville some conventions of the Empire were already in the making. Forty years before, the Crown, in the cases of Jamaica and St. Christopher, had acknowledged in general terms the legislative and financial functions of colonial legislatures. The Crown itself, although the final decision was not pronounced until 1774, had already virtually recognized that these functions once given could not be recalled. But in the time of Grenville it had not yet been made clear how far these conventions applied to King in Parliament as well as to King in Council. That an Order in Council could not enforce taxes on a colony with legislative rights did not necessarily imply that it could not be done by Act of Parliament. And so Grenville set out to do by Parliament what he did not venture to do without it. In this distinction lay the danger to the colonists under George III.

At the present time Parliament as well as Crown is subject to conventions in colonial affairs. The preambles of the great colonial Acts of the nineteenth century indicate clearly that Parliamentary legislation has limits

in practice although not in theory. The imperial legislation is based on the 'expressed . . . desire' of the people for whom it is passed. It is a record of their wishes, not an enforcement against them. It is an exceptional thing: for the ordinary work of legislation lies with colonial legislatures.

Such conventions do much to solve the difficulties of the imperial system. The danger of the present day is that there are still fields undelimited by convention. There are still questions as to which the conventions are only in the making. The most important of these is that of the control of foreign affairs.

IV. *The Problems of Imperial Foreign Policy*

As between colonies and mother country the problem of foreign affairs is no new thing. When the seventeenth century brought the New World for the first time within the sphere of British diplomatic intercourse, the twofold problem of to-day began to be felt. The adventures of Englishmen overseas involved England in international complications, and in turn those Englishmen found their interests seriously affected by English diplomacy at home. When James I in 1618 sacrificed Ralegh to the interests of the Anglo-Spanish alliance, he was in fact anticipating a difficulty that was inherent in colonial ventures. So in 1667 Charles II abandoned the royalist refugees of Surinam: and thirty years later William III, intent on continental aims, threw aside the colonial gains in Acadie: and in 1713 the need for peace in Europe cut short colonial ambitions on the St. Lawrence. The middle years of the eighteenth century provide examples of both sides of the problem. The European wars were in large measure the result of colonial rivalry: as Voltaire said, 'A torch lighted in the forests of America set all Europe in conflagration.' On the other hand colonial gains on the

Mississippi were reckoned as of little account at Aix-la-Chapelle, and Louisburg was surrendered to secure the Netherlands. The problem of foreign affairs is one of the many difficulties that caused the smouldering discontent which George III set ablaze.

At the present day as compared with that of George III there are many more signs of a peaceful settlement. The last half-century has done much to prepare the way for a solution: and much may yet be done to further it. The lines followed are indeed much the same as those of the eighteenth century, for the same conditions have determined them. But the development has proceeded farther to-day than in the colonial period of the United States.

Two main lines can be traced. There has been, in the first place, a constant progress in the direction of greater consultation with the dominions. When English administrations take action in matters affecting the dominions, it has become increasingly recognized that it must be in consultation with them. This to some extent was recognized in the eighteenth century, especially by the elder and the younger Pitt, but the practices of the eighteenth century have been greatly developed. On the other hand, there has been at the same time an increasing tendency for the Dominions to take action themselves. Here again there are precedents in earlier times. But this tendency is to a greater degree new, since only by search can eighteenth-century precedents be found, and, moreover, the results of colonial action in those days were more localized.

The growth of this newer tendency is due to many causes. Perhaps first among them should be mentioned a greater feeling of national identity in the colonies themselves, although here a comparison is difficult. In the eighteenth century the colonies varied in the strength of their national feeling. The West Indies stood in contrast

to the American mainland. In the West Indies the hopes of nearly all settlers lay at home. It was the place where their children were educated, and to which they hoped themselves one day to retire. Their national feeling was largely English, despite island rivalries and their jealousy for local rights. On the mainland the position was far more like that of a modern dominion. Yet probably even there the position was not so far developed. More important as a factor is the attitude of Britain. In the eighteenth century British foreign policy was dictated very largely by colonial interests. In the internal affairs of Europe she took but little part. Although the colonies might feel their interests neglected, in the framing of British foreign policy these interests had a dominant share. The close connexion of colonies and trade was no doubt mainly responsible, but that does not nullify the result. To-day trading interests are far less insistent in this direction. British foreign policy lies to a greater extent in Europe. The comparison is a question of degree, but the conclusion seems true. Lastly, and most important of all, the Empire is much more scattered. In the eighteenth century it lay on the Atlantic sea-board and its interests were far less diverse. At the present day the distribution of the Empire is bound to create divergency not only between colonies and Britain, but between one colony and another. The interests of the Pacific are not necessarily those of Canada. A tendency to independent outlook, and a wish for independent action, is bound to result. This indeed is the real difficulty of the position.

The two tendencies stand out therefore clearly from one another, although their growth has been simultaneous and closely connected. There is the question of consultation, and the problem of independent action. In other words, it has had to be recognized that, in so far as the British Commonwealth is one, the centre must keep in

close touch with its parts: in so far as it is many, the right of each part must be acknowledged. Such a formula is meaningless, save in the interpretation of the past. Behind it lies half a century of development, and the overcoming of many moments of danger.

V. *The Methods of Imperial Consultation*

In the eighteenth century consideration for colonial views was shown by the consultation of colonial agents. The practice had become general under the Restoration, although there were precedents under the early Stuarts for some colonies, notably Virginia. From the end of the seventeenth century the employment of colonial agents was the rule, and the experience of the Restoration had established certain conventions regarding their appointment and control. For the mainland colonies two types of agency existed. In some cases it was found convenient to retain in England some prominent merchant or Member of Parliament who should constantly keep watch over the interests of the colony. In others it was thought better to send over from the colony some influential member of it to represent colonial views on matters of colonial concern. Of the first type the most important example is Edmund Burke, agent for New York in 1769; among those of the second is Benjamin Franklin, who came over to England in 1757 and again in 1764 to look after the interests of Pennsylvania. The agent retained in London was of greater use because he might be supposed to have greater influence at home; the agent sent over from the colony was in closer touch with colonial affairs. The two systems supplemented one another in the eighteenth century.

The loss of America left the West Indian islands alone in carrying on the tradition of colonial representation in England, and in the nineteenth century there was a

movement for the abandonment of the practice. Agents there still were, but they were of a different character from those of earlier times, being commercial rather than political representatives. It was not until the last quarter of the century that an importance comparable to that of the time of Franklin and Burke began to be revived.

Then the initiative came from Canada. By this time Canada had been exercising for thirty years or more the responsibilities of self-government, and had found difficulties in doing so much the same as those of the colonies of the earlier Empire. From time to time Canadian ministers, and representatives appointed by the Canadian legislature, visited England to bring before the British Government the wishes and needs of Canada. It was on the occasion of one such visit in 1879 that a proposal was put forward for the revival of a system of a resident agency which should be definitely political in character. The suggestion was for the accrediting of ministers of 'quasi-diplomatic' standing.[1] And if the proposal was not accepted in its entirety, and all the results hoped for have not been realized, the appointment in 1880 of the first High Commissioner of a dominion did something to meet the necessity for representation. The system of High Commissioners has at least provided the British Government with a constant source of information. It is, indeed, not sufficient in itself for the purpose for which it was designed. The very residence in London, which is its essential feature, involves some alienation from dominion interests and ideas. It left untouched the necessity for occasional visits of colonial statesmen to represent more closely the views current at the time. But now as in the eighteenth century the two systems work together to give knowledge in England of colonial affairs.

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1880, xlix, p. 5 (C. 2594).

But a knowledge of colonial affairs is not in itself sufficient to guarantee consideration for colonial interests, as was proved abundantly under George III. Some more direct control of policy is wanted in the new Empire. And from this need has grown the most important method of imperial consultation to-day. In 1887, as one aspect of the Imperial Federation movement, a practice was started of holding colonial conferences: and since that time the practice has become progressively of greater importance. It has outlived the repeated efforts to create a rigid imperial constitution and has become a recognized method of imperial co-operation. The conference of 1897 saw the first of a series of failures to secure the adoption of a constitution; the colonial members then as later preferring the existing system. In 1907 the fifth such conference decided for a meeting every four years, and now the interval has further been reduced to two.

In form the system remains the same to-day as in 1897. The number of colonies represented has increased: the character of the discussion has changed: the significance of the decisions is incomparably greater. But the changes have all been within the machinery established at the beginning. The needs of the war produced the temporary development of the Imperial War Cabinet and the Imperial War Conference. The negotiations for peace transformed the Imperial War Cabinet into the British Empire Delegation. But both developments were to meet the special difficulties of the time. The closer and more equal co-operation of the Imperial War Cabinet has left its mark on the character of the subsequent imperial conferences: the British Empire Delegation has established a tradition of colonial participation in treaty negotiations. But no permanent machinery was produced. When the peace deliberations were over, the pre-war system of conference was restored, and in 1921 and again in

1923 imperial conferences have met to discuss imperial concerns. Again, as in earlier times, the Dominions have shown their preference for these less formal methods, and proposals for rigid constitutional systems have been withdrawn. To-day, as in 1890, the system of consultation is only a little changed from that of the eighteenth century. The constant presence of High Commissioners, the occasional visits of colonial statesmen, the recurrent meetings of imperial conferences, are the only machinery for preserving common action.

The absence of change in the machinery does not imply lack of development in its use. The character of consultation has in fact changed, and the necessity for it has been established. The conference of 1897 was the first at which a discussion of foreign policy took place. The next great landmark was the conference of 1911. At this meeting a survey of foreign affairs was laid before the members by Sir Edward Grey, and this precedent has been followed at all succeeding conferences. The Imperial War Cabinet and the Imperial War Conference were specifically for the determination of policy, and at the meetings since the end of the war full discussions have taken place. Consultation, once the exception, is now the rule, and the general lines of British international relations are determined in collaboration with the Dominions.

Not only is this so in general questions of policy, but on particular points of action consultation is frequent. Telegrams and dispatches, supplemented by occasional visits of colonial ministers, are the means taken to find out colonial views on matters of colonial interest. The possibilities of such consultation are unfortunately limited. In 1911 the Dominions complained that they should have been consulted before the issue of the Declaration of London. In 1922, Canada, on the question of Chanak, alleged insufficiency of information as a ground

for hesitation in support.[1] As a result of these difficulties at the Imperial Conference of 1923, the procedure in the conduct of foreign affairs was laid down. It is clear that great importance was attached to 'the fullest possible exchange of views'.[2] The two governments that have held office in Great Britain since the Conference of 1923, while they differed as to the most desirable method, were in full agreement on the question of aim, that 'the policy of working in concert' should be developed to the greatest extent practicable.[3]

VI. *The Independent Action of the Dominions*

The resolutions of the Conference of 1923 contemplated clearly two types of 'international agreement'. In some cases only one part of the Empire is concerned, in others more than one part. In the detailed procedure that is prescribed the phrases 'one part' and 'more than one part' occur frequently; and it is significant that no hint is made of any differentiation as between the various parts. Great Britain and the Dominions are alike parts of the Empire, and equality of partnership is thereby implied.

The question of equality of partnership becomes nevertheless beset with some difficulties when the other side of the matter is discussed—the power of the Dominions in separate action. This indeed is natural. Claims to consultation in matters of common interest assert equality only as against the mother country. Here as an obstacle to its realization, lack of machinery rather than goodwill stands in the way. Claims to independent action imply equality with the states of the outer world. It is depen-

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1924. Cmd. 2146. 'Correspondence with the Canadian Government on the subject of the Peace Settlement with Turkey.'

[2] *Parl. Papers*, 1923. Cmd. 1987. 'Imperial Conference, 1923.'

[3] *Parl. Papers*, 1925. Cmd. 2301. 'Consultation on matters of Foreign Policy and General Imperial Interest.'

dent upon their understanding of the peculiar nature of 'dominion status'. It calls for recognition by the outer world. In different ways both France and the United States have shown hesitation in granting it. Full freedom is therefore necessarily a thing of slower growth.

The history of the acquisition of a free hand in matters of their own concern goes back again over the last fifty years. The early progress was all in connexion with commercial interests, and the chief field for the experiment was the relation between Canada and the United States; although the colony of Victoria showed early tendencies to freedom of action. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century a number of commercial conventions marked the setting up of individual lines of action and the question of the grant of treaty-making power became serious. It was recognized as early as 1880 that British commercial treaties should not bind the Dominions without their consent. But in the concession of the full right of concluding treaties independently, the British Government was slow. In 1895 Lord Ripon, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, laid down a maxim that has not in fact been broken.

'A foreign power', he said, 'can only be approached through Her Majesty's representative, and any agreement entered into with it, affecting any part of Her Majesty's dominions, is an agreement between Her Majesty and the sovereign of the foreign state; and it is to Her Majesty's Government that the foreign state would apply, in case of any question arising under it . . .'

'To give the Colonies the power of negotiating Treaties for themselves without reference to Her Majesty's Government would be to give them an international status as separate and sovereign States, and would be equivalent to breaking up the Empire into a number of independent states.' [1]

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1895, xx, p. 16 (C. 7824).

This view was again impressed in 1907 and 1911 and indeed on many other occasions. The Empire must be one from the point of view of its treaty relations with the world.

Yet here, as in the case of consultation, the real development has been greater than it appears. Within the terms of Lord Ripon's general maxim much progress has in fact been made. This becomes clear at once as we go farther into Lord Ripon's dispatch. He passes from general principles to detailed procedure : and here his ideas have been left far behind :

' The negotiation, then, being between Her Majesty and the sovereign of the foreign state must be conducted by Her Majesty's Representative at the Court of the foreign power, who would keep Her Majesty's Government informed of the progress of the discussion, and such instructions from them as necessarily arose. It would hardly be expected, however, that he would be sufficiently cognizant of the circumstances and wishes of the Colony to enable him to conduct the negotiation satisfactorily alone, and it would be desirable generally therefore, that he should have the assistance, either as a second Plenipotentiary or in a subordinate capacity, as Her Majesty's Government think the circumstances require, of a delegate appointed by the Colonial Government.'

The procedure contemplated by Lord Ripon is obvious : signature by ' Her Majesty's Representative ', joint negotiation on an equal or a subordinate basis. By 1907 a further stage was reached. The commercial agreement with France of that year was negotiated wholly by Canadian ministers, and they shared with ' His Majesty's Representative ' the responsibility of signature. As late as 1922 this method was employed, and again in 1923. In 1923, however, a new precedent was set in the Halibut Treaty with the United States, and followed again in 1924 in the Canadian convention with Belgium and Luxemburg.

Both negotiation and signature were left to Canadian ministers. They were appointed for the purpose by the Crown: for the purpose they acted as and indeed were 'His Majesty's representatives'. Within the letter, therefore, of Lord Ripon's general maxim, the balance of responsibility and control has moved visibly to the Dominion side.

The difficulties over the Halibut Treaty,[1] and in some earlier instances, show clearly that even in the commercial sphere independent action raises serious problems, and especially that it makes the closest collaboration between members of the Empire essential. In political matters the dangers are even more serious, and in consequence the progress is not so far advanced. Even in the political sphere, it is true, the Empire cannot be said any longer to be one. It has not indeed yet been fully acknowledged that negotiations by Great Britain alone do not bind the Dominions. The case of the proposed guarantee Treaty with France in June 1919 might provide argument on either side. The question of Dominion responsibilities arising out of the Lausanne Conference has not yet been fully decided. But the portents point, it seems, in this direction. Perhaps the most important of them is the fact that for independent action the machinery is nearly complete. If Canada has not yet accredited a minister to a foreign state, it has been recognized by Great Britain that she may do so: and the Irish Free State in its position as a Dominion has made a precedent for actual appointment. Moreover, in this last case, the foreign state has accepted the appointment. The Dominions, further, were separate signatories to the Treaty of Peace of 1919 and the Washington Treaties of 1922. They are members

[1] As a result of them, in effect, the Treaty negotiated and signed by Canadian ministers was made applicable to the whole Empire.

of the League of Nations. To complete the machinery of independence would not take long.

Moreover, for independent action itself there are precedents in the past. In 1870 Victoria made a proposal for a local neutrality—strikingly reminiscent of the project two centuries earlier for a local neutrality in the Leeward Islands. In 1883 another Australian colony, Queensland, seemed likely to add to proposals for neutrality independent action: for her seizure of German Borneo was an indication of a spirit of independence. Nor are precedents the only arguments for this possibility. They are reinforced by the prophecies of common sense. An Empire scattered so widely must necessarily have divergent interests, and may well evolve divergent views. The interests of Canada lie markedly in the American continent: and in 1907 and again in 1911, and more recently the Turkish question of 1922, the attitude of Canada partook clearly of American aloofness. Sir Robert Borden stated definitely in 1906 that a Canadian contribution to the maintenance of the Fleet would not be likely: Canada was protected by the Monroe doctrine. It was largely because of the Canadian preference for non-participation that the scheme for colonial federation broke down in 1911. A century or more of colonial experience created in the United States the attitude of which the Monroe doctrine was the outcome. A century or more of colonial experience in Canada seems to have created a similar position. Non-participation has obvious advantages. 'Splendid isolation' is a policy well known in English history, and geographical advantages make it especially suitable to American lands. The imperial connexion has disadvantages from an American standpoint. Just as Ryswick, Utrecht, and Aix-la-Chapelle involved sacrifice for the old colonies, so Canadian interests in the '60's were endangered by English policy in the American War.

Moreover, there is the question of the Pacific. As against the difficulties of the isolation policy of Canada must be set the active policy of Australia. In the competition for the Pacific Islands, as early as 1883, Queensland tended to take a separate line. But at the present day the main difficulty lies in relation with the powers of the East. A 'white Australia policy' may well involve the whole Empire in complications, if Australian action can bind the Empire to act. The control of immigration, it is recognized, is a subject for colonial and not imperial settlement, yet its results may well be of general effect. The problem in both cases is curiously similar to those problems of foreign policy for which the eighteenth century failed to find a solution.

VII. *The Problem and the Future*

It is easy to see these problems, but it is doubtful how far we are nearer to a solution than the statesmen of George III. Now, as in the eighteenth century, the problem is complicated by the growth of democratic control. In the time of George III the gradual transfer of colonial policy from the King in Council to the King in Parliament created a position for which precedent did not sufficiently provide. The relative spheres of this Parliament and the colonial legislatures were outside the dictates of tradition, and in determining them Parliament destroyed the Empire. To-day it is recognized that there are, not one Parliament, but many. The question of their relative spheres is unlikely to cause serious breach. But still the problem of democracy remains. To each Parliament there is a responsible administration. Beyond its approval this administration cannot go. The lines of common action must be approved, not by a group of statesmen working on the principle of give and take, but by a group of democracies who cannot in the nature of things get round a table with one another.

Nevertheless the last half-century of colonial experience has shown many reasons for hope. It has become recognized that without the 'break-up of the Empire' so often prophesied, much internal divergency can exist. It is possible that in the future the path of wisdom lies in a frank acknowledgement of what has taken place, and an unopposed evolution on the lines already laid down. Freedom of action in the sphere of commerce may be followed by equal freedom in the sphere of politics. Dominion ambassadors may become the rule: Dominion ministers may conclude political as well as commercial treaties on behalf of the Crown.

Such a proposal will raise fears, no doubt, of ultimate absurdity: the Crown cannot in the last resort be at war with itself; it cannot enter into alliances with opposing aims. But the hope for the future lies in avoiding the absurdity of logic. Uniformity and logic destroyed the Empire of the eighteenth century, and there is danger in seeking them to-day. Knowledge rather than logic is the first necessity. Unity can be maintained only by knowledge of the Empire by the Empire: by an appreciation by each of these democracies of the ideas and interests of the rest. Of equal importance is the corollary to this. An understanding of the interests of the Empire brings with it a realization of their divergency. It is necessary to recognize that as between these democracies co-operation can be purchased only at a price. The imperial connexion must be paid for by Britain and the Dominions alike. Each part must be prepared for sacrifice to secure unity of aims.

And the sacrifice may not be only of interests. Each part may at any time be brought to consider whether the imperial connexion should be purchased at the price of an overthrow of principle. In the early years of the nineteenth century one great realization of principle had

for a time caught the imagination of the democracy (such as it was) of Britain. It was the liberation of the slaves. For this, even, they were prepared to pay. But it is hard to think that they were the real paymasters of the liberation. Not only commercial prosperity but political rights were taken from the West Indian colonists. They were too weak to revolt, for the American Revolution deprived them of mainland support. But it can hardly be asserted that they approved the change. It was an overriding of local legislative privileges. It is no wonder that British ministers hesitated before the act. They were ' between the saints and the . . . [colonial] legislatures ' : between the dictates of their own principle and the clamouring of other people's interest. Such a dilemma is not beyond the possibility of parallel to-day.

The Empire has indeed not yet proved its position. For England and the Colonies alike there are problems to overcome of which the solution is not yet apparent. One point is clear : when such difficulties arise in the future, they must be overcome without force, without breach of the principle of democratic control, by virtue of goodwill. It can hardly be contested that such a system in working would rightly be regarded as a great contribution from England to the modern world. It would be solid ground for hope of international peace. But can it be achieved ?

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IX

ENGLAND IN THE EAST

H. DODWELL

THE course of events in Asia since the war has merited more attention than it has received, for the European situation has tended to distract our minds from what is going on elsewhere. But we are at least familiar with such phrases as 'the Revolt of Asia', and the like, designed to cover the many perplexing phenomena which confront us from Teheran to Tokio, and which are all various forms of a reaction against European influences and control. The obscure situation in Persia, the uncertain attitude of Afghanistan, the unrest in India, the troubles in China, the new activities of Japan—all mark the revival of Asiatic self-consciousness and a growing reluctance to accept the orders of the West. In part, too, it is the result of the Russian Revolution, which meant the abandonment of the Westernizing policy of the Imperial régime and the transformation of that great country from a semi-European into a wholly Asiatic State. From our present point of view the problem may be shortly stated thus—whether the Soviet Government will succeed in organizing the states of Asia into an alliance inspired by an intense hostility to Europe and its civilization, or whether under the leadership of the English-speaking peoples the East may be brought into friendship and co-operation with the Western world. The problem is old in substance though new in form; but the events of the last ten years have given it a startling significance.

The time is certainly approaching when under the constricting influences of modern communications the two types of civilization which exist to-day must assume an attitude of definite friendship or definite hostility. The amused wonder with which we used to regard the age-old practices of India or China, the external politeness scarcely veiling the internal contempt of the Brahman or the mandarin for the manners and knowledge of the West, were of small moment when intercourse was slight, trade of little volume, and the European part in the wars of Asia mainly limited to directing the efforts of one body of mercenaries against another. In the old days contact was confined to a few individuals. But with the development of the steamship, the railway, and the telegraph, these conditions have wholly altered. They now permit economic forces emanating from the centres of Western civilization to react with unabated force on the markets of the East. The fluctuations of the tael have been felt all over China, for of all material things nothing exercises such subtle and far-reaching influences as currency; while the whole system of Indian trade and industry has been transformed under the pressure of Western forces. In other words the two types of civilization are now in close contact, and their relations have therefore become fundamentally important to the future development of human society.

It is indeed clear that the developments of the eighteenth and especially of the nineteenth centuries have transformed the conditions which till then had prevailed, and under which the two diverse types of civilization—the Asiatic and the European—had sprung into existence. Of these two the Asiatic is decidedly the older type. Indeed the civilizations of India and China represent survivals in the modern world of that ancient manner of life and organization that first appeared millenia ago on

the banks of the Nile and the Euphrates. All were civilizations that arose in fertile river valleys—all were essentially agricultural societies—in all the religious was scarcely differentiated from the secular life. So far the elements of East and West are after all much the same, because here, too, civilization was born on the banks of rivers, was founded on agricultural prosperity, and was originally marked by an intimate fusion of the secular and religious elements, an identity of Church and State. But the developments were essentially different. In Europe the economic world has developed a vast industrial activity that often obscures though it can never abolish the primary importance of agriculture ; in Asia agriculture still remains the essential occupation of man. Then, too, in Europe the State has shaken itself free from the Church, political institutions have developed an importance of their own, and while society has become more and more fluid the State has become more and more elaborate and consolidated. But in Asia until the other day the King-Priest or the King-God still survived ; Tibet is still ruled by a *Bodhisatwa* ; the germs of free political institutions never developed ; and the social not the political organization hardened into permanent form.

In part I suppose this to be due to the strong physical contrasts which Asia offers to Europe. In Asia, for example, everything is on a great scale. Like Europe, her southern coast breaks out into three peninsulas ; but Arabia, or India, or Indo-China are many times the size of the Iberian Peninsula, or Italy, or Greece. Like Europe, Asia is traversed by a great mountainous region ; but the Alps and Pyrenees sink into littleness beside the Himalayas or the Hindu Kush. Above all, whereas physical nature has formed Western Europe into a number of small and compact compartments, in Asia natural boundaries are few, and there is nothing to obstruct the

march of armies and the flow of civilizations over areas incomparably greater than those of any Western European state. This last has reacted on the character of Asiatic states. So far as our experience extends, free political institutions arise and develop in small, well-defined, and well-protected areas. Greece in the ancient world, Britain in our own, illustrate the way in which a lack of foreign preoccupations encourages and permits the development of political liberty. No doubt this is not the sole condition; but it is certainly a powerful factor; and its absence a strong obstacle. But this condition was just the one lacking to the early Asiatic civilizations. They sprang up amid extraordinarily favourable circumstances along those great alluvial valleys of the Euphrates, the Ganges, the Yang-tse-kiang, long before our own ancestors had succeeded in taking the first and painful steps towards a fuller and a wider life. In the course of time these early Asiatic civilizations gave birth to states. But, with the exception of Japan, the states thus brought into being were of indefinite extent—either very great and always tending to fall to pieces or engirt by a ring of other states, pressing closely on each other, without pre-ordained boundaries, and at constant war; then, too, all the great states that arose were tested again and again by the peril of barbarian invasions from the steppes and deserts of Northern and Central Asia; so that what between Timur Lenk and Jenghiz Khan on the one side, and a never-ceasing cycle of expansion, fissure, and redintegration on the other, the state's main preoccupation was either defence or conquest; and the individual citizen was usually a member of so vast an agglomeration as precluded the development of those common ideas and feelings which form the basis of nationality. This makes one essential difference between the history of Asia and that of Europe. The latter produced a considerable number

of well-defined national types existing within well-defined geographical areas, whereas the former produced a small number of loosely knit civilizations corresponding with more or less instable empires. And, secondly, as I have said the Asiatic states did not produce consolidated political institutions. In one region we find what looks like the germ of city-states; but the germ disappears without developing; or again we find traces of mingled proprietary and political rights in land which in Europe produced the feudal system; but in Asia (with the exception before noted of Japan) these remained undeveloped, and never hardened into system. And here again perhaps we may find the reason for the static condition of thought in the present era. The civilizations of the East betray many tokens of keen and independent minds in the past, along with evidence of very early progress towards an ordered and settled mode of life. But this free intellectual activity did not endure. One conjectures that it was educed by the reaction of that sudden change, which must have been deeply felt, when the early Chinese invaders established themselves in the rich valley of the Yang-tse and the founders of the Indian civilization settled in the valley of the Ganges. But gradually that impetus, by means of which the Chinese and the Indian civilizations were created, died away. Agricultural societies are always characterized by stability rather than progress; and when they are grouped in such large political units as the geographical conditions of Asia permitted and even encouraged, the mass of society was such that no individual could stir its inertia. The position was that of our own Middle Ages, but intensified a thousand-fold.

Nor were the physical conditions of the islands which fringe the south-eastern shores of Asia such as to enable their inhabitants to redress the balance. There, indeed,

were sharp physical divisions but set in a tropical and relaxing climate. It was easy for the inhabitants to secure a living with little toil; but the effort involved was too slight to produce habits of industry or energy of mind. While we find in these islands traces of former civilizations imported from the mainland, here, too, history has nothing to tell us except the rise and fall of evanescent kingdoms representing either civilizations far inferior to those of the mainland or else no civilization at all. Asia had lost the art of progress.

Now it has been Britain's role in Asia to be at the head of those who have disturbed the hereditary quietude that for long ages had been broken only by the rise and fall of dynasties. Into this strange world we began to intrude in quest of trade at the end of the sixteenth century. We did not break open the way for ourselves, but followed in the footsteps of the Portuguese and Dutch. For two centuries and a half our history in Asia is that of the East India Company. At first and for long afterwards our presence was marked only by our trading fleets which visited the ports of Southern Asia and by trading factories which gradually sprang up along the coast-line of that region, from Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf to Canton on the China Sea. Normally these factories stood side by side with those of the other European nations; but as the Dutch firmly established themselves in the Archipelago and long succeeded in preventing us from occupying points from which the great spice trade could be followed, we were obliged to centre our efforts more and more on India; gradually we extended our trade to China; but only in the last century did we secure a footing on the intermediate coasts.

In time these trading factories developed into political settlements, but not everywhere or uniformly. The transformation took place in proportion as the Asiatic

states within whose frontiers they stood fell into political decay, and could no longer provide those elementary securities on which civilized life depends. This again was a process by no means peculiar to ourselves. The Dutch and the French followed just the same line of development under the same impulsion of political facts. With us the process begins in India on the Coromandel Coast, just before the last remnants of the Vijayanagar kingdom fell into the hands of its Muslim neighbours, when the Carnatic was disputed between Hindu chiefs and Muhammedan conquerors. Madras thus became an independent settlement in everything but the payment of a small annual tribute. Its administration was entirely in English hands, and conducted according to English ideas. So, too, in the island of Bombay, which the Portuguese had occupied, as they occupied so many other points on the western coast of India in that interval between the invasions of Babar and the definite establishment of the Moghul Empire; and which was ceded to Britain by the Portuguese. There arose the same independent administration as at Madras, but without even the limitation of a quit-rent. In Bengal, however, the case was entirely different. There the Company purchased the Zemindari of the three villages which have since grown into the great city of Calcutta; and whereas at Madras and Bombay the government was conducted in the name of Great Britain, at Calcutta the Company's officials acted in part as the agents of the Company, but in part as the agents of the Nawab of Bengal, and had no real claim to political powers save those conferred by their tottering walls and tiny European garrison. But in spite of these variations in political status, whether the Company was acting as agent of the King of England or as agent of the Emperor of Hindustan, under their government each settlement sprang from an insignificant village into a populous city.

However much on theoretical grounds we may condemn the commercial company as an instrument of rule, clearly these early Anglo-Indian settlements were administered not without equity and insight. As India, in the century which runs from the revolt of Sivaji to the passing of the Regulating Act, fell deeper and deeper into that political chaos which is the inevitable punctuation of widespread but loosely knit empires, the English settlements became more and more a haven of refuge and the nucleus of a new empire.

With that a new motive and a new type of figure emerges. Instead of the merchant-administrator, we have Clive applying to Indian conditions the ideas of Dupleix, and securing for English control the richest province of India; we have Warren Hastings seeking in the face of overwhelming difficulties to carry on the administration of this new dominion in the spirit and by the methods to which the people had been long accustomed; we have Wellesley deliberately measuring the political weaknesses of the Company's position in India and strengthening each threatened point; and we have Lord Hastings carrying all this to its logical conclusion and establishing the Company as the paramount power in India. I cannot dwell upon the story—not because it does not merit attention; so far from that, it is full of illustrations of tenacity of purpose, of vigour of council, of a wise adaptation of means to ends; but because it is in great measure the story of our own personal achievements, and does not reflect very much of what to-day we are specially concerned with. But the results of this political expansion are all-important to us, because they meant the establishment of Britain as a great Asiatic power, in close association with that other type of civilization which with ours divides the world.

With the establishment of empire came the problems of the responsibilities of empire. These were not shouldered

readily—none but the most incurable optimist could expect that. But at the very time when the ideas of trade and conquest seemed most triumphant and undisputed, a movement of thought was already tending in quite a contrary direction. The history of the Humanitarian Movement has, I think, still to be written. Few things are more remarkable than the manner in which its leaders—Wilberforce, Grant, Zachary Macaulay, and others—turn up time after time as you explore one aspect after another of British activities overseas. This movement, which on one side devoted itself to social reform, and on another to the abolition of the slave trade, also deeply affected British intercourse with Asia in no less than three separate directions, though all were marked by their common origin. The first was the transformation of the spirit in which the Company's Asiatic provinces were administered. Warren Hastings had borrowed Indian conceptions as the basis of much of his policy; and the struggle then proceeding in England for the control of the Company had left him very much at liberty to do what he liked. But an awakening conscience not only put him on his trial for some things which he had and many which he had never done, but also introduced with Pitt's India Act in 1784 a new method of administration. The outward and visible sign of this was the appointment of Cornwallis as Governor-General, and the wholesale application of English ideas to India—the English ideas of law, of the functions of law-courts, of landed tenures, of taxation. Henceforth there was a strong tendency—only resisted by such men as Munro and Elphinstone—to cast the government more and more in a European mould and to abandon the policy, which Warren Hastings had indicated, of taking Indian institutions as they stood and gradually improving them as circumstances might suggest.

The second method in which the Humanitarian Movement exhibited its influence was the foundation of missionary societies and the endeavour to evangelize all India. Lord William Bentinck, in a minute written when he was Governor of Madras, seriously contemplated the time when Christianity would have replaced Hinduism and Islam. The Company's traditional policy had been the avoidance of every act which even looked like interference with religion. At first the directors were deeply suspicious of what might be the consequence of admitting missionaries into India; in 1793 they succeeded in defeating the project of opening their dominions freely to missionary enterprise; but in 1813 they failed; and from that time onwards, though the Company's government maintained an attitude of reserve, the missionaries enjoyed a free admission into the Company's territories and received an ever-increasing support from the Company's servants in their private if not in their official capacities.

Thirdly, we have the development of an educational policy. That begins with Warren Hastings, who, in education as in government, believed in seeking to develop what he found rather than in endeavouring to create something wholly new. In this spirit he established the Calcutta Madrassa for the encouragement of Islamic studies. His friend and pupil, Jonathan Duncan, did the same at Benares for Sanskrit. There the matter rested until 1813, when the Act continuing the Company's charter expressly authorized the expenditure of territorial funds for the propagation of useful learning. For upwards of twenty years educational policy continued to follow the lines which Warren Hastings had laid down. The Educational Committees which were formed to conduct the work aimed above all at developing the old literatures and transforming the vernaculars descended from the classical tongues so as to fit them for conveying the

knowledge of the modern world. The task was long and difficult. Perhaps it was not too skilfully approached. But when in 1834 Macaulay was appointed chairman of the Committee at Calcutta, the work which had been done was swept away with a withering blast of invective. The old system was abolished. English became the language of all higher instruction; Western knowledge the matter taught; the educational work of Warren Hastings was destroyed by Macaulay as effectually as his political work had been destroyed by Cornwallis.

Thus these three branches of activity, all of which may be traced to the influence of the Humanitarian Movement, had two things in common. They were all benevolent; and they were all based on the idea of transforming the Asiatic as much as possible into a European. In one way all were highly admirable; in another all were sadly marked by that self-sufficiency which characterized the age. In government, in religion, in thought, the Asiatic world was invaded by Western ideas; and these Western ideas acquired a great prestige and influence from the political greatness to which the East India Company had attained.

One might have supposed that the development of this new and enlightened policy would have been accompanied by a check in territorial expansion. But that was not at all the case. On the contrary, the British dominions expanded faster than ever. The conquests of Cornwallis, of Wellesley, and of Lord Hastings had been made contrary to the declared policy of the Company and Parliament alike. Pitt's India Act declared in oft-quoted words that schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India were repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the nation. But with the development of missionary enterprise and educational policy new motives and ideas emerge. Before 1840 the Company was declaring that no

honourable accession of territory was to be declined. Evidently it was felt that the development of an honest and improved system of administration, combined with the new educational activities, furnished a moral justification for annexation. Thus the Humanitarian Movement, in its origin opposed to conquest, came at a later stage to contribute arguments for the extension of dominion.

In the course of time this policy induced a strong reaction. We all know how this Westernizing policy, with its steamships, railways, and telegraphs, provoked a great unrest from one end of India to the other—an unrest which furnished the dark background of the Indian Mutiny. The unrest was of course unreasonable. No one wanted to destroy caste by a trick or convert India to Christianity by a subterfuge. But it was very generally believed, and believed with an intense alarm; and unfortunately the efficacy of an idea is proportioned to the degree of emotion it excites rather than to its absolute truth. The Mutiny was put down, and the new government which succeeded the Company's was emphatic in its declarations of religious neutrality. But, all the same, the Westernizing policy continued, and was soon reinforced by the establishment of telegraphic communication between India and Britain, and by the opening of the Suez Canal. These events greatly intensified the force of Western influences operating upon India. Till then they had been sufficient to alarm, but not sufficient to transform. But now the play of economic and moral forces alike was enormously increased. The development of communications with Europe, the development of communications in India itself, brought the latter within the orbit of effective economic, political, and moral influences. The results of this I have discussed elsewhere;[1] and it is enough here to point out that they

[1] See the present writer's *Sketch of the History of India, 1858–1918* (Longmans, 1925).

have led to a transformation of the Indian problem. In the course of the half-century which has elapsed since their introduction, we have seen a most notable expansion in India of foreign trade, so that Western markets now influence India at every point; a most notable expansion of higher education, so that Western ideas reach and influence a large number of Indian students; a most notable expansion of political experiment, for whereas Indians had little or no share in determining policy or conducting the administration of their country, they have now a considerable and an increasing share in both. The old government applied Western ideas to Indian conditions; the new is seeking to engraft Western institutions on an Asiatic society. In either case there is little difference in fundamental principle, for both policies are designed to reconcile our material interests in the shape of trade and economic development with our moral interests in the shape of the extension of Western culture, religion, and institutions.

But in spite of this fundamental identity, there was a marked change in another direction. The days of great territorial expansion were over. The two generations which preceded the Mutiny had witnessed an almost incessant expansion of territory. First Mysore, then the Carnatic, then the territory of the Peshwa, then Nagpur, Sind, and the Punjab were successively added to the Company's dominions. But since the Mutiny the only increases of territory have been the annexation of Upper Burma and a tiny accession of territory on the side of Afghanistan. Mysore, for many years under British administration, was handed back to Indian rule; and neither prolonged misgovernment nor actual rebellion has been deemed sufficient reason for the extinction of an Indian state. The reasons of this change were diverse. For one thing the Indian states no longer threatened the

British rule with political dangers—on the contrary they had displayed at the time of the Mutiny a marked and, in the circumstances, a remarkable disinclination to attack the Company; for another, no commercial or economic objects would have been secured by their overthrow; and for a third, the current of opinion that had always opposed annexation had recovered from its temporary weakening in the early nineteenth century, being reinforced by the more tolerant spirit of the later age.

Thus our function in India has developed from that of the trader into that of the ruler, and the latter has expanded so as to embrace that of the political and intellectual missionary as well. But with the exception of Warren Hastings the Governors-General of British India have been consistently opposed to the revival and development of the old culture and the old institutions. From Cornwallis down to Lord Chelmsford and Lord Reading, all have set it up as their main purpose to make not only the methods but also the ideas of the West prevail. English has been taught more vigorously than Sanskrit or the vernaculars; the culture of the schools has been English rather than Indian; and political reform has meant experiments with the Western device of representative government.

From our present point of view, then, that aspect of British work in India which immediately concerns us is the way in which we have brought Western ideas to, and and in some cases imposed them on, an Oriental people. The fact is capable of being variously represented. Our action has at points been open to criticism. But it is hard to see in what other way the stimulating and arousing influences of modern thought could have been put into such effective action. The idea occasionally expressed, that we have done India a wrong, is, I think, inspired mainly by a natural but uncritical admiration of the past.

Those who would defend it must show that India would have been better off without being introduced to scientific method—a contribution to the cause of civilization comparable to the discovery of fire and which Europe has spent twenty-five centuries in elaborating since Greek philosophy drew the first faint outlines of the conception. It is the one great gift of the modern world to man. It is playing in India, and indeed in all civilized Asia, the same part as Greek thought played in Medieval Europe. The latter shook the bases of society, of the Church; it prepared the way for the Reformation, for the emancipation of thought, for the development of industry, for modern democracy. In like manner before our eyes the Asiatic world is undergoing the same painful process. The old conception of the kingship is fast disappearing; the acquiescence on which oriental societies reposed is being sapped; the slender rivulets of trade have swollen into great rivers, cutting out for themselves—as Asiatic rivers are apt to do—new beds, and either abandoning or destroying the homes of former industry upon their ancient banks. But some strong stimulus of this sort was needed to set Asia once more on the intellectual quest.

Hitherto I have said little except about India; much the same is true of the work of Raffles, Brooke, and others in the great Eastern Archipelago; but I must mention more particularly two countries—China and Japan. The decay of the Indian political system which afforded an opening for the Company's political expansion was a normal movement with which Western influences had nothing at all to do. But the fall of the Manchu dynasty in China was in large part brought about by their direct and indirect action. Here, however, no Europeans had obtained or attempted political predominance. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when such an enterprise might well have been attempted, the Chinese

monarchy was too stable to afford the necessary provocation, nor indeed were the Europeans ever allowed foothold enough to encourage them to struggle for more. One city—Canton—and no other was open to their factories; one group of merchants—the Hong—and no other was allowed to buy and sell with them. When the Europeans were moved to protest—and they had frequent cause—against the exactions of the mandarins from the Hong and of the Hong from themselves, the only weapon which they attempted to use was the economic weapon of closing their factories. In two other ways were the European nations known to the Imperial Court. The Jesuit fathers succeeded in establishing themselves at Pekin, and in securing such respect for their scientific attainments as to obtain seats on the official board which regulated the Chinese calendar. Besides these an occasional diplomatic mission had appeared in China, such as those of Macartney and Amherst; but these had always been made to appear the humble envoys of inferior kings, in all points like the periodical missions from Nepaul, Tibet, or Burma, with complimentary offerings. The Western world was thus kept at arm's length in its proper position of respectful inferiority.

Unfortunately this attitude did not altogether correspond with the facts. Great as was the Empire of China and ancient as its culture, it was in a military sense feeble and in a political one ill organized. For many centuries no additions had been made to the Chinese store of practical or theoretical knowledge. The Celestial troops were still armed as our own had been in the Middle Ages and the mandarins were more corrupt than the officials of any Western state, with the possible exception of Russia. No civilization, whatever its claims to superiority, has hitherto supported itself without adequate military power; so that the superior claims of the Chinese could

not be justified in one regrettably important domain of human activity; while the corrupt mandarins of Canton gave the Europeans, and especially the English, numerous causes of complaint. In our own case the struggle came to a head over quite a disreputable matter—the importation of Indian opium into China. This was prohibited by Imperial orders but connived at by inferior officials. Indeed the prohibition was the one thing needful to enable these latter to reap the richest possible harvest. But, as usually happens in illicit trade, the partners were always falling out over the division of the booty. The Emperor's orders could not be effectively carried out. The English traders declared, not without reason, that they were being treated with bad faith; and the overbearing conduct of Commissioner Lin, who had been appointed expressly to bring this unlawful trade to an end, finally led to war. This war of 1842 and the latter war of 1858 marked two notable facts—the military inferiority of the Chinese armies and the end of the exclusion of foreigners from the Chinese Empire. As in the case of India, I cannot discuss the policy of the wars themselves. There is much to be said on both sides, and I can only commend you to the admirable work of Dr. Morse. But their results are vastly important. The military failure of the Chinese to hold their own against the barbarians of the West sent a shock through the whole Empire and began that process of dissolution which was completed by the Empress-Dowager and the victories of the Japanese. But along with this went another and even more powerful cause. European education at Shanghai and Hong Kong, the teaching of missionaries, the growing practice for Chinamen to proceed abroad for their education, aroused a spirit of criticism which no Oriental monarchy of the old type was at all calculated to meet; and the building of railways spread these ideas into the

interior of the country. Under this joint strain of military failure and foreign ideas the monarchy collapsed, just as the monarchy is collapsing in Persia or as it would have collapsed in India, had the Moghul Empire effectively survived into the nineteenth century. We have, indeed, what is at bottom similar to many episodes of the history of the Italian city-states during the Renascence, although in Asia the phenomena are magnified a million-fold.

In Japan we have the same tendencies with a difference. There, as in India, as in China, the introduction of Western ideas was brought about by a demonstration of Western military superiority—attested in this case not by the British, as in India and China, but by the Americans. And in Japan, too, the adoption of Western methods was national—not imposed by Western rulers or adopted merely by an intelligentsia. But then, as you will remember, Japan affords the great outstanding exception in the history of Asia. Her island-boundaries have engirt something quite different in the way of political phenomena. It is true that we find there the same inertia of thought as marked the rest of the Asiatic world before it was aroused by the Western stimulus, but in degree it was immeasurably less than elsewhere; and there had been displayed the faculty of developing political institutions—not indeed political liberty, but involving rights as against the central government, of a strength and solidity to be found nowhere else in the East. It is not surprising, then, that among these people Western ideas produced a repercussion deeper and more effective than anywhere else in Asia.

The whole of the East has thus been set off on a new career, and the impelling force has been very largely the activities of the British in Asia. Our motives have in all cases been very mixed. Throughout the whole story trade has been our great preoccupation. It is not a thing to be

explained away; it is not one of those things that need justification. The economic motive has always been at work pushing men into fuller and fuller modes of life; without it civilization could never have risen into being, and on it the civilization of the future, too, will rest. But with us it has seldom been that overmastering passion which in its excess has been responsible for much of the world's history that cannot be remembered without condemnation. The great Company, save for one short moment of its long career, was no vulgar seeker after profit. Read the dispatches which its governors addressed to its servants in the East and you will be surprised to find what an anxious interest they took in the administration of their settlements; and they had not long administered territories of any size before the national government began to lay down the mode in which their management should be carried on. The merchant's natural solicitude for a fair name has with us often proved a safeguard against injustice. Looking back on our connexion with the East, we must admit mistakes, we must admit a certain number of crimes, but if we survey it as a whole, we find it an honourable record. It was in the East that we first worked out that method of administration and that policy of mixed moral and material development which now form the basis of the mandates under the League of Nations. That we have done so is assuredly one thing that may help us to bring East and West together. But if we are to succeed in doing that, we shall have to allow more weight than we have lately done to Eastern considerations. In this respect the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries offer a remarkable contrast. In the first we were frequently at war with Asiatic states, but these hostilities were part of our prolonged struggle with France. Our European and Asiatic policies coincided. But in the second there was a violent clash of our European and

Asiatic interests; our policies were never adequately co-ordinated; the conflict of interests was never fairly faced, examined, or reconciled. On the whole we inclined to rate our Asiatic concerns too lightly and did not allow them weight enough in our European policy.

Our position in Asia as regards our foreign policy has thus been at times a source of strength, at times a source of weakness. But intellectually it has been a source of strength alone. Though we were late and backward in studying the strange peoples and unfamiliar practices with which we were brought into contact, our incuriousness was overcome by the imperative demands of administrative necessity. First came the study of the languages of India, and especially of Sanskrit, leading up to the study of comparative philology, in which, though the Germans made it peculiarly their own, the English had done much of the original spade-work. That led on again to the study of the religions of India, with its early and indeed premature fruit in the speculations of the school of mythologists headed by Max Müller, and its later and more important contributions to the study of Folk-lore. The contemplation of that remarkable system of Indian society which long seemed the one thing permanent in a world of change; familiarity with customs separated by worlds from our own, and with peoples utterly unlike ourselves; these and many other influences have obliged us to shake off something of our island narrowness and self-content, and have given a steady impulse in favour of wider views of humanity and its future, even when the effective influence of our own ideas and civilization has been steadily increasing.

This mutual influence constitutes the real value of our Eastern activities. It is almost the only bridge across that fissure which for so long has separated the two great groups of peoples; its maintenance is a matter of the

greatest importance. Hence we may look to the renascence of Asia under the stimulus of Western knowledge, the application of scientific method, and the emergence of common tests of knowledge and common standards of morals which will enable Asia and Europe to work together. That is the lesson of our Asiatic experience.

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X

ENGLAND AND THE BACKWARD RACES

F. S. MARVIN

A THIRD and most important department of our 'imperial' relations remains to be considered, kindred yet distinct from those treated in the last two chapters. In dealing with the 'Dominions' we are face to face and hand in hand with those of similar blood, traditions, and outlook to ourselves. The problem is one of equal partnership, according to population, wealth, geographical position, and general convenience. In the East we are in contact with great communities having an historic past in many points more venerable than our own, but unequal to us in their scientific education, or material strength. They are passing, under the stimulus of Western thought, into a state of national self-consciousness and scientific organization, and our function, while preserving their historic features, is to hold them together and guide them during the inevitable evolution. But in the third division the problem is largely different. 'Backwardness' is a relative term; but we are thinking in this chapter of populations or races who do not possess the ancient cultures of the East or the scientific training and energy of the West, men nearer to the primitive stages of nomad or pastoral tribes through which, as we now believe, all mankind has once passed.

England, of all Western nations, has the largest share of these contacts also, and they centre at the present day in Africa. It is the African problem, shared by us with

others, but, as we shall see, belonging to us by special ties of history and moral responsibility.

Before we turn either to the history or to the burning questions of the day, it will be well to clear the ground of one or two preliminary considerations.

The comparative savage—we can only speak in broad and general terms—being nearer to the primitive state of mankind, stands to the more advanced nations as children to the adult. We need not stay here to argue this question, for which ample evidence is available in any book on anthropology or the races of mankind ;[1] what concerns us now is the practical conclusions which follow from what is an accepted sociological law, an essential part of any rational doctrine of progress. What are the salient qualities of backward or less advanced peoples ? Are we called upon to deal with them at all in the relation of superiors or guardians ? If so, what are the principles which should direct our conduct ?

There are of course many grades and types of the backward. It is said that in Africa alone some seven or eight hundred different languages are spoken by the native tribes, and every more highly civilized country has within its borders social strata which resemble the savage state. Yet we may safely generalize in certain points.

The savage has not gone through that stage of settlement in a large well-ordered community which gave the world the civilizations of China, Babylonia, Egypt, Mexico, or Peru. He has not accumulated traditions and built up an historic consciousness with records and monuments. He is therefore comparatively unstable, without the same attachments either in space or time as the more cultivated of a later stage. He is the creature much more

[1] See *Western Races and the World.* Oxford University Press (Unity Series V) ; *The Backward Peoples and our Relations with them.* Sir Harry Johnston. (O.U.P.)

of emotion than of reason, affectionate but violent, easily led but incapable of long views, of steady persistence, or of commanding others.

The backward type therefore seems as well fitted by nature for a position of guidance and tutelage as each younger generation is at the hands of the more mature. The crimes and mistakes which history relates in our treatment of them do not lie in the nature of things, but in the blindness and perversity of the human actors ; and in the end the course which nature obviously prescribes is being haltingly pursued.

But the previous question which is often asked requires some answer. Why meddle with the natural evolution of these people at all ? Why not leave them to themselves and let them learn by experience and, so far as they are inclined, by example ? One hears something of the same sort advocated by certain educational prophets for the better training of the young. In the case of backward races the answer is manifold. In the first place the deed is done ; backward and forward, stronger and weaker have come together all over the world ; the question now before us is not whether to begin contact or to refrain, but how best to regulate an existing state of things. In the second place, it is not for the general good of the world that vast tracts should be left to the unimpeded occupation of a few scattered tribes. The earth must be cultivated and natural powers exploited for the greatest good of all. In the third place, some kind of training exercised by the more advanced over the less is nearly as much a duty between different social units as it is between individuals. At any rate the question is now a practical and not a theoretical one. The West, and especially England, is faced by urgent problems in many quarters owing to contacts of this sort already set up. We propose to consider them briefly in this chapter, following, as far as possible, the historical approach.

Our present position in this matter, and the duties which it entails, are, like the rest of things, the fruit of history. We have so large a number of backward people to deal with because, from the birth of our naval power in the sixteenth century and onwards, we have been the most active nation in exploring and settling the backward parts of the earth. Queen Elizabeth, from whose days we may date this as well as so many other national adventures, was inclined at first to take a humanitarian view of the right dealings of British seamen with the natives of the Black Continent. 'It would be detestable', she is reported to have said, 'if any Africans were carried off without their free consent.' But later on she honoured Hawkins with a coat of arms which was supported by 'a demi-Moor in his proper colour, bound captive'. The profits had overcome her scruples against the slave trade, as they overcame those of all who practised it for more than two hundred years. For we went to Africa and the West Indies, as we were going at the same time to India itself, in the first place as traders, with none of the crusading notions which tinged the early voyages of the Portuguese and Spaniards. It was as traders that we made our first settlement at Surat and Hugli, as traders that we claimed a fair share in the wealth that the Spanish galleons brought back from the West, as traders that we insisted on supplying at least our proportion of the African slaves to the New World planters. Now trade is a civilizing and binding tie when carried on between equals on honest terms; it is fraud and degradation when forced on ignorant inferiors, sometimes at the cannon's mouth, as in the Chinese wars of the 'forties and 'fifties. Slavery was the lowest depth to which the trading instinct drove the European in his dealings with the weak and backward.

Our own contacts with them increased steadily with our colonial expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As we had outstripped the Spaniards in the six-

teenth century in the West Indies and the New World, so in the seventeenth we passed the Dutch, and in the eighteenth the French. Each step enlarged our human responsibilities as well as our power. By the end of the eighteenth century we were suzerains of India and in touch with the Malays and other weaker races in Eastern waters. We had fought, sometimes with and oftener against, the Red Indians of North America. By the discovery and occupation of Australia and New Zealand we came to know one of the lowest and most primitive human types now in existence, and the Maoris, one of the sturdiest and most improvable of backward races. Africa was still not penetrated except for slaves, though at the end of the century we wrested the Cape from the Dutch and thus came in contact with Hottentots and Kaffirs.

From the first our method of dealing with coloured men differed in one important tendency from that of the French and southern European nations. All Western Europe shared the guilt of slavery; all from time to time committed gross cruelties on weak people at their mercy; all learnt slowly the methods of dealing with them which science and humanity dictate. But whereas what are called the 'Latin' races have cultivated 'fusion', we have on the whole pursued the policy of separation, with educational work and co-operation in the same legal and civic system gradually extended. Thus South America is largely peopled by men of mixed descent from aborigines and Europeans, and the French incorporate their Arab and Negro subjects in the Chamber and the Army as far as possible on equal terms. But throughout the Anglo-Saxon world the policy of 'reservations', of separate life and territories, has been followed and is still being extended, and inter-marriage has always been discouraged. In India the old Company was so convinced of the rightness of non-interference and non-fusion that

a sharp struggle was needed at the time of the humanitarian movement to induce them in any form to authorize missionaries.

Such, broadly, was the extent and the nature of our relations with the backward races, when at the end of the eighteenth century came the great movement of thought which revolutionized France, put new blood in the veins of humanity, and abolished the slave trade.

The date is notable in England for two events, both bearing on our treatment of weaker people, both inspired by a new spirit of humanity in dealing with them, both promoted by the same group of able, devoted, and enlightened men, nearly all of them in the old and unreformed House of Commons. Burke, the chief promoter of the impeachment of Warren Hastings, was equally strong and passionate in the cause of the slaves. Pitt, acting as Prime Minister with more caution and compromise, was no less decided. Wilberforce, the closest friend of Pitt, took up the slave-trade question as his life-work at Pitt's suggestion, lived for it, and found that it enriched and widened his own life also. Clarkson, the indefatigable inquirer and apostle, gave Wilberforce the support he needed outside the House and made his own name immortal too.

We have linked together the impeachment of Hastings and the crusade against the slave trade, because they illustrate the two capital principles of right dealing as between stronger and weaker races, and because they were both promoted by the same set of men. But from the point of view of justice no cases could be more distinct. The attack on Hastings was a personal wrong, only justified politically by the fact that it brought into prominence and endorsed for all time the principle of trusteeship in the administration of subject peoples. The crusade for the slaves aimed at redressing one of the gravest wrongs ever

inflicted on man by man ; it established the fundamental principle of freedom in the case where freedom had been most wantonly violated, by infamous means and for selfish ends, ever since those days in the fifteenth century, when the Portuguese, first coasting down to Guinea, looked out to see if they ' could make capture of any man, or hunt down any woman or boy, whereby the desire of their lord might be satisfied '.

Freedom first, trusteeship second, this is the order of the two great principles, and we will consider a little further what they imply, before we go on to discuss their realization in the British Commonwealth of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

We noted at starting the analogy between the individual young and the backward races of mankind. We might in fact, without too great a divergence from reality, go back to the old religious idea of a human family. It has support from modern science also, which has argued for the unity of origin of the race and gives us that parallelism between individual and racial growth. The race like the family has biological as well as moral unity. Both have members of diverse powers and various stages of maturity. Both must allow to their members freedom for development if they are to realize their fullest powers. Both must act on the principle of trusteeship if they are to function well. In the matter of freedom, however, we must go farther with backward races than the analogy of children would suggest. The parents and guardians of the child can and should coerce him in a way that the stronger and more advanced people should not coerce the weaker. The savage, though backward relatively to other races, is himself full-grown, with mature, deep-set instincts and passions, and his own way of treating his own juniors and inferiors. Hence, though racially immature and needing education like a child, he is, as an individual, adult and responsible, and must be given freedom to act

and develop on the lines of his own nature. The problem is educational, but more complex than the problem of educating the young of one's own environment, for in the case of the backward people we have to study characters and conditions differing from our own, and discriminate between those parts of our own acquirements which it is desirable that they should possess, and those which may be left aside or even avoided. The superior race must therefore cultivate knowledge and sympathy, if its task is to be well done, and the inferior must have sufficient freedom to develop on its own lines, with help and guidance from the more advanced. The mutual relation is a form of trusteeship, similar to, but not identical with, that which prevails between adults and minors in the same community.

Such is the ideal, and we have since the end of the eighteenth century been making a steady advance towards it; but there is perhaps no sphere of human activity in which it is more difficult to make practice tally with theory; it is the very touchstone of civilization. The civilized West, however, could not be said to have taken the first true step to the attainment of the ideal until they had turned their backs on slavery and the slave trade. Hence the supreme importance of the long-drawn struggle which Wilberforce initiated in Parliament on the 12th May before the outbreak of the French Revolution, but had been prepared for many years by the labour and enthusiasm of humane men, especially among the Society of Friends. The Revolution, and the prejudice which it created for a time in England against all reform, set back this movement also. Wilberforce's immediate object, the prohibition of the trade, was not accomplished till 1807, after the death of Pitt and Fox who had both supported the forward movement to the end, and when Denmark had anticipated us by four years.

When the slave trade was finally abolished in England and for all English ships, opinion had so far advanced that

there was little opposition, and the country at once put itself at the head of the European movement for carrying out the prohibition thoroughly and making an end of slavery itself. In this the British Navy became the most efficient instrument and it has pursued that policy ever since. Not only so, but at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when all the Powers were assembled to reconstruct the ruins left by the Napoleonic wars, England put first upon her own agenda the general abolition of the trade, and the strongest Tories such as Castlereagh and Wellington were as decided and persistent as any Jacobins. It is interesting to note, and perhaps not surprising, that Spain and Portugal, the first two countries to carry off the 'good cargoes' of slaves in the fifteenth century, were the last that would abandon them.

The greater step followed inevitably. In the first Reformed Parliament, in July 1833, general abolition was carried, and the news was conveyed at once to Wilberforce who lay on his death-bed in Cadogan Place. 'Thank God', he said, 'that I should have lived to witness a day in which England is willing to give twenty millions sterling for the Abolition of Slavery.' He died within three days. The sharpest conflict, however, which arose from slavery had still to be fought out in the American Civil War, and patches of slavery still remain to this day, in Africa, and especially Abyssinia, and in Nepaul.[1] But the battle was really won with Wilberforce. It was the most striking and significant fruit of the humanitarian revolution of the eighteenth century, and it was accomplished by religious and conservative-minded men, working on the traditions of British Law and the British constitution.

It is not within our scope to trace the evolution of our relations with the backward since the abolition of slavery

[1] The acting ruler of Nepaul is now abolishing slavery, and 'no more dealings in humans' are to take place.

to our own time. We should have many blood-stained pages to turn over. There have been wars in every continent, almost in every district, where white and coloured men have mixed together, wars in South Africa and New Zealand, risings and shootings in Australia and the West Indies. We want rather to dwell on the cessation of these events and the gradual spread of a more harmonious spirit and a more enlightened and humane point of view. The Maoris of New Zealand, now numbering some fifty-four thousand persons, are flourishing and loyal fellow citizens of the British colonists. They have their own lands reserved, as have the aborigines in Australia, the Redskins in North America, and many of the native tribes in South Africa. The negroes and half-castes in the West Indies have since the rising in 1865 lived a peaceful and fairly progressive life. Africa has in the period been completely opened up. The least-known continent until the middle of the last century, it has within our own days become the most discussed. It is there that the great problem of the relation of the races has now to be worked out. But before we look in any detail into the various questions that arise there let us review briefly in a general way what has happened in the world, especially in the British world, in the last hundred years affecting the backward races.

It has been a century of exploration and expansion, a century of the material exploitation of the earth, a century of the growing development of the idea of trusteeship, a century of the spread of self-government and of national self-consciousness and determination, a century of world-organization. All these features of recent life and thought intimately affect our problem; they are the abstract conditions. Concretely, it has been and remains, in this connexion, the century of Africa.

The century since emancipation has seen the white man

traversing every tract of the globe from Pole to Pole. Englishmen have taken as large a share of this as they have of all seafaring since the great days of Queen Elizabeth. And this exploration has brought them into closer and wider contact with undeveloped peoples than any other Western nation can boast. English names are to the fore from Greenland and Labrador to the forests of central Africa and the deserts of Australia—Grenfell, Livingstone, Speke and Grant, Spencer and Gillen, and the host of others. The exploration and the study of native customs and ways of thought have chimed in with the growth of anthropology; they had been in fact an essential part, the foundation, of it. The pioneers in the slave crusade acted from simple instincts of humanity and justice; we have added, since then, the knowledge that the backward races of mankind represent, approximately and with necessary modifications, bygone stages of our own past. This new view, for it is part of the scientific acquisition of the nineteenth century, has given fresh zest to the study of primitive races, and has increased our sympathy with them. We regard them now not only as simple men, the humanitarian position; not only as fellow recipients with us of God's grace in redemption, the point of view of the missionary: in the new view they appear as part of ourselves, early sketches of the same work, children of the same family.

Thus anthropology brings us to the threshold of trusteeship, and we shall remember that Edmund Burke, who first made trusteeship part of our political creed, was also an early and passionate advocate of the doctrine of the slow, inevitable, and majestic process of human societies. The doctrine of human evolution, in the wider and truer sense, does not lead to the deadly conflict which imperialists of the bad and narrow school deduced from Darwin in the late nineteenth century. Humanity is of many types and colours, and advances at varying speed. It is neither

necessary, nor to the general good and richness of the whole, that the stronger type, physically or materially at a given time, should struggle to efface the rest. Hence the new doctrine of evolution, rightly understood, led to greater care and sympathy for men of a backward race. Science has ameliorated our treatment of them, as it has transformed our sanitary and educational practices at home; the two advances are parallel and connected.

Science and the power of applying it collectively to the improvement of our life and conditions are the simplest measure of the advance or backwardness of a civilization. This is not to say that civilization involves no other elements. It obviously does; art and brotherhood, for example. Nor is it implied that under other conditions than the present, other tests of advance or backwardness might not be applicable. For instance, were the world generally organized by the spread and applications of science we should naturally look to some other tests of civilization, the power of producing and enjoying things of beauty, personal charm, the level of education and intelligence, and the many other valuable qualities which distinguish all races of mankind in varying degree. But for our present purpose, and in the recent evolution of society, there can be no question that the decisive thing has been the growth of systematic knowledge and the mental and moral energy necessary to apply it. When the East generally possessed this in greater measure than the West, as in the eighth and ninth centuries A. D., it was for a time more advanced. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the tide definitely turned. China, which was once an example to Europe in many of the highest qualities and attainments of the human spirit, fell behind in the race by the non-acquirement of science. Japan has gone ahead by admitting this leaven from the

West. Clearly the most backward races at the present time are those among whom science and collective power are least diffused, and the best means, the right measure, and the probable results, of introducing them raise the most difficult questions in the whole range of our contacts. As in most practical human questions there are two extremes which must be avoided, and somewhere a middle course, Aristotle's immortal mean, which we have to discover if we can. The extremes here are, on the one hand, to leave the backward tribes and races in undisturbed possession of the territories in which they are first found, on the other, to dispossess them completely and exploit their land, using them merely as the human instruments. Neither extreme is acceptable, neither would at the present day command the assent of any body of responsible opinion, although in practice no doubt many individuals are attempting, or would like to attempt, the second. Science and energy, through the agency of Western man, have increased the productivity of the soil, improved the conditions of life, and promoted intercourse and order wherever advanced, and backward people have shared possession or co-operated in work. Instances are universal and details seem otiose. Irrigation, railways, sanitation, methods of cultivation, markets, everything which denotes an expanding life or trade, have come in recent historic times from the intervention of the more active and more scientifically minded white man. We must regard this on the whole as a gain to the world, but it should not push us to the extreme of treating the coloured or backward man merely as a tool. Here the moral principle of another great philosopher, a voice of the Revolution, must be admitted, 'Every man to be treated as an end in himself.'

It has been found that African natives—to come to the *locus classicus* of the backward races—are quite capable of

efficient trade and production on their own account, when they have once been trained in modern methods. They are eminently educable. In Sierra Leone and the West Coast generally the native tribes are working and trading more independently than in the Eastern territories. It is on the West that free settlements arose at the time of the campaign for emancipation. Zachary Macaulay spent laborious years at Freetown in building up a self-respecting community under British protection, and at Liberia a negro republic was founded by a white American and declared to be independent in 1847. In 1910 the United States Government, acting in general agreement with England, France, and Germany, assumed charge of the finances, military organization, agriculture, and boundary questions of the republic. Under American leadership of this kind a native population of over two millions, of a fine and progressive type, is growing in strength.

Both these cases were direct offshoots of the emancipation movement, and represent the awakening of the European and Western conscience to the evils which had been done in the past and an attempt to redress them. But the greater awakening took place later in the century after the entry of Germany into the African arena. The capital date is 1889 when at the instance of Lord Salisbury a European Conference was called at Brussels to put an end to the 'scramble for Africa', and set up a humane common standard for all the Powers who had established themselves in control. It will be seen that our action on this occasion fits in as a stepping stone between the Congress of Vienna, when England insisted on the abolition of the slave trade as a part of the general European settlement, and the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919, which hands over mandated territories to the mandatory Powers as a 'sacred trust of civilization'. The Brussels Conference declared that the purpose of the Powers

should be, 'to put an end to the crimes and devastations engendered by the traffic in African slaves, to protect effectively the aboriginal populations of Africa, and to ensure for that vast continent the benefits of peace and civilization.'

Crimes and horrors have followed even that solemn collective undertaking, but in a steadily diminishing degree and always with strong reprobation and some form of retribution to the wrong-doers. Details here are not relevant, but an Englishman may quote with some, but not too much, satisfaction, the letter of a Herrero sent from British South Africa, 'Let me tell you that the land of the English is probably a good land, since there is no ill-treatment; white and black stand on the same level; there is much work and much money, and your overseer does not beat you, or if he does, he breaks the law and is punished.'

One would like to believe that such a judgement was entirely and universally true wherever Englishmen have in recent times come in contact with backward races; we will hold fast such truth as it possesses and try to advance on the same lines in the greater problems which face us for solution in the twentieth century. They will be found chiefly in Africa, where our responsibilities have been largely increased since the war by the transfer of vast territories, especially in the East and South-west, from Germany to Great Britain and the South African Union under mandates. The South-west, which had been ravaged by German wars with the Herreros, has been practically absorbed by the Union. The East, which is now known as Tanganyika Territory, is contiguous on the South with the previous British possessions of Uganda and Kenya. The whole area has lately been visited by an Imperial Commission which has published its report this year.[1] Including Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in its survey the Commission found a total population of

[1] *Report of the East Africa Commission.* (Cmd. 2387. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

about 12,000,000 which comprised some 60,000 Asiatics and 18,000 Europeans. These territories form together an empire in themselves, and any step forward in their development must be taken, either by direct grant or by guarantee, by the Imperial Parliament.

This consideration leads the Commissioners directly to the doctrine of trusteeship as put forward by Sir Frederick Lugard in *The Dual Mandate*. The responsibility which trusteeship involves lies on the shoulders of every man and woman of European race in Africa and not only on the Government agents and missionaries; and it is a double duty because it involves care for the whole world of rich territories as well as the higher claims of the welfare and advance in civilization of the native populations. The burning questions of the day are then discussed; Land, Labour, and Education, and on each of them an effort is made to secure some advance between the inevitable contradictions of the case. Land: the land must be cultivated and European settlers are attracted to the better regions by the prospects of a pleasant and healthy life and profit. But, *per contra*, the natives must be secured in the possession of their reserves. Labour: the white settler needs labour, and the native should work harder both for his own sake and the development of the land. But, *per contra*, forced labour, except for works of public utility, must not be obtained either by direct or indirect compulsion. Education: training of a practical kind is needed, especially in hygiene, agriculture, and various crafts. But a large part of the expense of such training must fall on the home government as the colonial revenues are insufficient.

The Report and the problems it deals with are of the highest moment, both historically and for the future, because they offer for the first time a plan of action in dealing with a large population of backward races on the principle of mandates, a trust for civilization, put in the

hands of the greatest colonial nation in the world. Part of this East African Empire is mandatory in the formal sense, as having accrued to Great Britain under the Treaty of Versailles. If we follow up the Report and make a periodical return of the progress accomplished to the League of Nations we should be extending the mandatory principle in the way in which it should be extended, and giving an example to the whole world, white and coloured, of a trust honestly accepted and manfully carried out. In no better, perhaps in no other way at all, could the rising discontents and aspirations of the native population of Africa as a whole be satisfied and their peaceful advance secured. In no better way could the noble aspirations of Pitt's immortal speech on that April morning of 1793 be fulfilled. The House of Commons had been debating Wilberforce's annual motion all night, and at seven o'clock the sunlight began to stream through the windows of the Chamber. 'If we listen', said Pitt, 'to the voice of reason and duty and pursue this day the line of conduct which they prescribe, some of us may live to see the reverse of that picture from which we now turn our eyes with shame and regret. We may live to behold the natives of Africa engaged in the calm occupations of industry, in the pursuit of a just and legitimate commerce. We may behold the beams of science and philosophy breaking in upon their land, which, at some happy period, in still later times, may blaze with full lustre, and, joining their influence with that of pure religion, may illuminate and invigorate the most distant extremities of that immense continent. Then may we hope that even Africa, though last of all the quarters of the globe, shall enjoy at length, in the evening of her days, those blessings which have descended so plentifully upon us.

'Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens adflavit anhelis
Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper.

'It is in this view, Sir; it is as an atonement for our long and cruel injustice towards Africa, that the measure proposed by my honourable friend most forcibly recommends itself to my mind.'

Fox, who walked away from the debate with Grey and Windham, declared that the speech was one of the most extraordinary displays of eloquence they had ever heard, and Wilberforce, who had suggested the theme of the civilization of Africa to his friend the day before, said that 'for the last twenty minutes he really seemed to be inspired'.

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XI

ENGLAND AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

F. S. MARVIN

WE have been tracing in previous chapters the gradual enrichment and expansion of the English nation from those early days before history proper begins, and when the civilization of this island appears as a sort of fringe to a great 'megalithic' culture with its roots and its centre elsewhere, to the time near the present, when we stand out in the world as the head of a Commonwealth of nations encircling the globe, ourselves European in training and connexions, but with branches and relations North, West, East, and South, a unique and potent factor in the civilization of mankind.

Geographically the fate of England was decided when the sea broke through in 'palaeolithic' times and the Channel was formed. Our island was to be *of* Europe but not *in* it. The phrase stamps our character for all time. It is true, as Mr. Collingwood points out in Chapter II, that in Roman times the Channel was of little moment, and that Southern Britain and Northern Gaul formed a cultural whole more closely similar than Northern and Southern Gaul or, of course, than the Northern and Southern parts of Britain itself. Yet even then the force of the insular position of Britain was felt. Britain was the first part of the Empire to be denuded of Roman troops in the fifth century, and the isolation of Britain in the succeeding centuries led to a set-back which needed the Norman connexion of the eleventh century to make

good. Again for three hundred years our rulers attempted to act as if the Channel did not exist, but on both sides now a national consciousness was awake, and St. Joan became as great a benefactor to England as to France by inspiring the decisive fight.

From the end of the fifteenth century onward the national spirit grew apace, and the national character became more strongly marked. In Shakespeare we feel it fully developed, although Shakespeare is also our most universal man. Whoever doubts the possibility of combining in one consciousness a full-blown nationalism with complete humanity need only turn to Shakespeare. But nationalism, both for us and others, was too strong from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, and we needed again to be knit up with Europe and the world, especially with Europe, before a full life could be lived at home or our full force exerted abroad.

There was thus a certain ebb and flow in our relations with the Continent, and England does not begin to develop her definite place in the world until the sixteenth century. Elizabeth and Shakespeare first clearly embody our national aspirations and point the way to the future. From their time onward we have acquired our greatest intellectual light and a clear national policy—a growing Empire or allied Commonwealth overseas, and a restrained and cautious attitude in Europe. Three capital features of the England that we know date from Elizabethan times. The greatest of all in its effect on other nations, our example in self-government, does not come into full prominence until a century later. Thus equipped we were ready to play our part in the modern world introduced by the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century.

A restrained and cautious policy in Europe, expansion overseas, and continually extending self-government; all three points call for some explanation and enlarge-

ment as they are vital to a comprehension of our subject in this chapter, viz. England's relations with the League of Nations.

It is customary to date the beginning of what is called the policy of the Balance of Power from the time of Wolsey and Henry VIII. Elizabeth is the better fountain-head. She was the truer patriot, and in her tortuous policy and the playing off of one continental rival against another—which is the crude form of the Balance of Power—she had no object but the salvation and strengthening of England. It was not till the latter part of her reign, when the Spanish-Catholic menace had been finally repulsed, that she or England could breathe freely and think of social or political improvements at home or the conditions of a wider peace in Europe. On the last and greatest topic she had at that time a sympathetic colleague in Henry of Navarre, whether or no the ideas of Henry's 'Grand Design' were discussed between them as some have supposed. It will be seen therefore that this policy of a balance was in its origin a matter rather of national necessity than of ambition, and so long as the rival ambitions of other Powers threatened either our own freedom or the peace of Europe, the policy retained its justification. Elizabeth gave us the first triumphant example of its use in practice, William of Orange the second, and Pitt the third. When we come to later times and see the working of the same spirit in our entry into the Great War, we must remember that, in the first place, so far as it was a true motive in 1914, it had a respectable historical genealogy, and, in the second place, that no historical events are strictly parallel, and that by the beginning of the twentieth century the groupings and mutual obligations of nations had become so much more complicated that other motives played perhaps as great a part.

As time went on the perfectly sound element in the policy of the Balance of Power became enlarged and fortified by other international factors, so that in the end we may hope to see the ideal of the common good as supreme accepted by all competing nationalities. How great an advance had been made since Elizabethan days, before the Great War broke out, is shown by the overwhelming vote of the world against the Central Powers for their two capital breaches of international law, in the invasion of Belgium and unrestricted submarine warfare. Our participation, and that of America, assumed the character rather of a vindication of international right than of the preservation of the balance of power, though the latter motive no doubt also entered into the case.

England thus re-enters, in the twentieth century, a world-order far more extensive and more united than the world in which she first played a decisive part three hundred and fifty years ago. We say 're-enters' because for so much of the intervening space, especially in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the policy of British statesmen was rather to limit than to magnify our influence in Europe. There is abundant evidence of this, were it possible to trace in detail the fluctuating course of our foreign policy, but Lord Clarendon's complaint to Mr. Gladstone just before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 is striking evidence. 'Belief in the selfishness that dictates our present system of isolation', he wrote, 'has reduced our importance, and therefore our influence, on the Continent to zero. Europe now cares no more about England than she does about Holland, and I have suffered many things on that account during the last two months.' So far as this was true it was due to many causes, some of them personal. It was no doubt partly a reaction from the over-assertiveness of Lord Palmerston and partly due to the temperament of Mr. Gladstone, then under the

influence of other associates. But it was left to Lord Beaconsfield to point out, a few years later, another and perhaps a more potent cause for our timidity in Europe. It was not, he said, because of our weakness, but because of our very greatness that we tended to stand apart. Our greatest interests were elsewhere. We were a world-power, busied, anxious, and continually expanding outside Europe, and for this reason careful not to tie our hands in our neighbours' knots. Our feeling then was something like that of the United States in our own days. The change came gradually at the turn of the centuries. The Boer War revealed our dangerous isolation, and the commercial and naval ambitions of Germany completed our conversion. We entered with Edward VII into the circle of European groups.

But another and more important change in our position had taken place meanwhile. The Boer War tested and demonstrated the solidarity of the Empire. It was soon followed by the grant of autonomy to the Union of South Africa, and when we entered for good and all the European arena it was at the head of a Commonwealth of sister nations. By that time Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa had all become self-governing units, free to leave us if they would, united to us by those bonds of kindred, common interests, and similar institutions which form the surest links.

Here was the greatest advance, the strongest fortification of England's position in the councils of the world. We had from the eighteenth century onward been quoted and followed as an example in self-government by other nations ' struggling to be free '. The example was marred by our mismanagement of the American colonies, but restored and brightened by the experience of the century and a half which followed. All the world is now to have a free constitution, such as we had passed on even to the

first and most powerful of our colonies, those who had broken away in 1776.

This is the greatest and most characteristic gift of England to the world. In other matters, science, art, literature, and religion, we have contributed our share, sometimes more and sometimes less than other nations; but in the art of self-government, in preserving an unbroken political unity, without a revolution for 250 years, and gradually extending the system to our offshoots and dependencies, in this we stand alone; and the world has recognized and followed our initiative since the end of the eighteenth century. Previous chapters have given some of the earlier stages and explained their causes so far as these are capable of explanation. We are concerned here with the effect of this character and these traditions at the present time, when, by our intervention in the Great War and our prominent position in the League of Nations, we count for so much in the stability and progress of the world. The role is a distinguished but a very difficult one because the consciousness of power and superiority is always dangerous both to oneself and others, and the open assumption of them is fatal. Through this cause fell Germany, and all of us, France, the United States, and England, who for different reasons have some claims to primacy, create jealousies and opposition by this very fact. Nay, does not the whole West collectively offend the East in the self-same way? The fact that our strength is predominantly industrial and political aggravates the problem, for it is on those grounds that men are now inclined to fight. The only permanent and ultimate safeguard lies in steadily cultivating the sense of the whole, and recognizing that our share, whether great or small, is of value only in so far as it conduces to the common good.

The question why England escaped a revolution in the nineteenth century, although she gave birth to the 'indus-

trial revolution' which has stirred up more popular unrest than any previous event in history, and though she contained, and perhaps still contains, the greatest contrasts between poverty and riches, has exercised many minds, and the solutions proposed are interesting for our present purpose; for the League of Nations exists to generalize the peaceful progress which is the characteristic of English history. An eminent French writer has found the chief cause in the religious preoccupation of our people at the time when continental nations were brooding on ideal schemes for life on earth, and putting up barricades to secure them. It seems an offensive assumption to assert that we are more religious than our neighbours, yet in this connexion there is much to say for M. Halévy's view. Our Labour leaders have nearly always been men of strong religious beliefs, often local preachers, and the Methodist movement in the early nineties of the eighteenth century was essentially popular and as a whole anti-revolutionary. But though a cause, religion was only one of many, and we should put before it that solidarity of the nation which had been a marked feature in our history from the sixteenth century onward and relieved even the Civil War of many of the horrors which have accompanied such conflicts elsewhere. Before the great drift to the towns which followed the industrial revolution English life had learnt to be a fairly united, and, on the whole, a kindly and tolerant thing in its country home, where landlord, farmers, parsons, and labourers, all living side by side, though conscious of one another's faults, were also conscious of one another's needs and shared a common life. This spirit passed over to some extent into the new towns, and above it all were the common institutions of Parliament, with its local members known to all, and its Sovereign a part of the parliamentary system. To this we must add the cautious, practical spirit of the average

Englishman, fortified by the Scot when he came to regard himself as one of us. It is the exact opposite of the idealist spirit which erects barricades. It always asks, what are we actually suffering from, and how can we best secure real relief and improvement ?

No better moment could be found for observing the working of this national aptitude than the crisis which preceded the passing of the first Reform Bill, and no better examplar than Francis Place, the Charing Cross tailor, who, having risen from extreme poverty to position and affluence, identified himself in the most intimate way with the popular movement, and was the strongest link between the extremists and the reformers proper, who at that time thought that everything was to be gained by improving the representative character of Parliament. All forces were concentrated on this, and the thing was done.

The practical spirit is the spirit of compromise, and compromise here means the adjusting of rival claims when each contending party has some measure of justice on its side. Such claims cover nearly the whole debatable ground as between capital and labour and still more nearly the whole international field. Hence those trained in the English school of ' practical politics ' have many special aptitudes for service in the League of Nations, which is a great idealist experiment now passing into a practical success. Nearly all the schemes which have preceded the present League have been of continental and idealist origin. If we except the very limited and short-lived Holy Alliance, the present League is the only such scheme which has been attempted in practice. Hence the first principle of the political practician, to find a precedent and follow it, does not strictly apply. What if the British Commonwealth turn out to be the nearest precedent ?

The differences are obvious. The British Empire became self-governing in the first place through the community of origin of its parts: India, which is the least autonomous, is to the least extent British and so on with the rest. This makes the problem a far more manageable one, and it differs also fundamentally in the fact that the Empire is politically one, in so far as all the parts acknowledge the same Sovereign and the same Supreme Court of Judicial Appeal. Yet on other grounds General Smuts was right in claiming that we had in the Empire a lesser League of Nations already in working. Think of the similarities. Its constituent members are all freely united just in proportion as they are self-governing. We should no more dream of retaining one of our self-governing Dominions in the Empire by force of arms than the League of Nations would think of compelling the adherence of Germany or the United States. Then war has played something of the same part in each of the two great Commonwealths of nations, the part of a precipitating agent though not of a primary cause. Just as the Great War brought to a conclusion a process of international growth which had been going on with increasing speed for three or four generations, so the American War of Independence put finally on a basis of free co-operation all the other parts of our Empire, and secured similar treatment for every community which sought complete nationhood within our borders afterwards. The Quebec Act was the Magna Charta of the Empire. But the greatest likeness of all lies in the similarity of aims which each of the organizations has before it. They exist not only for negative and preventive purposes, to avoid wars and conflicts and protect their members from external wrong, but also, and even more, one hopes, in the end, to promote the common weal by consultation and united action.

The British Empire has six seats in the Assembly of the League of Nations, and by the terms of the Covenant one permanent place in the Council. This gives us in each case something like a ninth of the membership on the present basis, but in actual weight far more. But it must not be supposed that the vote of the six members for the British Empire is necessarily cast as one. Complete freedom of decision prevails, and the British Empire delegates discuss questions together as a little assembly within the Assembly itself. The machinery of the League thus provides to some extent a means of meeting the difficulty discussed in Chapter VIII. This advantage of conference is keenly appreciated by the British Empire delegates, and it must be remembered that the International Labour Office has its annual gathering as well as the Assembly. In both cases representatives of the different parts of the Empire meet at Geneva and compare notes among themselves, as well as taking part in the general discussions with other nations.

All the fifty-five nations now in the League bring something of their own to the common stock; the British contribution like the rest being strictly conditioned by our history as an expanding state. It arises therefore from the evolution which has been sketched in the preceding chapters. First of all undoubtedly must be put the training and the turn for practicality which we have just mentioned as a potent factor in preventing revolutions in our later history. How is this to be carried out? is always with us as necessary a question as whether the object aimed at is in itself desirable. The effect of taking this point of view, invariably and instinctively, is that more weight is attached to administration than to legislation in our system. The Civil Service, local as well as central, has become actually the most important part in the government of the country, and some of those who

have tried to answer the question as to the absence of revolutions among us have attributed it to the strength of the Civil Service. There are two aspects of this strength, both equally vital. One is that the more legislation which is passed of a practical kind, and with an eye fixed on its practicality, the greater must become the weight in the state of the administrative bodies which have to do the carrying out. And the last hundred years have added to our statute book a greater mass of laws than were ever passed before, and increasingly of this detailed and practical kind. The other aspect of the matter is that with us the administration is strictly impartial, and the laws, therefore, even when they have been carried after a fierce party struggle, take on a national and not a party colour. This is precisely the spirit which is most needed in the League of Nations, the spirit which approaches every problem in the conviction that a fair solution is possible if both sides sincerely desire it, above all, the spirit of determination and habitual readiness to accept the decision, when arrived at, as law, and confidence that it will be strictly and impartially carried out.

It is connected with this side of our national tradition that we maintain on the whole a continuous policy in foreign affairs, and therefore go into the League of Nations as a steadying force.

This may seem to conflict with what was said above about the ' fluctuating course of our foreign policy ', but the contradiction is only superficial. Obviously, in a national sense, our policy as reflecting the national temper, knowledge, and general attitude, has varied greatly at different periods. We have seen how in the sixties we were steady for abstention, and allowed the Prussians to dismember France. In 1914 we became the dominating factor on the other side. In 1854 we waged a terrible and rather futile war for the Turks against Russia. Before

the end of the century our leading statesman declared publicly that we had 'backed the wrong horse', and in the last war we were of all the Great Powers the most persistently anti-Turk. But these were not changes of policy due to party: they came about slowly owing to general causes, and on each occasion the nation as a whole was united, and did its best, as one, to carry out the policy to which the country was committed. In the same way at the present time it cannot be said that our political parties are divided as parties, or on principle, as to the League of Nations. The difference is one of emphasis or enthusiasm or hopefulness, not as to the goodness of the thing itself, and whether we ought to support it or not. Some would give it more work to do and some less. Some believe that it will prevent another great war, and others think that it will prove its impotence. But all, except an occasional eccentric, wish it well and desire its increasing strength and usefulness.

Two other effects of a general kind, which may be looked for from British co-operation with the League, remain to be noted before we go on to deal with some of the problems of the day; they have already manifested themselves in its six-years' growth.

The first is the natural sympathy and similarity of the new nations in the British Commonwealth with the 'small nations' elsewhere. Canada, Australia, South Africa, cannot of course be called 'small nations' in any strict sense of the term: they have vast territories, high hopes, and unlimited possibilities. But they resemble the small nations of Europe in the size of their populations, the newness of their acquired autonomy, and the fact that they have swarmed off from an older, more populous and central state. It is all to our advantage, and the advantage of the world, that they can contrast their feelings and past relations with the dominant state—be

it Russia, Turkey, Austria, or Germany—with those of the daughter-nations of Great Britain. It is no doubt largely due to this cause that we have hitherto found ourselves, in great debates in the League Assembly, at one with the representatives of the smaller nations.

The other side on which our experience is bound to tell heavily in the work of the League is industrial organization. We made an able Frenchman head of the International Labour Office, just as the French and other nations loyally support an Englishman as General Secretary of the League. But in the working of the office and in the place which industrial, financial, economic, and transport questions take in the whole work of the League, English influence is decisive. In such a place as the League of Nations and such a time as the present it is well that we are a nation of shopkeepers, for in the end nothing tends more effectually to calm down political passions than a heavy stake in the commerce of the world.

But right theories must direct our practice and sound politics be mingled with commerce if a world-organization is to prosper. Hence it is wholesome for us to have to listen sometimes to the fervid discourses of those who deal more readily in the abstract than we do ourselves. Patriots though we should be, and grateful supporters of the Mother of Parliaments, we should not aim at an Anglo-Saxon world, or desire every debating assembly to reproduce the actual House of Commons. There seems, however, no immediate danger of this in the Geneva gatherings. There is no lack of idealist oratory, and with the French interest in the Committee of Intellectual Co-operation, and the expected advent of the Germans this year (1925), the forces of abstract thought will be greatly strengthened. Undoubtedly what is most wanted for the speedy progress of the League is the further admission

of Americans to positions of influence and work. They still stand out from formal membership and responsibility, and will probably maintain this position for some time yet. But meanwhile, as in the case of the Dawes Plan, they are constantly at work on special committees and inquiries, and in this way may actually do more service than by taking their vacant chairs in the Council and the Assembly. For us in England their adherence in every sense would be of the utmost value and good omen. As in the war, we shall still go on and always hope for a successful issue; but the New World at our side would be the keystone of the arch. It is good news, as we write, that the United States are to take part in the committee appointed by the League to supervise the publicity required of countries manufacturing munitions of war.

In general terms the English function in the League is to infuse it with a practical spirit gained by centuries of experience in dealing with similar problems on a limited scale. We have to co-operate in a frank and cordial way with others to whom abstract ideas, whether of humanitarian or national import, are much more real and urgent than they ever seem to us. To us, the League being once founded as the embodiment of a great idea, the matter of supreme moment seems to be to strengthen it by successful work, to make it appear to all the world not only, or even primarily, a *beau geste*, but a useful and growing concern. For this reason its wisest friends among us are at pains to remember, and constantly refer to, the multitude of pacific as well as disputed matters in which the League has already played a beneficial part, the conflicts it has appeased, the suffering it has relieved, the necessary and fruitful inquiries it has set on foot. These are its best credentials for the future: *possunt quia posse videntur*.

In particular Great Britain and her sister nations stand

in a peculiarly favoured position for allaying the two most excited and dangerous sores in the world at the present moment, and of these it is worth speaking in a little more detail than of the other problems which face the League.

The first and most urgent is the age-long rivalry, so often exasperated into actual war, between France and Germany. Our position as between them is unique. We have fought with, and against, both of them from time to time, but with both we have substantial grounds of friendship which far outweigh any past or present grounds of strife. We are largely Teutonic in race and still more in language, and links of marriage, business, and of all kinds of association are more numerous between us and the German people, from our royal house downwards, than with any other nation. We are more like them in social habits and tradition, in religion, poetry, and art. Above all in history we helped to build up Prussia by supporting Frederick the Great, and we took a leading part in securing her salvation from the assaults of Napoleon. On the other hand we are complementary spirits to the French. With them too we have many historic links from Julius Caesar downwards, and it would not be hard to prove that at the happiest times in the history of both countries they have been on terms of close friendship with one another. The links here are intellectual rather than consanguineous, Alcuin and Charlemagne, Roger Bacon, and many others, with the University of Paris; Elizabeth and Henri IV; Cromwell and Mazarin; Voltaire and Newton; in each case the association stands for a turning point in the mental or political evolution of the West. The times of strife—the Hundred Years' War, the colonial and commercial wars of the eighteenth century, the struggle with Napoleon—were times of disaster, and for the most part of grave error on one side or the other. England in politics, France

in language and general culture, have led the world, and there was never a time when cordial co-operation between them would do more good to mankind than the present. This twofold relation of England, though it perplexes us gravely, is in reality a most valuable asset. Neither party can do without us, and we, if we play our cards well, can bring them together. This is the first problem of the hour at the League of Nations, and our statesmen of all three parties have struggled manfully with it. The resemblance with the task left us in 1815 is striking enough, and has been duly exploited by historical critics. It is not our business here to discuss questions of the day in detail, but the recent preference of the British Government for the proposed Five-Power Pact over the Protocol of Geneva may, if successful within the League, seem justified by this supreme object—to get Germany into the League on terms permanently and honestly acceptable both to her and to France. The League, and England with it, can prosper without the formal adherence of the United States: their substantial, though informal help, given as at present, will serve for the time. But Germany is essential: without her, and with her suspicions unallayed and her temper unreconciled, the League must limp along painfully as it has from the first.

The other vexed question to which we referred, and for the solution of which the British Commonwealth has unique advantages, is the clash of East and West which threatens to make the Pacific as stormy a centre in the twentieth century, as the Atlantic was in the sixteenth.

The problem is on another plane from that discussed in the last chapter, for India, China, and Japan all contain great historic civilizations and are all members of the Assembly of the League. They can all speak for themselves there, and Japan has a permanent seat upon the Council. Yet in each case there are smouldering flames

which unskilful stirring might rouse into a blaze. The troubles of India we have discussed in Chapter IX, and know them well as an Imperial question. China is in a state of political disorganization and seems to need the advice and strong support of disinterested friends to weather the storm as a united people. Japan has acute differences with the United States and is credited with ambitions in the Pacific which might bring her into direct conflict with the British Empire.

Now in each of these cases England has a certain prerogative place which, if wisely used, might serve the peace and progress of the whole East; and East and West are not to be the severed and alien things in the future which we have sometimes been taught to regard them in the past. In India our responsibility is a direct one; we cannot abandon the task which we have assumed of leading her mingled races and civilizations to a permanent state of equilibrium and harmony. The forward political elements in the country demand complete self-government, and from our own principles, applied elsewhere, we cannot deny the claim, though we naturally and rightly insist that the goal must be reached by safe and progressive steps and not by revolution. In China we have no more claim to intervene than many other signatories of treaties with her. But, apart from the terrible episode of unjustifiable aggression in the mid-nineteenth century, we have a long period of friendship and mutual esteem between the two countries, and many services to our credit rendered to the Chinese state by financial experts and managers like Sir Robert Hart. Those who know China best advise us that she would welcome a friendly conference at the present time if she could feel assured that those conferring had no selfish ends of their own in view. That we and all the world would benefit by the entry of a peaceful and united China into the comity of

mankind is evident; but the benefits to be gained must be general, not 'spheres of influence' or special privileges to be won by certain more astute negotiators at the expense of others. It marks a real advance in civilization that such advice and conference is now regarded as feasible, whereas thirty years ago we were all engaged in the prospective carving up of the corpse of China for Western exploitation. The League of Nations is more than a political institution: it is a symbol of a new frame of mind, which was growing before the war and now, in the memory of that great disaster and the stress of its consequences, is urging us afresh to acts of mutual helpfulness and solidarity.

It has been pointed out that the British Empire is like that strange prehistoric monster unearthed some time ago in Africa with a sort of head, a nervous centre, at each end of its elongated body. Awkward to manage, the structure is unique in providing outlooks on the world, distant and distinct channels of approach, which, if co-ordinated, would make a circle of attack or defence. Our two extremities abut upon the Pacific Ocean. On the one side in North America are some of the youngest and most vigorous communities in the world; on the other, the ancient peoples lately aroused by Western science, and struggling to accommodate the new wine in their old but still tenacious bottles. England is here the link between East and West. Canada and Australia spring from her; she is the military protector, and, to a large extent, the actual ruler of India; the friend and erstwhile ally of Japan. No other nation can dispute her honourable and heavy responsibility in this respect any more than her precedence in establishing large self-governing communities in the modern world. As link of nations and torch-bearer of politics, she leads them all; and this is her vital function in the League of Nations.

In yet another way England presents a singular example for the study and solution of the underlying problem which we have been pursuing in this book—the reconciliation of patriotism and the larger allegiance to mankind. We see the problem on every scale within the area of the British state: we have it in every county and almost every town, we have it again in North and West, East Anglia, Wales, Scotland, and every subdivision of the Commonwealth which possesses local attachments and a corporate spirit. They are Devon men, but Englishmen still more, and, as Englishmen, proud members of the Empire, and as members and builders of the Empire they now share in six votes for the management of the common affairs of the world in the League of Nations. If there is any essential conflict between the claims of country and mankind, there must be also in all the subordinate steps from the family upwards. But though there may be, and often is, in practice, there is none in theory, and as we saw in Shakespeare, and might see in all the greatest international heroes of history, love and understanding of mankind find their best roots in love and understanding of home and country. One grows from the other, and the larger attachment need not in any way dwarf or hamper the smaller.

It is among the many special advantages of England and the British Commonwealth of nations that we have been able to achieve so great a variety of combinations between local and larger patriotisms. We have the Welshman with his intense devotion to his native hills, and at the same time a loyal and enthusiastic member of the English Parliament, a supporter of the Empire, and an ardent friend of the League of Nations. We have the Canadian who complicates his amalgam of attachments with another loyalty to the New World and a strong feeling of kinship with the great republic just over his borders to the south;

and the Australian who is building up another New World in the Pacific. And even these are simple cases compared with the negro of Jamaica who grafts a passion for the Empire upon the dim background of his ancestral home from which the founders of the Empire tore away his forefathers by force or fraud, and the Gurkha who went down proudly to his death in Flanders for a cause in which his own white suzerain in India was only indirectly, and to him unintelligibly, engaged.

Marvellous and infinite are the capacities of human sentiment and loyalty, and all may be in the end transfused by a larger and deeper feeling for the whole human brotherhood of which the League of Nations is now the accepted symbol and organ.

St. Joan, the saviour of France, is now as great a heroine and as much beloved among those she fought and who gave her to the stake. She felt, more fervently than any others of her day, the new patriotism of France ; but the voices first came to her from the fields and homeland of Domremy, and they led her to a profound love and pity for all mankind.

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XII

THE CHILD'S APPROACH TO INTERNATIONALISM

F. J. GOULD

IN speaking of the child's approach to Internationalism, I assume that the teacher believes in the ultimate moral unity of mankind. The significance of that unity is nowhere stated with such beauty and brevity as in Pascal's saying that : ' The whole succession of men during the ages should be considered as One Man, ever living and always learning.' This conception, moreover, should be the governing thought of education, shaping to fine issues the varied instructions which we call literature, art, science, and crafts. Of course, the philosophic conception of unity is entirely outside the child's reach ; perhaps, indeed, hardly one man or woman in a thousand of the world's population has reached the realms of gold where the vision is possible. Therefore, I should deprecate the formal use, in the case of children under 14, of such terms as ' Unity ', ' Brotherhood of Man ', or ' World Fraternity '. For the teacher's heart and mind the conception should be as a guiding pillar of cloud or fire. For the child the process is one of approach, of a gradual learning from concrete and pictorial hints, stories, legends, poems, biographies. These things (to use the tongue of Plato) are the shadows of a great idea, yet to be amply revealed, we may hope, in the education of adolescence and manhood.

Now as this noble educational task can easily be

spoiled by ill-considered enthusiasm, I wish to lay down two postulates both for warning and guidance. One is, that the story of Britain and her Commonwealth shall be the central framework, clear and consistent, and must not be obscured by a confused mass of foreign and cosmopolitan allusions. The other is, that no foreign nationality should be introduced into our story as an abrupt and unexplained name; every foreign nationality must be introduced in human, vivid, and picturesque terms. For example, our old history manuals were stupidly disobedient to this rule when they opened with the sentence—'In the year 55 B. C., Julius Caesar, a great Roman general, invaded Britain.' They were stupid because they left the words 'Rome' and 'Roman' unilluminated. Usually they forgot to say where Rome was; and they forgot to say what sort of people the Romans were outside the life of the army.

My present business is not with British history as such. But I may venture on two general observations. First, that for Britain, as for any other country, the child should receive the story in a few large periods (such as Roman, Early English, Medieval, and so on), unencumbered with year-dates. Secondly, the story should run along the lines of agricultural and village life, town life, church and abbey life, fairs, guilds, trade, sea-faring, exploration, the meeting-habit local or parliamentary, and associations for religious, trade union, and social reform ideals, and art, science, and culture; all this, as already said, to proceed mainly by way of biography, assisted by legend, duly classed as legend. Such, also, will be the broad elements in the presentation of the foreigners who step on to the British stage. For example, we ought never to quit the subject of Julius Caesar, Hadrian, and the Romans before we have, in simple pictures, given ideas of Roman peasant industry, with (say) the tale of Cincinnatus

at his plough ; and the teacher who talked of the Crusades without relating the story of the Prophet Mohammed should be visited with stinging rebuke from Clio, the Muse of History—for such a teacher is an impostor and an idler.

The foreign contacts encountered in the course of British social evolution are—Greek, Roman, Jewish, Arabian, Scandinavian, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Flemish, and Dutch, American (the Red Race), African (beginning, say, with West Africa), aboriginal Australia, aboriginal New Zealand, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese ; and so, at last, we reach the almost universal contact, in 1920, of the League of Nations. It is obvious, at the merest glance, that the British teacher needs to be more concerned with the child's approach to Internationalism than any other teacher on earth.

I have just affirmed that, to children learning history, ' every foreign nationality must be introduced in human, vivid, and picturesque terms.' And in order to put this affirmation to an immediate test, I will ask you to assume the mental attitude of children below the age of 14 (and whosoever cannot do that can never be an educator), and to assume that, with the aid of a map, you have formed your first conception of early Britain, its climate, forests, hills, rivers, marshes, animals, Keltic inhabitants and their mode of life. That is the beginning of what I have called the central framework, or native story. I will now ask you to suppose that, as children, you are reading or listening to this account of the approach of a foreign nationality :

A group of men wearing metal jackets of reddish bronze and helmets that had plumes of horsehair, stood on the stone rampart of a city. They looked anxiously towards a high mound of earth which besiegers had cast up, and on the top of which appeared a crowd of the enemy—men with pointed hats, tunics hardened with

plates of iron, wicker shields, and spears, bows, and arrows.

The leader of the men on the wall shouted :

' We ask your general to give us twenty-four hours to think over the question, whether we shall fight on or surrender.'

Presently the reply came :

' Our general grants your wish. Till this time to-morrow we shall make no attack.'

In the evening the citizens held a meeting and thus decided :

' Sooner than become slaves we will leave the city that we love. We will follow our seafaring fathers to the west and find new homes in Italy, or beyond. Collect the treasures ! Prepare the ships ! '

The ships had sails, but each ship was also speeded by fifty oarsmen. During the night people hurried to and fro. Women carried children. From the stone-walled houses were borne cooking-pots, hand-mills for grinding corn, vases, and tools ; and from the temples of the gods were brought gold or silver or bronze images of gods, goddesses, bulls, wheels, and other sacred objects. In the grey dawn the city was deserted. Thousands of citizens were crowded into the long ships that lay in the bay.

They gazed at the Ionian shore. Their Greek hearts were sad, but brave. One of the captains dropped a lump of iron into the sea, crying as he did so :

' We will never return till this iron floats.'

The besiegers entered the empty city, and, arriving at the harbour, they saw the Ionian fleet sailing fast towards the blue horizon.

This flight of the Ionians took place in the sixth century before Christ. For many years their seaports had been busy with the coming and going of ships that traded across the Mediterranean Sea, and even into the Black Sea. Look at the map and notice the narrow water-passage that leads into the Black Sea, and is guarded by the city of Troy. At least, it was once guarded by Troy, and the Troy folk, or Trojans, were jealous of strangers who sought to pass the narrow way. And Greeks and Trojans fought a ten-years' war, and Troy was burned, and Greek ships could then sail into the

Black Sea without hindrance. Note also, on the map, the land of Lydia, which was neighbour to Ionia. Here ran a river, in the sands of which were found grains of gold. About 700 B.C., the Greeks of Lydia made the first coins, of mixed gold and silver, with designs; and such coins, bearing the patterns of heads, horses, and birds, were used by Greek traders in their voyages far and near.

The pilgrim people in the fifty-oared ships found their way, some to Italy, some to the city Massilia, near the place where the river Rhone spreads among flat sands, and rolls into the sea. The city had been founded by Ionian explorers about fifty years before. Trading vessels splashed in and out of its lively harbour. Shops were stored with tin, bronze, copper, iron, ivory, pots, earthenware lamps, beads, and garments; and perhaps you could buy papyrus to write upon. On a hill-top overlooking the city rose two Greek temples, one to the Lord of Sunlight, Health, and Music, named Apollo; and the other to the Lady of Moonlight, Motherhood, Fertile Earth, refreshing Streams, and the Hunter's game (deer, wild boars, &c.), and her name was Artemis. To-day, we know this famous city of Massilia as the French sea-port of Marseilles, and on the hill-top stands a Catholic church, on the roof of which rises a figure of the guardian Lady, Mary.

Here I cut short the story told as to children. But if, in later references, I speak of narrative-methods suitable for the juvenile ear or eye, I trust the recital just given may serve as example. This recital has been drawn, with adaptations, from the pages of Herodotus. The besieged city was Phocaea, a Greek city on the west coast of Asia Minor, not far from Smyrna. In a very simple manner our story has hinted at Greek social life, economics, and religion. And when we have brought these Greek ships to Massilia, we have established a link with Britain; for, from this port of Massilia, in the year 330 B. C., and in the lifetime of Alexander the Great, a Greek seaman named Pytheas sailed to the northern waters, and both saw and

landed in Britain. The description he left of the southern part of this island, short but not unimportant, need not here concern us. My present point is to indicate how, at a quite early stage in our Child's History of Britain, we have introduced what we may call the Greek idea. If we have done so with adequate dramatic liveliness, we have grafted into the young consciousness a memory that will last till, at a later stage (such as the days of Sir Thomas More, and Shakespeare and the great painters), the Greek idea glides again into the art of Europe.

Naturally the next international episode will confront us with the Romans. I will again assume that what I have called the British framework is assured; and for this purpose Mr. Norman Ault's *Life in Ancient Britain*, with a little help from Frazer's *Golden Bough*, will give us most of what we want for a portrayal of Keltic society, agriculture, industry, trade, and religion. That being done the teacher should pause, turn southwards to the Mediterranean, and, so to say, prepare the way for the entry of the Romans into Britain. A few elementary notions should be conveyed of Roman law and citizenship, the social basis in slavery, and the Roman constructive genius, whether expressed in road-making and aqueducts, or in the establishment of republican and imperial order in the Mediterranean region and in lands facing the Atlantic. With rough maps and plenty of pictures, and the indispensable magic of story-telling, we might sketch the life of Julius Caesar. We might even so arrange the stage as to make room for glimpses of Italy, Spain, Gaul, the Germans, and their North Sea neighbours; and thus, in faint outline, we shadow forth that Western region which, in later ages, would form what Auguste Comte called the 'Grand Western Republic', and which is to-day the heart of civilization, and also the seat of the world's warmest passions. We shall do the child a great service,

however crudely we set this scenery. In a concrete and perfectly simple manner we shall have initiated the habit of looking over the frontier, and scouting for signs of a kindred humanity to our own among people who differ from ourselves in language, modes of life, and perhaps faith. I emphasize the word 'faith'. The time is coming when the history-teacher will, with quietness and confidence, reveal to youth the religions of mankind, not as faiths in the sense of doctrines, but as expressions of social ideals, visible in the biographies of prophets and saints. When the Greek and the Roman appear in contact with our British social order they will bring some sort of picturesque suggestions of their worship, and their view of divine personalities in nature and the spirit of man. To-day it is a most lamentable defect in our popular education that millions of children have no joyous and sympathetic understanding of the poetic legends of the classical peoples. And at this point (I am thinking of the later centuries of the Roman Empire and the opening of the Middle, or Catholic-Feudal-Age) we meet the Bible as an agent in the European evolution. Now I consider it as almost an insult to the heart and intelligence of a child to impose on him such a dull statement as that 'Christianity was introduced into Britain' at such and such a date. It is in such terms that we record the introduction of sugar, tobacco, and potatoes. We should rather picture the merchants of the Hebrew 'Dispersion' in the Roman Empire, and the eager Christian propagandists of Anatolia, or Alexandria, or Rome, carrying the message of their parables, histories, gospels, and songs. I would add, as opportunity permitted, such biographies as those of St. Benedict and St. Patrick. Both the biographies are quite within the scope of young listeners or readers—the story of Benedict, his prayers and his gardening, and the vast and varied arts and crafts in bridge-building,

abbeys, illuminated missals, and the rest, in which the Benedictine Order uttered its heart and intellect; and the story of the slave-boy Patrick, with all the romantic developments that followed after Patrick's labours in Ireland. In passing, I would observe that the English or Welsh or Scottish child would be put into far nobler touch with Irish history by beginning with the story of St. Patrick than by beginning (as has been customary) with an armed expedition of the Earl of Pembroke in the days of King John. And so, instead of using such half-vulgar phrases as 'the introduction of Christianity' into Britain, we should portray the men and women who brought into our island-life and manners the influences of Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, Monte Cassino, and the rest, and enriched our grey latitude with the dreams and inspirations of a sunnier clime. So again (to anticipate things far ahead historically) when the East presses upon us in the Crusades, or in the revelation of India to the seventeenth and later centuries, we shall take the tenderest care to let young people behold Arabia, India, and the rest in the figures of teachers, poets, and social leaders. India, especially, possesses so rich and ample a store of lovely legend and ethical evangel that it is a grief to think how little of it is known to the schools, and even churches, of this island to-day. I will not dwell in more detail on the aspect of the faiths that have affected British psychology or the British policy. But one may make the modest claim that children who have, at preliminary stages of history-teaching, been placed in happy and genial relation with the religious systems of the world, will have had a measure of valuable training for the after-problems of modern thought and controversy.

When we arrive at the settlement of the English in this island, from the fifth century onwards, we have first to make clear that the new people would lay the foundation of

a laborious age of agriculture and village service, and that they would, by accepting the teaching of the Catholic missionaries, again link up this country with Roman civilization. When that is done we may use the map, and pictures, and all the other aids we can invent, to describe the coming of the Northmen or Scandinavians. Our earlier tales have told how Greeks sailed from Anatolia towards Ultima Thule; and now we see the Vikings reverse the movement, and, by invasion, trade, and sometimes colonization, affect the social life of Scotland, Ireland, England, France, Flanders, Sicily, Southern Italy, and even Greece and Eastern Europe. A lively help in this phase of the history-teaching will be rendered by the legend of the Jutish hero, Beowulf, and his fights with dragons and the like, and his burial in a mound on a tall cliff overlooking the sea and its ships. By means of 'Beowulf', and stories of the heroes of Asgard, we portray the communities who influenced our rural manners and traditions, gave us the names of our Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, and, above all, initiated (or adopted by reaction, as in the case of Alfred the Great) that seafaring habit which so largely moulded the destiny of the English, and consequently of the world. These movements lead us naturally on to the Normans, and the French from the eleventh to (say) the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. Now the old history-books showed us the English and the French peoples, during this period, as continually engaged in a sort of battle of giants, the tragedy being occasionally relieved by a picturesque anecdote, such as that of King Edward the Third at the windmill watching the exploits of the Black Prince at Crécy, or the burning of Joan of Arc. Certainly we cannot hide these wars; but there is a quite rational way of putting them in their just relation; and I incline to regard the case as a crucial test of the educator's power

to respect both the national spirit and the international spirit. We can picture the English and the French as two peoples, growing side by side from village serfdom, through the Crusades (in which they both suffered), through a Catholic experience which gave cathedrals and monasteries to both, through a like growth of city-communes and craft-guilds, and merchant guilds, and a gold and silver currency, towards the relatively liberal times in which Henry of Navarre and Richelieu and Molière gave splendour to France, and Elizabeth and Shakespeare and Cromwell to England. And in this same period we may draw aside curtains from innumerable little French peep-shows, and show, in bright action, the legends of the Holy Grail, or Huon of Bordeaux, or Pierre and Maguelone, or Reynard the Fox, or the poor jumping clown[1] who was too unlearned to sing proper psalms, but tried to please God and the lady Mary by antics and somersaults. And then having, so to speak, displayed the social soul of England and the social soul of France (though such expressions are for our tongues alone, and not for children) we hang up the map once more, and trace that unhappy border-land of Normandy and Anjou across which confused bands of armed men hurried and fought through long years in the effort to disentangle the two communities, and leave each free to develop its tremendous modern progress from the medieval order. The war chronicle will be duly recited—the bows and arrows of Agincourt, and Joan in armour at the siege of Orleans, and all the rest—but it will almost create its own regrets, for the teacher will have already won sympathy for the brave and very human French. We shall wish that the people who built Westminster Abbey, and whose pilgrimages are mirrored in Chaucer's poetry, could have avoided the long blood-feud with the people who built Notre Dame, and whose Saint

[1] See *Our Ladys Tumbler*. J. M. Dent & Sons.

Louis sat under the oak tree, and, as a father to the French commonwealth, judged justly the causes of the humble who pleaded before him. This method can be carried through the centuries until the tragic days of the Somme and Ypres tell their tale of tears and pride. I can only snatch a moment to refer to one example in what one may call the twin cases of the English Captain Cook and the French Labourdonnais. As governor of the islands of Bourbon and Mauritius Labourdonnais had improved the finances, softened the lot of the slaves, and immensely developed agriculture. In 1748 he arrived at Falmouth just as war broke out between England and France, and was taken prisoner; .but he was presented at the English court, and released on parole because of his eminent services to civilization. Some years later, when our Captain Cook set out on a voyage in the interests of science and humanity, the French minister Turgot gave orders that no French man-of-war should stay Cook's progress on the high seas. Certainly we must necessarily open to youth the book of the wars of Louis XIV and Napoleon, with their economic meanings; but such stories as I have just cited may shine as eternal stars through the passing glooms.

I trust that, in a quite benign and genial sense, we may regard Ireland in an international aspect. It cannot be said that British educators have made heroic attempts to present to British youth the nobler phases of Irish life and manners; and the establishment of the Irish Free State in no wise lessens the ethical need for such a presentation. I have already hinted that children should hear the story of St. Patrick; and I would add the story of St. Columba, and how he ground corn in the monastery of Donegal, and how he sailed with companions to the little island of Iona, and how he laboured as a teacher among the people of the Scottish West, and how he died,

blessing and blest—even the old horse that bore the convent's burdens (so says legend) lamenting his. departure with tears. From collections made by Lady Gregory, Miss Eleanor Hull, and others, we may cull tales of Irish saints, and chieftains, and honest peasants, and, even out of legendary material, construct pictures that tell of tribes, tribal pastures and cattle, tribal Druids and poets, and tribal customs, and so, even to children, hint at a civilization which took far different shape from that of Romanized, Anglicized, and Normanized England. I presume to say it would not be too fanciful an experiment if (with Lady Gregory's help) we told the legend of the girl and her three brothers who were bewitched for nine hundred years, and were singing swans all that time, and sorrowful and bitter was their long life, but lovely their song; 'for there never was any music, nor any delight heard in Ireland, to compare with the music of the swans.' And, perchance, this may pass as a parable, innocent even for hard-shell politicians in Ulster, or the Free State, or Great Britain, of the griefs of 'The Isle of Saints' and Shamrock.

I assume, once again, that we are clearly outlining our native British record from the Catholic-Feudal times onward—the decline of serfdom, the expansion of trade and the money-system, the rise and progress of Parliament, the coming of new great poets and men of science, the spread of machinery, and the marvellous oversea quest for wealth and for colonies; and such a record brings us close to the present age. At what point might we logically use pictures and stories for special illustration of Germany? In effect, the ancient history-books introduced Germany and Martin Luther together, so that the young learner's first impression of Germans was that of a people who defied Popes and nailed theses to doors, or flung inkpots at disagreeable persons in the romantic

castle of Wartburg. Now all the world knows Germany to-day as a wonderful organization, for blessing or otherwise, of industry and thought. Therefore, while we duly place Martin Luther on the sixteenth-century stage, I would rather throw more energy into picturing German village life, arts, crafts, guilds, and the voyages of the ships of the Hanseatic League, together with the story of Gutenberg's printing-press, and glimpses of German art, as in the beautiful drawings of Albrecht Dürer, or scenes of city architecture. Anybody who turns the pages of such a work as Janssen's *History of the German People after The Middle Ages* will see an immense treasury of material, much of which appeals to young minds. Of course, we should carry our German panorama into later times, and tell of Frederick the Great, and Goethe, and Humboldt's travels amid the forests and mountains of South America. And those who wish for legends cannot ask for a richer store—the tales of the hidden gold of the Nibelungs, fairies of the Black Forest, a noble line of Catholic saints (such as Bruno the monk, gardener, and missionary, who died in a humble mud-cabin in Calabria), or the famous volumes of Grimm. If, perchance, some critical minds may judge that I allot too ample a space to legends, I would plead that poetry (legends being a form of poetry) is essential to all history, and also that, if judiciously selected, such stories even reveal instructive facts of geography, economics, and social manners.

From the age of Shakespeare, who remoulded Italian stories, of Bruno (afterwards martyr), who visited Oxford University, and Milton, who went on pilgrimage to see the aged Galileo and his telescope, down to the days of Browning, and George Eliot, and the crowds that cheered Garibaldi in London streets, the British contacts with Italy have been many and happy. In our little tour

through British history we have already met the Romans and Benedict. When we reach the early part of the thirteenth century, and watch seven Italians, clad in humble grey, step from a ship at Dover, and ask for shelter at a near-by castle, we might use these Franciscans as an occasion for relating pages from *The Little Flowers of St. Francis of Assisi*, and thence easily pass to the Italian peasantry and craftsmen and seamen (Columbus, for example) and land-travellers such as Marco Polo, who visited China. I know no valid reason why our children, no matter what type of faith reared in, should not hear fragments of the great poem of Dante, and peep into the glen where he met the lion, and also met Virgil, and see people toiling up the steep path of Purgatory, and look at the eagle, all made of sparkling stars, whose voice rang through heaven and proclaimed the glory of justice. We cannot recite tales from Shakespeare without rich contact with Italy. In our earliest history-talks we have told of the seafaring Ionians whose fifty-oared ships sailed to Italy, and who often thought of Sardinia as a Realm of Gold. When we and the children have reached the nineteenth century with its Trafalgar, Waterloo, and Sedan, we may again turn to Sardinia, which became the starting-point of United Italy; and here our young listeners may rightly be interested in the careers of Mazzini and Garibaldi. And (if I may step down from the sublime to the ridiculous) I fancy we shall not insult the Muse of History if we trace to Naples the pedigree of our lively friends Punch and Judy.

Taking a swift glance at Holland I note not only admirable examples, comprehensible by children, of industry in ships, dikes, agriculture, commerce, and the colonizing courage, but splendid figures such as William the Silent, champion of both temporal and spiritual freedom, and Grotius, prophet of international order and

ethics. So much, at least, should be displayed to children over whose British commonwealth a Dutch king once reigned, not without honour.

Last but one of European lands, I speak of Spain, with thoughts of its shepherds, vine-growers, muleteers, and miners, and of such personalities as St. Teresa, Cervantes, and Las Casas, the benevolent 'Apostle of the Indians' of the west. The openings for this approach are many; one, for instance, is the period of the Peninsular War. It is a keen reproach to our history-books that they have scarcely revealed Spain to the young (or to their elders) except as the creator of the Spanish Armada. And lastly, in Europe, we name our comrades of the ocean, the Portuguese, concerning whom I will only venture on the one remark that their valiant and picturesque epic of the *Lusiads* (the story of Vasco da Gama's voyage to India) ought to be familiar, in outline, to our youth. I regret that I am obliged to leave other European contacts unnoticed.

I am far from supposing that the most zealous teacher would try to drag the child through the extensive complex of international topics which I have so rashly sketched. It is rather the spirit of the approach that I wish to emphasize than the precise lines. Yet it must be said—for British children, at any rate—that we have so far attained, in the preceding outline, only the lesser degrees of our task, in a geographical sense. From the age of Cromwell onwards we not only have to show forth an industrious nation, developing manufactures, and developing democracy and education; we have to picture it as the greatest of inter-racial pioneers, establishing relations, often for evil and yet, on the whole, more for the final good of civilization, with the red tribes of America, the black multitudes of Africa, the wandering natives of Australia, the warrior Maoris of New Zealand, and the

peoples, many in varieties of physique and psychology, of Japan, China, Burma, India, and other regions of Asia. It is useless to sigh over the lost opportunities of past teachers of history, and to lament that, for example, they occupied time with the Black Hole of Calcutta that might have been better devoted to a portrayal of Indian village life, and Indian arts and crafts. Instead of sighing I would sooner render thanks to one man and one woman. The woman is Miss Margaret Noble, a London infants' school teacher who went to teach girls in a back lane of Calcutta, and who, in her book *The Web of Indian Life*, acted as prophetess of the Hindu soul, and disclosed its profound charms of devotion and imagination to us of the West, and who has narrated for children the *Cradle-tales of Hinduism*. The man is Romesh Chunder Dutt, once Prime Minister of Baroda, who, in easy English verse, has recited the chief episodes of the wonderful old epics, the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*. I hardly dare guess that, if we gathered any chance thousand of British teachers, even one could rise up and repeat an elementary outline of the legend of Prince Rama and his wife Sita, and their adventures in a long exile of fourteen years, closing with the extraordinary scenes of battles of men, demons, monkeys, and bears in the island of Ceylon. Yet this most fascinating story is beloved, even as a gospel, by many millions of our British Commonwealth fellow citizens in India, and our children ought to know it at least as effectively as they know (or their history-manuals know) the events of the Indian Mutiny. In brief, I would affirm that it is now one of the most pressing and solemn duties of the teacher to open up a knowledge, preparatory yet vivid, of the far-stretching Indian civilization. India is destined to form one of the largest links in the final chain of human unity, and to neglect India would be as foolish as to neglect France in a survey of the evolution of Europe.

And China and Japan also claim attention as we unfold the story of British trade and expansion in the nineteenth century. Each has its wonderful record of village industry and arts and crafts; and each has a charming treasury of folk-lore. For Japan the late Lafcadio Hearn's collections of legends and fairy-tales will amply meet the curiosity of our young listeners.

Inter-racial facts and aspects confront us in Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. In a few cursory phrases one may indicate the chief of these—the culture and folk-lore of the red tribes of Canada; the culture and folk-lore of the swarming coloured populations of South Africa—not, of course, forgetting a fraternal thought for the Dutch life and manners; the deeply interesting tribal customs and totemism of the Australian black-fellows; and the social system of the Maoris. In the case of the Maoris we may gratefully recall the historical service rendered by Sir George Grey in gathering native creation stories and other legends in his work on *Polynesian Mythology*. As I close this almost colossal catalogue of hints it would seem advisable, not only to repeat the caution that no teacher could be expected to cover all these topics, but to say also that much of this international survey, begun in rudimentary modes in lessons for the ages up to fourteen, will be more effectively developed in years of adolescence.

But even now all is not said; and our farewell thought must surely be devoted to the duty of familiarizing youth with the ideal of the League of Nations, as it appeals to-day, and will appeal on a larger scale to-morrow. As I have on more than two hundred occasions addressed young people aged twelve to fifteen or so on this theme up and down the country, I may perhaps venture to say that the subject can be made interesting to youth, both as regards the machinery of the League and the Inter-

national Labour Office, and its moral purpose. But the conditions of success are insistent, and almost rigid. Doubtless it is proper to display the machinery of the League (Assembly, Council, Permanent Court of International Justice, and the rest); but the main accent must be placed on the concrete aspects of human unity, by means of stories of goodwill and service performed by members of a variety of races, colours, creeds, and nationalities. I would, for example, sooner recite the story of the heroic Chinaman who sacrificed his life in the effort to put an end to the custom of head-hunting among the natives of Formosa than dwell on the loans to Austria and Hungary arranged by the mediation of the League. The enthusiasm of Humanity first; the administrative details second.

I suppose the vast majority of educators are now persuaded that the world's youth, from the earlier stages right through the years of adolescence, should combine the ideal of service of Family and Country with the ideal of the broadest international co-operation. But ideals are scarcely born before they need, like the infant Moses, to be rescued from a tyrant; and that tyrant, in the present case, is dullness in teaching. I am convinced that, scattered through historical and biographical literature, the materials exist (but, I admit, requiring patient research and selection) which can make social life and institutions, and the progress of material welfare, arts, sciences, and ideals as fascinating and quickening as the anecdotes of war in the manuals of the past; and no annals will yield more attractive values than those of Britain and her Commonwealth. We of to-day may prepare the path for the teachers of to-morrow, who will make all history dramatic and inspiring. To them youth will listen as, in Milton's epic, Adam listened to the story of the world told by the angelic Raphael:

The Angel ended, and in Adam's ear
So charming left his voice, that he a while
Thought him still speaking, still stood fixed to hear;
Then, as new-waked, thus gratefully replied:
'What thanks sufficient, or what recompense
Equal, have I to render thee, divine
Historian, who thus largely hast allayed
The thirst I had of knowledge, and vouchsafed
This friendly condescension, to relate
Things else by me unsearchable, now heard
With wonder, but delight?'

(*Paradise Lost*, Bk. viii.)

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

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